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PREFACE 
This dissertation consists of five chapters, which explore complexities of social capital in 
boards of directors. The first chapter explains theoretical background, overarching research 
question, and the selected methodological approaches. The following three chapters empirically 
investigate different aspects of social capital in boards of directors. Although each of the 
empirical chapters addresses a specific research question, the chapters combined contribute to 
answering the overarching research questions stated in this dissertation. The first two empirical 
studies are single-authored (Chapter 2 and 3). The last empirical study is co-authored (Chapter 
4). In light of the overarching research question, the final chapter summarizes and concludes the 
findings, discusses limitations, and directs avenues for future research. The empirical studies are 
listed below:  
• Sulinska, I. “Board social capital and firm performance: nuances of the relationship.”
• Sulinska, I. “Social capital of board chair and its performance implications.”
• Sulinska, I. & Butler, B. “Dynamics of board social capital – multiple case studies from
China.”
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ABSTRACT 
The aim of the dissertation is to disentangle complexities of social capital in boards of 
directors through proposing new theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches. 
Although extant previous research has discussed various aspects of social capital and its 
association with numerous organizational outcomes, still the literature demonstrates evident 
shortcomings resulting from overlooking and oversimplifying its complexities. Therefore, to fill 
gaps in the literature, the dissertation addresses the following research question: in the context of 
boards of directors, how can social capital be better understood through exploration of its 
complexities?    
The dissertation comprises three empirical studies that individually address the identified 
gaps in the literature and combined address the aforementioned research question. In this way, 
the dissertation demonstrates that social capital in boards of directors is more complex than it 
has been assumed in previous studies and its understanding requires a novel approach to 
conceptualization and empirical research. The first chapter explains the topic and motivation for 
the dissertation. The following chapter (Chapter 2) synthetizes the previous approaches to 
investigating board social capital and proposes a new theoretical and methodological approach. 
It particularly asserts that research on board social capital may be advanced through utilizing 
configurational perspective and method, what is then shown on an example of the relationship 
between board social capital and firm performance. Chapter 3 explores social capital of board 
chair, which has been overlooked in previous studies. It suggests that individual social capital of 
board chair is as important for organizational performance as social capital of CEO and 
directors. Therefore, performance effect derives from combined social capital of board chair, 
CEO, and directors. Further, the dissertation discusses dynamics of board social capital (Chapter 
4) in the context of firm expansion. It emphasizes that evolution process of board social capital 
is driven by multidimensional changes occurring within internal and external networks of social 
relationships created by board members. Evolution paths are consequently proposed for 
diversity and strength of external network ties, and for internal network cohesion. In light of the 
overarching research question, the final chapter summarizes the findings.   
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SAMMENFATTNING 
Formålet med afhandlingen er at udrede kompleksiteter af social kapital i bestyrelser ved 
at foreslå nye teoretiske perspektiver og metoder. Selvom eksisterende forskning har diskuteret 
forskellige aspekter af social kapital og dets association med talrige organisatoriske udfald, så 
viser litteraturen stadig tydelige mangler, hvilket er et resultat af, at kompleksiteterne af social 
kapital overses og overforsimples. For at udfylde manglerne i litteraturen adresserer 
afhandlingen derfor følgende forskningsspørgsmål: Hvordan kan social kapital i en 
bestyrelseskontekst blive bedre forstået i forbindelse med bestyrelsen gennem udforskning af 
dens kompleksiteter? 
Afhandling består af tre empiriske studier, der individuelt adresserer de identificerede 
mangler i litteraturen og i kombination adresserer det førnævnte forskningsspørgsmål. Hermed 
viser afhandlingen at social kapital i bestyrelser er mere kompleks end antaget i tidligere studier, 
og at forståelsen af social kapital i bestyrelser kræver en ny tilgang til konceptualisering og 
empirisk forskning. Det første kapitel beskriver emnet samt motivationen for afhandlingen. Det 
følgende kapitel (Kapitel 2) syntetiserer de tidligere tilgange til undersøgelser af social kapital i 
bestyrelser og foreslår en ny teoretisk og metodologisk tilgang. Særligt påstår det, at forskning 
om social kapital i bestyrelser kan fremmes ved brugen af konfiguratorisk perspektiv og metode, 
hvilket efterfølgende vises ved et eksempel af forholdet mellem social kapital i bestyrelsen og 
firmaets præstation. Kapitel 3 udforsker bestyrelsesformandens grænse-spændende rolle, som er 
blevet overset i tidligere studier. Det indikerer at bestyrelsesformandens sociale kapital er lige så 
vigtig for organisatorisk præstation som den administrerende direktørs og 
bestyrelsesmedlemmers sociale kapital. En effekt på virksomhedens præstation skyldes derfor 
bestyrelsesformandens, den administrerende direktørs og bestyrelsesmedlemmernes samlede 
sociale kapital. Ydermere diskuterer afhandlingen dynamikker i bestyrelsens sociale kapital 
(Kapitel 4) i forbindelse med virksomhedsekspansion. Den understreger at udviklingsprocessen 
af bestyrelsens sociale kapital er drevet af multidimensionelle ændringer i interne og eksterne 
netværk af sociale relationer skabt af bestyrelsesmedlemmer. Som følge deraf foreslås 
udviklingsveje, der kan styrke og skabe diversitet i eksterne netværksbånd samt skabe 
sammenhæng i interne netværk. I lyset af det overordnede forskningsspørgsmål sammenfattes 
resultaterne i det sidste kapitel. 
10 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The question of how social ties of board members affect organizations has been 
extensively researched in corporate governance and management literature (Hillman, Withers, 
Collins, 2009; Zona, Gomez-Mejia, Withers, 2015). Knowing that social ties are linked to 
resource provision, scholars associate sociological aspects of connections with economic 
benefits (Bourdieu, 1986; Granovetter, 1973). For instance, social ties provide access to 
information, rare resources, legitimacy, and reputation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The literature 
consequently describes the phenomenon of resources embedded in networks of social ties as a 
form of capital, namely social capital that is conceptualized as the accumulated resources 
deriving from social connections of individuals or groups (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). In the 
context of boards of directors, social capital demonstrates the ability of board members to 
provide resources for an organization (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Importance of social capital is 
acknowledged in the literature, as the phenomenon has been linked to numerous organizational 
outcomes, such as board dynamics and director selection (Withers, Hillman, Cannella, 2012), 
formation of dominant groups within boards (Stevenson & Radin, 2009, 2014), CEO turnover 
and excessive returns (Cao, Maruping, Takeuchi, 2006; Sauerwald, Lin, Peng, 2014). Moreover, 
previous studies revealed that social capital is positively associated with firm competitiveness 
(Wu, 2008), high growth of new ventures (Florin, Lubatkin, Schulze, 2003), and firm 
performance (Barroso-Castro, del Mar Villegas-Periñan, Casillas-Bueno, 2016; Zona, Gomez-
Mejia, Withers, 2015).     
Despite the extant research demonstrating its importance, social capital is a multifaceted 
umbrella concept (Hirsch & Levin, 1999) without one strict definition. For this reason it is often 
perceived as an elastic term (Lappe & Du Bois, 1997), which constitutes a challenge for 
theoretical developments and empirical research. A generally accepted definition proposed by 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998:243) states that social capital is “the sum of actual and potential 
resources embedded within, available through and derived from the network of relationships 
possessed by an individual or social unit”. The definition already suggests several sources of 
complexity of the construct. First, the complexity derives from a varying unit of analysis, for 
social capital may be a feature of an individual or a group. Hence, also in the context of boards 
of directors, one may investigate group-level or individual-level social capital. Previous research 
tends to polarize these two levels by focusing specifically on individuals, such as CEOs and 
directors, or on boards analyzed as groups (Daily & Johnson, 1997; Zona, Gomez-Mejia, 
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Withers, 2015). Though interdependency between social capital of CEO and the board has been 
recognized, for example through investigating dimension of CEO power together with effects of 
board social capital (Haynes & Hillman, 2010), still research in this area remains fragmented.  
Second, the construct encompasses the sum of actual and potential resources deriving 
from social ties. However, the ties may be established to actors within or outside the 
organization, and thus may have different organizational implications. The literature indeed 
differentiates between internal and external social capital to highlight these differences (Kim & 
Cannella, 2008). Internal social capital derives from network ties formed within the organization 
to, for example, CEO, assistant general manager, board chairman or directors. Previous studies 
have demonstrated that internal social ties bond board members through building trust, 
understanding, and common norms (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Coleman, 1988). Moreover, owing to 
its bonding nature, internal social capital has a positive effect on group dynamics (Oh, Chung, 
Labianca, 2004; Oh, Labianca, Chung, 2006), increases propensity to collaborate, and improves 
board effectiveness (Harris & Helfat, 2007; Forbes & Milliken, 1999). External social capital 
originates in social ties to actors outside the organization, for example, governments, academic 
institutions and research centers, charities and business associations, and also other firms 
operating in the firm’s environment. Establishment of external ties allows board members to 
span organizational boundaries (Aldrich & Herker, 1977) and acquire resources outside the firm. 
Through bridging the boundaries between the firm and its environment board members act as 
boundary spanners, whose external ties serve as conduits for resource flow (Mizruchi, 1996; 
Tushman & Scanlan, 1981). The resources transmitted through external social ties may take a 
form of, for example, knowledge and expertise, legitimacy, etc. (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In 
the literature the bridging nature of external social capital has been acknowledged for positive 
impact on numerous organizational outcomes, such as firm performance (Barroso-Castro, del 
Mar Villegas-Periñan, Casillas-Bueno, 2016; Mizruchi, 1996; Zona, Gomez-Mejia, Withers, 
2015), competitiveness (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Wu, 2008), and organizational learning (Li 
et al., 2014). 
Lastly, social capital can be perceived as an asset, which derives from internal and 
external social ties of board members. However, over the course of their careers board members 
may establish, re-establish, and dissolve their social ties. Moreover, over time some board 
members may leave the board, but also new board members may be appointed. Any changes to 
board composition will have an impact on board social capital. Board members may join or 
leave the board and, as a result, their social ties will enrich or reduce board social capital. 
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Therefore, it is worth noticing that social ties and social capital have also a dynamic dimension. 
Depending on the purpose of the analysis scholars may investigate social capital at a given point 
in time or explore its dynamics. The impact social capital exerts on organizations typically has 
been explored in a static perspective, which overshadowed its dynamic aspects (Adler & Kwon, 
2002). Although previous studies largely contributed to the existing knowledge on social capital, 
understanding of the construct is still to some extent limited. This issue calls for further studies, 
because as Maurer and Ebers (2006) have observed “… to date we know very little about how 
organizations’ social capital develops over time, about the factors and processes enabling and 
constraining its development, and about possible related performance implications” (Maurer & 
Ebers, 2006, p. 262).              
The literature acknowledges that social capital is a multifaceted construct, which 
influences organizations in multiple ways. However, the construct is often oversimplified in 
empirical research, because the aforementioned complexities make the association between 
social capital and organizational outcomes challenging to unravel. This oversimplification pulls 
the research away from the quintessence of social capital and produces misleading results. 
Moreover, it overlooks the richness of the construct and underestimates its role in organizations. 
A careful consideration of how to unravel the construct’s complexities and integrate into 
research would contribute to better understanding of social capital and its impact on 
organizational outcomes. Furthermore, complexity of any construct ought to motivate to search 
for alternative theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches, in order to advance the 
existing findings and show the way forward for future research. For this reason, this dissertation 
aims to provide novel insights into social capital, specifically in the context of boards of 
directors, through exploring and capitalizing on its complexities. The dissertation addresses the 
following overarching research question:    
 
In the context of boards of directors, how can social capital be better understood through 
exploration of its complexities?    
 
Social ties and social capital in the context of boards of directors   
The literature traditionally assigns the following roles to boards of directors: monitoring, 
resource provision, and strategy role (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The 
monitoring role, anchored in the agency theory, encompasses a set of responsibilities related to 
management monitoring and control (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This 
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role aims to address potential conflicts of interests resulting from separation of ownership and 
control in organizations, also known as the agency problem. The resource provision role, 
explored by the resource dependence theory, concentrates on the resources transferred through 
social ties established by board members to actors in the firm’s external environment (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). The potential resources may take a form of access to rare resources, 
information, network of connections, legitimacy, and reputation or even in a boarder perspective 
“anything that could be thought of as a strength or weakness of a given firm” (Wernerfelt, 
1984:172). Through holding multiple board posts, memberships in professional associations, 
educational institutions, or in government, board members have the ability to build widespread 
networks of highly important social ties. Their individual networks mirror the accumulated 
professional experience and informal personal connections (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009), 
which are essential for performance of the strategy role. The strategy role involves board 
members in strategy formulation and implementation (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Board of directors 
can be therefore perceived as a decision-making group responsible for setting and controlling 
firm’s strategic direction (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). The accumulated skills and knowledge of 
board members indeed contribute to performance of the strategy role. Nevertheless, the 
established social ties allow board members to use their peers in other firms or institutions as an 
advice network and, as a result, provide alternative perspectives on firm’s strategy (Geletkanycz 
& Boyd, 2011; McDonald, Khanna, Westphal, 2008; McDonald & Westphal, 2010).          
Already in early studies on boards of directors, scholars have noticed the importance of 
social ties for organizational outcomes and concluded that “organizations survive to the extent 
that they are effective. Their effectiveness derives from the management of demands, 
particularly the demands of interest groups upon which the organizations depend for resources 
and support” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978:2). Furthermore, it was emphasized that “board size and 
composition are not random or independent factors, but are, rather, rational organizational 
responses to the conditions of the external environment” (Pfeffer, 1972: 226). The early research 
has stressed that organizations are not self-contained units and do not function in a vacuum, but 
rather are embedded in a complex system of relationships with actors in their external 
environment. In order to advance the early findings, scholars were further trying to understand 
antecedents and consequence of social ties formed by board members. It resulted in emergence 
of new theoretical concepts, such as board interlocks and corporate elites (Davis, Yoo, Baker, 
2003; Mizruchi, 1996; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988), whose positive organizational implications 
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were exemplified, for example, by the association with firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998; 
Davis, 1996; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1994).  
The extant research on the relationship between social ties of board members and 
organizational outcomes has also integrated the findings of sociologist, such as Boissevain 
(1974), Bourdieu (1986, 1993), Granovetter (1973), and Putnam (1995), whose work is highly 
influential and relevant for explaining the process of forming social relationships and its 
consequences for individuals, communities, and nations. The sociological perspective 
conceptualizes the resources deriving from social relationships as a type of capital, namely 
social capital. Initially the concept appeared in the context of communities and stressed the 
importance of strong, reciprocal relationships for building trust, engagement in collective action, 
and for community survival (Jacobs, 1965). Further research on social capital has stretched its 
applicability to a wide range of social phenomena. Nevertheless, it was invariably emphasized 
that networks of social relationships may transmit resources, and thus be associated with 
numerous outcomes. Nahapiet and Goshal (1998) summarized the previous work on social 
capital in an inclusive definition, which states that social capital is “the sum of actual and 
potential resources embedded within, available through and derived from the network of 
relationships possessed by an individual or social unit” (Nahapiet & Goshal; 1998:243).     
According to the above-mentioned definition, social capital may be investigated at an 
individual level or a group level. Therefore, in the context of boards of directors, social capital 
may be a feature of a CEO, individual director as well as a feature of the entire board. Previous 
research exploring group-level social capital in boards, or simply board social capital, often has 
been narrowing down the focus to the effects of particular types of social ties, such as board 
interlocks, which occur when board members hold multiple board posts simultaneously 
(Mizruch, 1996; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988), political connections, and appointments of former 
politicians (Goldman, Rocholl, So, 2009; Hillman, 2005; Lester et al., 2008, Okhmatovskiy, 
2010; Park & Luo, 2001). The literature recognizes the fact that board members may establish 
social ties to diverse actors in the firm’s environment, for example, to financial institutions, 
governmental organizations, charities, lobby groups, etc. However, empirical research in this 
area often delivers conflicting results. For instance, it is particularly pronounced in research on 
board interlocks, which is still producing mixed results, despite considerable effort to 
disentangle the association with firm performance (Hillman, Withers, Collins, 2009; Mizruchi, 
1996; Westphal & Khanna, 2003; Zona, Gomez-Mejia, Withers, 2015). The reason for such 
dissonance in empirical evidences may be hidden in the complexity of board social capital, 
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which encompasses the resources deriving from social ties to actors inside and outside the firm. 
Diversity of external social ties reflects the heterogeneity amongst board members in terms of 
their functional background, occupation, and previous professional experience (Hillman, 
Cannella, Paetzold, 2000; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009). Moreover, through frequent 
interactions at work and also possibly after working hours, board members form internal social 
ties with peers in the organization. The internal ties may enhance propensity to collaborate, 
improve board dynamics and effectiveness as well as ease knowledge sharing amongst board 
members (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Harris & Helfat, 2007). In order to properly reflect social 
ties and disentangle their relationship with organizational outcomes, empirical research ought to 
recognize that social ties of board members, both internal and external, form an integrated 
system of social connections. Therefore, social ties and their organizational effects are not 
isolated, but rather are elements of the system, which also accumulates the resources deriving 
from social ties. Moreover, in the system there is a possible interplay between the resources that 
makes them complementary or substitutable. Although it seems natural to study board social 
capital using a system perspective, since even its definition points out that it is “the sum of 
actual and potential resources (…)” (Nahapiet & Goshal; 1998:243), the literature lacks such 
comprehensive investigations. Moreover, complementarity and substitution, thus the interplay 
between the accumulated resources in the board, contribute to organizational outcomes, such as 
high firm performance. However, the existing research continues to adopt a simplistic approach 
to social capital and limit empirical analysis to the investigation of the effects of particular types 
of social ties.   
Previous research on individual-level social capital has been mainly focusing on social ties 
of CEOs and directors. It has been shown that individual social capital is linked to social 
similarity, status and CEO compensation (Belliveau, O'Reilly, Wade, 1996), director selection 
process (Kim & Cannella, 2008), CEO turnover and organization capabilities (Cao, Maruping, 
Takeuchi, 2006), and opportunity capture in new ventures (Li et al., 2014). Scholars additionally 
have investigated the effects of individual connections to nonbusiness actors, such as 
government (Fan, Wong, Zhang, 2007; Lester et al., 2008; Peng & Luo, 2000), community 
leaders (Acquaah, 2007), and prestigious universities (Bond, Glouharova, Harrigan, 2010). 
Moreover, it is evident in the literature that individual social capital may also derive from 
internal ties to actors within the organization, and thus reflect one’s current or prior relationships 
with other board members (Stevenson & Radin, 2009, 2014). Internal ties of CEO and directors 
build trust, improve their cooperation, and enhance collaborative orientation of the board (Boyd, 
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Haynes, Zona, 2011; Harris & Helfat, 2007; Westphal, 1999). Social ties endow an individual 
with a specific type of power, namely prestige power that emerges from having connections to 
high profile individuals in the industry or important institutions in the firm’s environment 
(Finkelstein, 1992). What is more, social connections to actors in the environment may have a 
resource provision function, thus in this way individuals, both CEOs and directors, with wide-
spread external ties perform boundary spanning roles in organizations (McDonald, Khanna, 
Westphal, 2008; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In the literature the resource provision and the trust-
building functions of social ties are assigned to CEO and directors. Despite extensive research in 
this area, it has been overlooked that similar benefits may be provided by social ties of board 
chair. The role of board chair is usually discussed in the context of CEO duality. However, the 
role may extend beyond control and liaising. Board chair may hold multiple board posts, 
memberships in business associations, and furthermore have executive experience, as it is not 
uncommon for a former CEO to remain in a board of directors as a chairman (Quigley & 
Hambrick, 2012). Board chair acts as a liaison between CEO and the board; hence her/his 
internal social ties may ease teamwork and help the involved individuals to become a governing 
team. Therefore, similarly to CEOs and directors, individual social capital of board chair may be 
an important asset for an organization (Krause, Semadeni, Withers, 2016). Further investigation 
of board chair social capital would help to uncover the big picture of social dynamics within the 
board and with actors in the firm’s environment. However, the literature remains divided 
between studies exploring social capital of CEOs and directors leaving the organizational effects 
of board chair social capital unexplored. A comprehensive approach to individual social ties has 
not been proposed yet, despite quite intuitive joint influence of social capital of board chair, 
CEO, and the board on organizational outcomes.              
Social capital derives from social ties, which can be established, reestablished, and 
dissolved over time. Therefore, this construct can be investigated in a static and dynamic 
perspective. However, the existing research has been mainly focusing on antecedents and 
consequences of social ties, and thus leaving evolution of social capital unexplored (Ahuja, 
Soda, Zaheer, 2012; Maurer & Ebers, 2006). It is worth mentioning that longitudinal research on 
social ties and social networks faces numerous challenges, such as data availability or 
methodological constraints (Borgatti, Everett, Johnson, 2013). For this reason, and because of 
the limited theoretical developments, the existing knowledge on how social capital develops still 
needs considerable advancements. Although the concept of social capital has been often recalled 
in the literature on boards of directors, in this context it is particularly evident that its dynamics 
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remain overlooked. The literature lacks well-developed theories explaining evolution paths of 
social networks formed by board members. Evolution of networks occurs on multiple 
dimensions, as board members may establish social ties to actors within and outside 
organizations. The evolution process is driven by mechanisms and affects organizational 
outcomes, however, previous research has not disused it thoroughly. For instance, studies on the 
growth of new ventures assert that social capital plays an important role in firm expansion 
(Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2010). In addition, different social connections may be important at 
different stages of expansion (Coviello, 2006). However, in the literature on boards of directors, 
despite linking social ties to numerous organizational outcomes, scholars have overlooked the 
dynamic aspect of board social capital in the context of firm expansion. Although it is natural 
for social relationships to be established and to deteriorate over time, like also to be 
instrumentally employed to support particular organizational goals, the existing literature seems 
to underestimate their temporal value and dynamic influence on organizations.  
Despite numerous studies investigating social capital in board of directors, it still remains 
a puzzle how its complexities can be better approached to disentangle the relationship with 
organizational outcomes. The literature lacks theoretical perspectives and methodological 
approaches suitable for integrating the multiple facets of social capital into empirical research. 
The brief review of the literature presented in this chapter identifies three issues that have been 
overlooked in the literature: 1) system of social ties in boards of directors and the interplay 
between the resources aggregated in the system 2) social capital of board chair 3) dynamic 
nature of board social capital. Motivated by the above-mentioned overarching research question, 
in this dissertation I aim to explore each of the identified issues separately in the following 
chapters, to build an inclusive picture of complexities of social capital in boards of directors. 
Table 1. Empirical studies and their respective research focus 
Chapter  Empirical study Level of analysis Research focus 
Chapter 2 Sulinska, I. “Board social capital and 
firm performance: nuances of the 
relationship.” 
Group level social 
capital 
System of social ties and 
the interplay between the 
resources in the system 
Chapter 3 Sulinska, I. “Social capital of board 
chair and its performance implications.” 
Individual level 
social capital 
Social capital of board 
chair 
Chapter 4 Sulinska, I & Butler, B. “Dynamics of 
board social capital – multiple case 
studies from China.”    
Group level social 
capital 
Evolution patterns of 
board social capital in the 
context of firm expansion 
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Empirical context and data 
The empirical studies presented in the following chapters of the dissertation are set in the 
context of publicly listed firms in China. China offers a unique advantage for research on social 
capital, due to a highly relationship oriented culture deriving from Confucianism. Influence of 
this philosophy is still pronounced nowadays to a very high extent. Networks of social ties, also 
known in the Chinese context as guanxi, have been identified as an essential factor driving 
social and economic activity (Child, 1996; Gold, Guthrie, Wank, 2002; Park & Luo, 2001). 
Nevertheless, the high dependence upon social ties is not only culturally determined, but also is 
a result of underdeveloped institutions in China. For decades China has been going thorough 
institutional transition, which begun with economic reforms introduced in the late 1970s by 
Deng Xiaoping, a progressive leader of the Communist Party. Although the initiated reforms 
have opened up the economy for foreign investors, allowed entrepreneurs to flourish, and 
contributed to often double-digit economic growth, still the state remains a powerful actor in the 
business environment (Naughton, 2007; Redding & Witt, 2007). It is particularly noticeable in a 
wide-spread state ownership of companies and banks in China. The state is a controlling 
shareholder in firms operating in strategic industries, for example, in aerospace, energy and 
water supply, oil and gas, and biotechnology. In fact, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate 
strategic industries, while in non-strategic industries state-owned and private firms are both 
present (Boisot & Child, 1996; Bruton et al., 2015).       
Since even nowadays the state exerts a considerable influence on the business 
environment in China, ties between business and politics are significant and have numerous 
consequences for companies and individuals. Their effect is visible as well in compositions of 
boards of directors, which often include politically-affiliated members. In state-owned 
enterprises presence of politicians in boards may result from, for example, their career 
progressions, but also from the efforts of the state to keep control over enterprises to ensure 
pursuit of business and political goals in the government’s agenda (Breslin, 2016; Groves et al., 
1994; Liang, Ren, Sun, 2015).  Nevertheless, also private firms are seeking potential candidates 
with political connections, to address the environmental dependency deriving from the prevalent 
presence of the state in the business environment. Motivated by the potential direct or indirect 
support from the state, for example, in the form of favorable contracts and subsidies, private 
firms treat instrumentally appointments of politically affiliated individuals. Previous studies 
have demonstrated that actually performance effect of political ties is greater in private firms 
than in state-owned enterprises (Peng & Luo, 2000), and that political ties ease organizational 
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growth and learning (Li & Zhang, 2007; Li et al., 2008; Li et al., 2014). Moreover, recent 
research has shown that political ties continue to be of utmost importance in the context of 
China (Huang, 2008; Shi, Markóczy, Stan, 2014; Zhang, Tan, Wong, 2015). The importance of 
political connections, and social connections in general, is typical for transitioning economies, 
as it has been confirmed by empirical evidences from, for example, Thailand (Peng, Au, Wang, 
2001), Indonesia (Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006), Taiwan and Hong Kong (Young et al., 2001; 
Au, Peng, Wang, 2000), and Russia (Batjargal, 2003; Okhmatovskiy, 2010).       
The undertaken economic reforms in the late 1970s inevitably have affected, or actually 
introduced, corporate governance in China. Particularly the ownership reform, which aimed at 
privatization, or rather corporatization, of state-owned enterprises, and the Company Law of the 
People's Republic of China passed in December 1993, built a foundation for corporate 
governance system (Naughton, 2007; Naughton & Tsai, 2015). The Company Law has been 
subsequently amended several times and is continuously being aligned with market reforms. To 
implement practices known from the Western corporate governance models, in 2001 China 
Securities Regulatory Commission issued the ‘Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors 
to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies’ and the ‘Code of Corporate Governance for 
Listed Companies in China’. These documents provide guidelines for listed companies 
regarding, for example, appointments of independent directors and separation of CEO and 
chairman roles. Moreover, they specify threshold for board independence, which at the moment 
suggest that boards of listed companies should consist in 1/3 of independent directors. The 
present corporate governance system has many characteristics of the continental (control-based) 
system typical for Germany and Japan. Chinese firms have adopted a two-tier board structure 
(dual board), and thus oversight is performed by board of directors and supervisory board. 
Although the introduced regulations and practices move China’s corporate governance system 
towards the standards of developed countries, still there are some skeptical standpoints doubting 
its effectiveness. For instance, Wei (2007) emphasizes insiders’ control of decision-making and 
weak actual independence of boards. Similarly, supervisory boards have been found ineffective 
in performing their oversight functions (Tam, 2002; Wang, 2008).   
The choice of the empirical setting could be considered as an opportunity to provide 
evidences from a non-Western context and advance the knowledge on corporate governance in 
emerging economies. However, this choice inevitability imposes some limitations on the 
conducted empirical studies. The limitations of each study are further discussed in respective 
chapters of the dissertation.     
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Exploring multiple aspects of social capital requires empirical data that comprehensively 
covers social ties of individuals and groups involved in management and oversight of 
organizations. As collection of data on social ties amongst highly reputable figures in business 
world may be a constraint, due to sensitivity and confidentiality of such information, the 
empirical studies were conducted using secondary data. According to disclosure requirements in 
China, board members of publicly listed firms are obliged to report simultaneously held 
positions in annual reports. Knowing the disclosure requirements, this data was obtained from 
China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. The database provides 
financial and non-financial information disclosed in annual reports of listed firms. Moreover, it 
is an approved data source for research in Chinese context, which has been utilized in previous 
studies, such as Markóczy et al. (2013). The data from CSMAR database was utilized in all 
empirical studies included in this dissertation. Moreover, in one empirical study (Chapter 4) the 
data was supplemented with information from various external sources, to build as detailed as 
possible case studies of the analyzed firms. The details of data selection and samples for each 
study are presented in the respective chapters.     
 
Research methods 
The presented literature review demonstrates how complex is the construct of social 
capital and that existing research produces contrasting results. This may result from 
methodological limitations of previous research. A vast majority of empirical studies exploring 
social capital in boards of directors adopts econometric methods, such as regression analysis, 
and investigates linear relationships between the selected variables (e.g. Bond, Glouharova, 
Harrigan, 2010; Martin, Gözübüyük, Becerra, 2015). The available methodological 
advancements, for example, inclusion of mediating and moderating variables or interactions 
(e.g. Barroso-Castro, Villegas-Periñan, Casillas-Bueno, 2016; Chen, 2014; Forbes & Milliken, 
1999) help to conduct a more insightful board research. However, because of the selected 
econometric methods, previous studies could have answered only specific types of research 
questions, which were based on the assumption of linear causal relationships. Econometric 
methods assume that one particular model is relevant for all observations in the sample, thus 
scholars are not able to explore multiple explanations of the investigated phenomenon. 
Moreover, in the selected model interactions of usually only two variables can be included, 
since interactions of multiple variables are challenging to interpret.  Therefore, although 
previous studies have significantly contributed to building knowledge on social capital, still 
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were not free from limitations imposed be the selected methods. This dissertation aims to 
complement the existing findings by adopting an alternative approach to conceptualization and 
empirical investigation of social capital in boards of directors. It acknowledges the contribution 
of previous studies and other methodological approaches, yet it aims to challenge the prevalent 
assumption of linear causal relationship between social capital and organizational outcomes. 
Motivated by the identified complexities of social capital, the dissertation asserts that the 
construct is more complex than has been assumed in previous studies. Moreover, social capital 
can be better understood by adopting configurational logics and method, namely fuzzy-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin, 2006, 2008). In addition, because of limited 
theoretical developments regarding dynamics of social capital, conducting case study analysis 
may provide new insights and advance the existing findings. The main advantage of adopting 
fsQCA method is the ability to investigate complementarities and substitutions between the 
analyzed causal conditions (variables). It is a novel approach to analyzing social capital, since 
previous studies have been focusing on the effects of particular types of social ties, such as 
political ties (e.g. Goldman, Rocholl, So, 2009, Okhmatovskiy, 2010), social capital of 
particular individuals, such as CEOs (e.g. Davis, Yoo, Baker, 2003; Geletkanycz & Boyd, 2011) 
or outside directors (e.g. Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009), or the entire board (e.g. Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003). In contrast to other methods, fsQCA provides insights into nuances of the 
complex causal relationship between social capital and organizational outcomes by identifying 
alternative causal configurations leading to the same outcome. In this way the method not only 
advances the existing studies, but also shows directions for future research aimed at solving the 
puzzle of how social capita affects organizations. Although QCA is still a novel method in 
corporate governance and strategic management, it is being increasingly applied in empirical 
studies (Bell et al., 2013; Garcia-Castro, Aguilera, Ariño, 2013; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014). 
Moreover, the interest in the method is growing rapidly and scholars are being encouraged to 
explore complex causal relationships underlying organizational phenomena (Misangyi et al., 
2017).    
  The dissertation includes three empirical studies presented in the respective chapters.  
The studies in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 apply fsQCA methodology, while Chapter 4 presents 
multiple case studies of the selected firms. The choices of methodologies were theoretically 
driven to match with the identified research problems. Given the novelty of adopting fsQCA in 
corporate governance research, the section below outlines the main concepts and assumptions of 
the method together with details of data preparation. The empirical studies presented in Chapter 
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2 and Chapter 3 additionally include more elaborated method sections to make the reader 
familiar with the method. The details of the conducted multiple case study analysis are presented 
in the method section in Chapter 4.       
 
Main concepts of fsQCA 
Set-theoretic methods, such as fuzzy–set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), use 
sets and investigate set relations, in contrast to other research methods in social science. The 
literature defines a set as “a mental representation of an empirical property” (Mahoney, 2010:2). 
While scholars use different forms of variables in conventional econometric techniques, each 
variable in set-theoretic methods has to be present in a form of a set. Individual observations are 
treated as separate cases, which are given membership scores in the selected sets “according to 
whether or the extent to which they are in possession of the represented property” (Mahoney, 
2010:2). Therefore, the data used for fsQCA consists of set membership scores, which reflect 
difference in kind and difference in degree amongst cases. The investigated relationships 
between social phenomena are further modeled in terms of set relations. Set relations can be 
understood as necessary and sufficient conditions for a given outcome to occur. Necessary 
causal conditions are inevitably linked to occurrence of an outcome. Hence, whenever an 
outcome is observed, the given condition is also observed. Sufficient conditions are also linked 
to an outcome, but there can be other conditions that create alternative paths to the same 
outcome. In other words, whenever the given condition is observed, an outcome is also 
observed. The results obtained using Boolean algebra (Ragin, 2006, 2008) identify conditions or 
combinations of conditions linked to a given outcome, and thus demonstrate the complex causal 
relationship between the investigated phenomena.   
In set-theoretic methods, and thus in fsQCA, a typical model of a causal relationship 
would use a notation system typical for Boolean algebra, which is used to perform set 
operations. The notation system includes the following logical operators: “AND” for 
conjunction/multiplication “OR” for disjunction/addition, “NOT” for complement/negation, and 
an inclusion sign “->” (if –then relation). To explain how results of fsQCA should be 
interpreted, let’s discuss the empirical analysis presented in Chapter 2. The study in Chapter 2 
investigates the relationship between different types of social ties formed by board members and 
firm performance. The following types of social ties are selected as variables (sets): ties to 
business group (strong ties to business group), business ties (strong business ties), political ties 
(existing political ties), nonbusiness ties (strong nonbusiness ties), internal social capital 
26 
 
(extensive internal social capital), state ownership, and firm performance (high firm 
performance) as an outcome set. The aim of the analysis was to identify which combinations of 
social ties are associated with high firm performance and firm underperformance, which social 
ties are complementary and which are substitutes. The results (see Table 3 on p. 49) demonstrate 
that, for example, a combinations of state ownership, extensive internal social capital, and strong 
nonbusiness ties is leading to high performance, but also a combination of extensive internal 
social capital, strong nonbusiness ties, and existing political ties, and a combination of political 
ties and absence of state ownership. In each combination causal conditions are linked using the 
logical operator “AND”, which indicates conjunction of conditions, while the combinations are 
linked with the logical operator “OR”, which indicates addition. Therefore, the above-mentioned 
combinations could be noted as the following solution: state ownership AND extensive internal 
social capital AND strong nonbusiness ties OR extensive internal social capital AND strong 
nonbusiness ties AND existing political ties OR political ties AND NOT state ownership -> high 
firm performance. The solution demonstrates that three alternative, equally effective 
combinations, in which causal conditions work in conjunction, are inducing high firm 
performance.      
Considering configurational nature of the method, it is important to clarify the rationale 
for applying fsQCA. There should be a plausible theoretical expectation that the phenomenon 
under study may be better understood in terms of set relations and complex causality. Fuzzy-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) is particularly relevant if configurations of 
conditions are expected to influence a given outcome. The method is also applicable, if it is 
expected that multiple combinations of causal conditions can cause the same outcome. In 
principle, fsQCA allows for analyzing conjunctural causation and equifinality. The notion of 
conjunctural causation assumes that the mechanisms linking causal conditions and outcome are 
conjunctural. Therefore, the causal conditions are not analyzed in isolation, like in variance-
based methods, but in configurations. By applying fsQCA, not only it is possible to identify one 
configuration of causal conditions, but also to identify alternative configurations leading to the 
same outcome. The method allows for equifinality of solutions explaining a given outcome. It is 
in stark contrast to causal homogeneity typical for econometric methods, which explain the 
outcome using the same variable(s) across all observations. Moreover, moving beyond linear 
relationships, fsQCA presumes that “variables found to be causally related in one configuration 
may be unrelated or even inversely related in another” (Meyer, Tsui, & Hinings, 1993: 1178). 
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These assumptions consequently allow for exploration of complex causality and nonlinear 
relationships.  
In empirical analysis fsQCA utilizes measures of consistency and coverage as parameters 
of fit for further assessment of results. The consistency measure captures correspondence of the 
identified combinations with empirical data. The coverage measure reflects relevance of the 
identified combinations for outcome explanation. Measures of consistency and coverage are 
calculated according to the following formulas:  
 
 
where xi is a set membership score in a condition X and yi is a set membership score in an 
outcome Y.  
 
Data preparation for fsQCA 
As set-theoretic methods explore set relations, the variables (causal conditions) chosen for 
investigation of a causal relationship have to be transformed into sets. Loosely interpreted as the 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, sets reflect qualitative and quantitative difference 
amongst the analyzed observations (cases). Depending on the intended differentiation of 
qualities, variables can be transformed (calibrated) into crisp sets or fuzzy sets. Similarly to 
binary variables, crisp sets use dichotomized thresholds defining membership (1) and non-
membership (0) in a set. Therefore, crisp sets demonstrate a qualitative difference and make 
clear distinctions between cases representing a given empirical property. Fuzzy sets, however, 
allow for partial set membership, thus membership scores range from 0 to 1. To calibrate a 
variable as a fuzzy-set, three qualitative anchors (thresholds) have to be specified: full 
membership (1), non-membership (0), and a point of maximum ambiguity (0.5). In this way 
fuzzy sets draw out qualitative and quantitative differences amongst cases. Calibration process 
of fuzzy or crisp sets may seem subjective. Hence, it is important to use extensive knowledge 
about the analyzed phenomenon to justify the chosen qualitative anchors (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012). The literature provides standards of good practices (e.g. Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2010) for calibration processes that help to ensure that the calibrated sets are closely 
linked to theoretical concepts. The empirical studies included in this dissertation use direct 
method of calibration as recommended in Ragin (2008; 2006) and Fiss (2011). It is a commonly 
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applied method of calibration, which transforms data into fuzzy-sets using log odds. In practice 
calibration process is software-based and may be performed using R (Thiem & Dusa, 2013). 
The empirical information accumulated in the calibrated sets is further inserted into a truth 
table. Even though truth table resembles a standard data matrix, it contains causal conditions and 
outcome organized in columns, while each row represents a statement of sufficiency. Number of 
truth table rows is determined by the number of 2k logically possible combinations of 
conditions, where k is the number of conditions. For this reason, truth tables should not be 
mistaken with data matrixes. Each case is assigned to a specific truth table row, based on its set 
membership scores. By definition, a case can be assigned only to one truth table row. 
Furthermore, consistency with the statement of sufficiency represented by each row is verified 
by checking case membership in an outcome set. Truth table analysis aims to identify which 
sufficient conditions or combinations of conditions are linked to an outcome. Results are 
obtained through logical minimization of truth table. This procedure is based on Boolean 
algebra and can be performed using the Quine-McCluskey’s algorithm (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012).  
 
Dissertation outline  
Chapter 2 (“Board social capital and firm performance: nuances of the relationship”) 
addresses the puzzle of how board social capital affects firm performance, given that studies 
exploring this problem often produce mixed results. The chapter outlines shortcomings of the 
literature and asserts that social ties of board members ought to be perceived as elements of an 
integrated system of social connections. It is subsequently argued that, in order to unravel the 
relationship between board social capital and firm performance, the interplay between the types 
of resources deriving from internal and external social ties of board members have to be taken 
into account. Consequently, it is proposed that complementarity and substitution between the 
resources contributes to high firm performance. The empirical results provide original insights 
into the combinations of social ties inducing high firm performance and underperformance. 
Moreover, the chapter demonstrates how a novel methodology, such as fuzzy-set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), may advance corporate governance research.  
Chapter 3 (“Social capital of board chair and its performance implications”) challenges 
the traditional perspective on the role of board chair in organization. Building on the literature 
discussing individual social capital of CEO and directors, this chapter asserts that board chair, 
apart from performing control and liaising functions, may also holds a prestigious position in 
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corporate world and be essential for enhancing internal dynamic in the board. Consequently, it is 
argued that board chair, similarly to CEO and directors, may have wide-spread social ties to 
actors within and outside the firm. However, to thoroughly investigate the performance effects 
of board chair social capital, social capital of CEO and the board should not be overlooked. 
Therefore, the chapter proposes complementarities and substitutions between internal and 
external social capital of board chair, CEO, and the board. The empirical findings present novel 
insights into social capital in boards of directors with particular emphasis on social capital board 
chair. The chapter, in addition, demonstrates advantages of fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (fsQCA) in investigating complex organizational phenomena.  
Chapter 4 (“Dynamics of board social capital – multiple case studies from China”) 
unravels the evolution process of board social capital in the context of firm expansion. The 
chapter puts emphasis on complexity of the process, and the construct itself, by thoroughly 
investigating evolution paths of internal and external networks formed by board members using 
multiple case study analysis. The case studies of Chinese firms included in the chapter 
demonstrate how social ties may evolve over time and simultaneously to firm expansion. In 
light of the obtained results, it is proposed that as firms move from an initial to a later stage of 
expansion, diversity of external network ties follows an inverted U-shape pattern. Strength of 
external network ties changes in a similar manner through initial strengthening of weak ties and 
weakening of strong ties, and subsequent strengthening of strong ties and dissolution of weak 
ties. Nonetheless, cohesion of internal network amongst board members increases consistently 
throughout different stages of expansion. 
While each chapter individually addresses a specific research problem, the dissertation in 
a broader perspective seeks to explore complexities of social capital in board of directors and 
their organizational effects. The final chapter (Chapter 5) discusses and concludes the findings 
with reference to the overarching research question.      
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Chapter 2: Board Social Capital and Firm Performance:  
Nuances of the Relationship 1 
 
 
 
Abstract: Despite considerable scholarly attention to the social connections of board members, 
empirical studies of the effects of board social capital on organizational outcomes, such as 
performance, often produce contrasting results. This study aims to address this conundrum. 
Building on extant literature, this study argues that the social ties of board members ought to be 
considered as elements of an integrated system of social connections. Consequently, it is argued 
that understanding the effects of board social capital on organizational outcomes requires 
explicit consideration of the interplay between the type of resources board members derive from 
social ties to actors inside and outside the organization. Subsequently, it is proposed that 
complementarity and substitution effects between the resources individual board members bring 
to the board will contribute to high firm performance. The empirical results, based on a study of 
the board social capital of listed firms in China, support these arguments and provide new and 
counterintuitive insights into the combinations of social ties leading to high firm performance 
and underperformance. These results contribute to extant research on board social capital by 
advancing a configurational perspective on the link between the social ties of board members 
and firm performance. In addition, this study shows how alternative methods, such as fuzzy-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), may advance extant research on the behavioral 
aspects of boards of directors and contribute to exploration of complex causal relationships 
typical for organizational phenomena.     
   
         
 
 
                                                     
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 34th Annual Conference of the Strategic Management Society 
(September, 2014) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Board social capital is gaining popularity as a new perspective on how social ties of board 
members affect organizations (Haynes & Hillman, 2010; Johnson, Schnatterly, Hill, 2013; 
Stevenson & Radin, 2009, 2014; Withers, Hillman, Cannella, 2012). Defined as the resources 
available to the board of directors through its social networks (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003), 
board social capital has the potential to shed new light on the latent mechanism of influence 
behind social connections and further uncover the ‘human side’ of boards and corporate 
governance (Huse, 2007, Osterloh, Frey, Frost, 2001; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004). Social ties to 
actors in the external environment bridge organizational boundaries and serve as conduits for 
resource flow enabling organizations to gain competitive advantage, legitimacy, and to address 
environmental dependencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, Useem, 1984). Internal social ties bond 
board members, as they build trust, enhance exchange of information, and facilitate cooperation 
within the boardroom (Hansen, Podolny, Pfeffer, 2001; Harris & Helfat, 2007). Social capital of 
boards has been argued to influence numerous organizational outcomes and processes, such as 
board dynamics (Stevenson & Radin, 2009; Westphal, 1999), selection of directors (Kim & 
Cannella, 2008; Withers, Hillman, Cannella, 2012), or firm competitiveness (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998; Wu, 2008). The importance of social capital is generally acknowledged in the 
literature, thus scholars have been attempting to understand its association with firm 
performance (Dalton et al., 1998; Kaczmarek, Kimino, Pye, 2014; Martin, Gözübüyük, Becerra, 
2015). 
Prior research on social capital in boards of directors has addressed effects of particular 
types of social ties, such as the effects of board interlocks (Davis, 1996; Mizruchi, 1996; 
Mizruchi, & Stearns, 1994; Zona, Gomez-Mejia, Withers, 2015), or the appointments of 
politicians (Goldman, Rocholl, So, 2009; Hillman, 2005; Lester et al., 2008, Okhmatovskiy, 
2010). Still, the empirical findings oftentimes lack clear conclusions. For instance, research on 
board interlocks has demonstrated mixed results regarding the effect on firm performance 
(Mizruchi, 1996; Westphal & Khanna, 2003). In addition, recent empirical evidence has shown 
that the effect of board interlocks on performance may depend on a variety of factors, including 
power imbalance, firm’s relative resources, CEO ownership, and ownership concentration 
(Zona, Gomez-Mejia, Withers, 2015). These findings emphasize that the mechanism of 
influence, which social capital exerts on organizations, is highly complex. Nevertheless, the 
existing theories either focus on one type of ties or aggregate all ties into one construct without 
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noticing the nuances of how these ties actually work together to induce a particular outcome. 
This quite simplistic approach reduces understanding of the impact social ties have on 
organizations and their performance. 
Motivated by the shortcomings of the literature, this study seeks to enhance understanding 
of board social capital as a theoretical construct, its relationship with firm performance, and also 
investigates possible association with firm underperformance. The study builds on the definition 
proposed by Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) and conceptualizes board social capital as the sum of 
actual and potential resources deriving from social ties of board members. It particularly asserts 
that in order to understand how organizations capitalize on social ties, it is useful to recognize 
that board social capital arises from a system of social connections in which the deriving 
resources may compliment and substitute each other. Therefore, on one hand, the study applies a 
holistic approach to social ties of board members through combining them into a unified system. 
On the other hand, it proposes a possible interplay, namely complementarity and substitution, 
between the resources deriving from external and internal ties of board members that contribute 
to high firm performance. The empirical investigation of the proposed relationships is carried 
out using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin, 2006, 2008). This 
methodological approach, although still novel in corporate governance and management studies, 
is highly suitable for uncovering multiple combinations of causal conditions leading to the same 
outcome. The fsQCA methodology has recently been applied to study effects of combinations in 
variety of fields, such as international business (Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop, Paunescu, 2010), 
social networks studies (Cárdenas, 2012; Raab et al., 2013), and strategic management 
(Fainshmidt, Smith, Judge, 2016). The study is set in a highly relationship oriented empirical 
context of listed firms in China. 
The study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it highlights the complexity 
of board social capital that is often overlooked in the existing literature. It particularly asserts 
that the construct of board social capital can be better understood if conceptualized as an 
integrated system of social ties formed by board members to actors inside and outside the 
organization. Second, it reveals nuances of the interplay between the resources deriving from 
external and internal social ties combined into the system. The study proposes that there is a 
possible complementarity between the resources that enhance their effect on firm performance. 
Moreover, the obtained empirical evidence demonstrates that social ties cannot be discusses 
only in quantitative categories, such as the more social ties the better the outcome will be, since 
even absence of social ties may, in combination with other conditions, lead to high firm 
41 
 
performance. The study also proposes substitution between the resources deriving from social 
ties and empirically investigates alternative explanations of high firm performance and 
underperformance. Third, the focus on board social capital and social ties of board members 
contributes also to the literature exploring behavioral aspects of boards of directors and 
corporate governance (Huse, 2007; Osterloh, Frey, Frost, 2001). Lastly, the study offers also a 
methodological contribution by demonstrating how unconventional methods, such as fuzzy-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), can advance the existing research, unravel complex 
causal relationships typical for social science, and bring empirical research closer to practice.         
The study is structured as follows. The theoretical background for the study is presented in 
the next section and followed by development of theoretical propositions regarding the 
relationships between the resources deriving from social ties of board members and firm 
performance. Then the selected methodological approach is introduced and applied to empirical 
data. The result section reports the outcome of the analysis and presents the identified causal 
combinations of conditions leading to high performance and underperformance. Discussion of 
results and limitations conclude the study.    
 
THEORETICAL BACKGOUND 
Board social capital is a relatively new concept in the literature and offers a novel 
perspective on analyzing boards’ role performance, including also the ability to perform these 
roles (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). The concept has its roots in sociology and emphasizes the 
importance of resources embedded in social ties (Boissevain, 1974; Bourdieu, 1986, 1993; 
Granovetter, 1973; Putnam, 1995). Already in the early studies on resource dependence theory, 
scholars perceived social connections of board members, and resources embedded in these 
connections, as an integrated mechanism shaping interactions between firms and their 
environment (Mizruchi, 1996; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). As social capital can be 
defined as “the sum of actual and potential resources embedded within, available through and 
derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit” (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998: 243), organizations can gain a competitive advantage and positively influence 
performance by utilizing social networks (Richardson, 1987; Zaheer, Gulati, Nohria, 2000; 
Zaheer & McEvily, 1999; Zona, Gomez-Mejia, Withers, 2015). This definition compiles 
previous theoretical developments regarding social capital (Bourdieu, 1986, 1993; Putnam, 
1995). However, it is worth mentioning that social capital is an umbrella concept (Hirsch & 
Levin, 1999), often perceived as an elastic term (Lappe & Du Bois, 1997) without one strict 
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definition. The concept of board social capital emphasizes that boards of directors, apart from a 
strict control nature, have also a social dimension or the ‘human side’. Boards of directors are 
governing bodies and decision-making groups, which indeed comprise individuals (Huse, 2007, 
Osterloh, Frey, Frost, 2001; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004). Prior research has recognized the 
importance of behavioral aspects of boards by investigating internal board dynamics, conflict 
resolution, negotiations, decision making process, and also motivation and identification with 
the organization (Huse, 1998; Osterloh, Frey, Frost, 2001; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005). In turn, the 
concept of board social capital highlights the fact that board members are able to establish social 
ties with other actors that may provide resources, which are significant for organizational 
outcomes.    
The literature tends to differentiate between two types of social capital: internal and 
external (Kim & Cannella, 2008; Sauerwald, Lin, Peng, 2016; Tian, Haleblian, Rajagopalan, 
2011). External social capital derives from network ties to actors outside the firm, such as 
financial institutions, governments, clients, buyers and suppliers etc. Resource dependence 
theorists emphasize access to resources, information, experience, legitimacy, and reputation as 
the major advantages arising from ties to external environment (Drees & Heugens, 2013; Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978). Moreover, owing to external ties directors may be able to influence 
stakeholders through lobbying or associations to reshape the environment and respond to 
unfavorable market conditions (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; 
Hillman, Cannella, Paetzold, 2000). Internal social capital derives from network ties to actors 
within the firm, including other directors, CEO, or senior executives. Cohesiveness of such 
network enhances group trust and group effectiveness (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Oh, Chung, 
Labianca, 2004). Internal social capital can ease communication and cooperation inside the 
boardroom, and at the same time, have a positive effect on board effectiveness in terms of 
teamwork, role performance, decision making (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Harris & Helfat, 2007; 
Stevenson & Radin, 2014), and additionally, facilitate exchange of knowledge and information 
(Hansen, Podolny, Pfeffer, 2001; Krause, Semadeni, Withers, 2016). 
Board social capital derives from combined individual social networks of board members 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). In other words, it arises from the whole 
system of social ties to actors inside and outside the organization. Potentially each social tie to 
business or nonbusiness actors, such as governments, associations, academic institutions, etc., 
like also social ties amongst board members may provide resources that enhance firm 
performance (Kim & Cannella, 2008; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Board members over the 
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course of their careers may establish connections with numerous actors through, for example, 
working together in the same firms, having memberships in business or charity associations, or 
even lecturing at the same academic institutions. Previous studies have shown that multiple 
board post of board members, a circumstance often described in the literature as ‘board 
interlocks’, can have a positive effect on firm performance (Mizruch, 1996; Mizruchi & Stearns, 
1988; Zona, Gomez-Mejia, Withers, 2015). Moreover, board interlocks support dissemination of 
corporate governance practices (Shipilov, Greve, Rowley, 2010). Board interlocks with firms 
affiliated within the same business group may facilitate access to intragroup equity financing, 
such as opening up possibilities for engagement in joint investment projects (Mahmood & 
Mitchell, 2004). Corporate directors are members of corporate elite (Davis, Yoo, Baker, 2003) 
and their affiliations with prestigious clubs or alumni networks of elite universities create 
another layer of networking (Bond, Glouharova, Harrigan, 2010; Useem, 1984). Membership in 
elite associations is a source of power and prestige (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001), and can 
function as an advice network for executives (McDonald & Westphal, 2010). Moreover, it is not 
completely uncommon for board members to combine business and political careers. Therefore, 
some of them may be active also on the political scene or be connected to political actors 
through, for example, offering consultancy to the government. The extant literature on 
significance of political ties has demonstrated a positive effect of politically connected directors 
or appointments of former politicians on firm performance (Bond, Glouharova, Harrigan, 2010; 
Goldman, Rocholl, So, 2009; Lester et al., 2008; You & Du, 2012), and particularly in the case 
of industry deregulation and the related environmental changes (Hillman, Cannella, Paetzold, 
2000). Moreover, the positive effect on performance is more pronounced in firms operating in 
regulated industries, because of stronger interdependencies between business and government 
(Hillman, 2005). The important role of politically connected board members has been also 
stressed in the context of emerging countries, as underdeveloped market institutions lead to 
strong dependency on governments (Acquaah, 2007; Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Peng & Luo, 2000). 
The system of social ties, which underlies board social capital, accumulates the resources 
deriving from individual social ties of board members. Each of the resources, which could take a 
form of, for example, expertise, information, legitimacy, trust and understanding, etc. (Harris & 
Helfat, 2007; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) may have an individual value and be associated with a 
particular outcome or a benefit. For instance, directors holding multiple board post may provide 
greater industry knowledge through their business connections and contribute to strategy 
development of the firm (Fich, 2005; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009; Ruigrok, Peck, Keller, 
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2006). However, in the board of directors individual networks of social ties and the associated 
network resources are integrated into one system. Therefore, organizational implications of the 
resources, and thus also their effect on firm performance, depend on the available resource pool 
in the system. This is also highlighted in the definition of social capital (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998), which describes the sum of resources embedded in social relationships of individuals or 
social units. Looking from the system perspective, there is a possible interplay between the 
resources and their associated outcomes. To illustrate this mechanism, consider board 
appointments of politically connected individuals. The individuals with political ties assist firms 
to deal with external dependencies through establishing connections with powerful actors in the 
environment, lobbying the government, and in this way may have positive effect on firm 
performance (Hillman, 2005; Lester et al., 2008; Selznick, 1949, You & Du, 2012). However, 
effectiveness of the obtained political ties also depends on the already existing system of social 
ties within the board. For instance, effective utilization of the political ties may be enhanced by 
internal social ties amongst board members that help to build trust and eases cooperation inside 
the boardroom (Harris & Helfat, 2007; Oh, Chung, Labianca, 2004). Then, the positive effect of 
political ties is leveraged, and the resources deriving from these ties are utilized effectively, 
owing to cooperative orientation of the board. Therefore, the resources available through 
political and internal social ties complement each other in leading to high firm performance. 
This shows that the resources available through social ties of board members can be combined 
in such a way to enhance their effect on firm performance. For this reason, it may be argued 
that:  
     
Proposition 1: The complementarity between the resources deriving from external and internal 
social ties of board members contributes to high firm performance.   
 
The concept of board social capital encourages the system approach to social ties of board 
members. A social tie embedded in the system may transmit a resource or multiple resources. 
For instance, board interlocks may provide legitimacy and alternative perspectives on firm’s 
strategy based on experiences and knowledge of board members and executives serving in other 
firms (McDonald & Westphal, 2010; Mizruch, 1996; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). However, boards of directors comprise members with diverse profiles, 
demographic characteristics, and professional experience (Dalton et al., 1998, Johnson, 
Schnatterly, Hill, 2013; Kim & Cannella, 2008; Withers, Hillman, Cannella, 2012). Although 
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board members may indeed establish numerous connections with actors in firm’s environment, 
while serving in multiple boards, being active in non-profit organizations or academic 
institutions, it is not obligatory. Board members may as well pay less attention to professional 
networking, career development, and relationships with colleagues, thus have small networks of 
social ties or even none. Therefore, boards may include members with very resourceful 
connections as well as members, who do not have connections that potentially bring value to the 
firm. This affects the pool of resources available through social ties of board members and the 
potential abundance of board social capital.    
The system of social ties may accumulate numerous types of resources. However, 
depending on the types of social connections and the actors embedded in the networks of board 
members, some resources may be lacking in the system, and thus in the board. Board members 
may, for example, interact only amongst themselves or with individuals similar to them, thus 
keep their social circle closed and do not network with professionals, who have dissimilar 
background, different industry experience, etc. Then it is likely that their networks will 
accumulate similar resources and even make some of these resources redundant (Burt, 1992). 
However, although business knowledge and experience may overlap between the board 
members, their close relationships with others also generate trust, ease exchange of information, 
and facilitate teamwork (Coleman, 1988; Oh, Chung, Labianca, 2004). Even though the board 
may lack unique business insights from other firms, it still can capitalize on the close internal 
relationships amongst board members. As firm performance is closely linked to availability and 
effective utilization of organizational resources (Barney, 1991, 2001; Wernerfelt, 1984), 
effective cooperation of board members may results in development of strategies and solutions 
that lead to high firm performance. This shows that the presence of ties to similar actors and 
close relationships amongst board members do not have to negatively affect the board and firm 
performance, as the abundance of internal social capital ease role performance of the board. 
Therefore, boards of directors do not have to accumulate all possible resources through social 
ties of their members or only appoint members with widespread social connections to get access 
to unique resources. As it has been shown in the literature, particularly external social 
connections formed by board members mirror environmental dependencies that organizations 
are facing (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Hence, over the years and also through new board 
appointments, boards of directors can accumulate firm-specific pools of resources that 
correspond to the systems of social ties typical for each board and its members. Nevertheless, 
the absent resources in the firm-specific resource pools may be compensated for by the already 
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accumulated resources. This possible substitution between the resources enables boards to 
perform their roles and has positive performance implications. Therefore, it is proposed that:   
 
Proposition 2: The resources accumulated in external and internal social ties of board members 
compensate for the absence of resources in the board and contribute to high firm 
performance. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
This study proposes a multifaceted relationship between the resources deriving from 
external and internal social connections of board members, thus board social capital, and firm 
performance. Empirical examination of this relationship requires application of a methodology, 
which is able to identify the multiple combinations of social connections that are associated with 
high firm performance and also, to get a comprehensive view the relationship, uncover those 
associated with underperformance. Analyzing such a complex relationship is a methodological 
challenge for conventional econometric techniques, which are more suitable for investigating 
linear relationships (Ragin, 2008). Although econometric methods can partially address 
nonlinear relationships through estimations of interaction effects, interpretation of interactions 
of more than two conditions is problematic and makes these methods less suited to the task of 
exploring complementarities and substitutions between causal conditions. Therefore, taking the 
theoretical expectations into account, I utilized a set-theoretic method - fuzzy-set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin, 2008), which is more suitable for analysis of multiple 
combinations and contingencies. This methodology allows for empirical exploration of complex 
causal relationships, namely identification of alternative configurations of causal conditions 
leading to the same outcome. In this way fsQCA provides more nuanced insights that add to the 
results obtained in previous studies, which utilized more traditional methodological approaches 
implying linear relationships. The advantages of the method have been acknowledged across 
multiple disciplines, including international business (Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop, Paunescu, 
2010), corporate governance (Bell et al., 2013; Garcia-Castro, Aguilera, Ariño, 2013) and 
strategic management (Fainshmidt, Smith, Judge, 2016).      
Fundamentals of fsQCA assume that the phenomenon under investigation is characterized 
by complex causality, namely there are strong theoretical premises regarding conjunctural 
causation, equifinality, and causal asymmetry. Conjunctural causation implies that 
configurations of causal conditions, rather than individual conditions, lead to a given outcome. 
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Equifinality contends that there are possible alternatives amongst these configurations, thus 
different configurations of causal conditions can lead to the same outcome. Additionally, 
presence and absence of an outcome can have different explanations, thus the causal relationship 
is asymmetric. These fundamentals make set-theoretic methods a suitable methodology for 
theoretical exploration and theory building. Instead of implying linear relationships and singular 
causation, the set-theoretic methods permit nonlinear relationships and explore complex 
causation. A thorough explanation of this methodological approach is presented in Ragin (2008) 
and Fiss (2007, 2011).       
 
Data and sample description 
Data from publicly listed firms in China were utilized for the purpose of this study. The 
empirical context was chosen deliberately for the following reasons. First, China is often 
recalled as an example of a highly relationship oriented culture, which originates from the 
Confucian philosophy and emphasizes the importance of social networks (guanxi) to a higher 
extent than in other countries (Chen, Chen, Huang, 2013; Park & Luo, 2001; Xin & Pearce, 
1996; Yang, 1994). Second, social relationships in this context not only influence the dynamic 
of society, but also economic activity and interorganizational relationships (Estrin & Prevezer, 
2011; Hitt, Lee, Yucel, 2002). The widespread influence of social networking resulted in the 
creation of informal mechanisms governing the business environment in China. For example, 
firms use guanxi to overcome resource dependencies or institutional disadvantages resulting 
from institutional transition (Park & Luo, 2001; Xin & Pearce, 1996). Therefore, this empirical 
context offers a unique opportunity to explore the concept of board social capital and study its 
influence on firm performance.  
Application of fsQCA requires extensive knowledge regarding the analyzed cases 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Therefore, a mid-N size sample of publicly listed firms 
operating in Transportation Equipment Manufacturing sector in 2009 was extracted from the 
China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. The database comprises data 
from annual reports and is an acknowledged source for research on Chinese firms, which has 
been utilized also in previous studies (e.g. Markóczy et al., 2013). According to the information 
in CSMAR, there were 97 publicly listed firms operating in the selected sector in 2009. The 
obtained data on affiliations of board members were subsequently categorized and coded to 
reflect different types of network ties, which directors had in their individual networks. During 
the coding process, the data was verified with other external sources to obtain as close as 
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possible approximation of social networks and collect additional information about the listed 
firms. However, limited sources of information and data that was hard to verify affected the size 
of the sample. Moreover, the fsQCA procedure may impose a limitation regarding a number of 
conditions that can be included in the analysis, because of limited diversity. To address these 
issues and increase comparability of cases, several sources of variation in firm performance 
were controlled for in the sampling process. Hence, 43 firms with similar characteristics were 
chosen for fsQCA analysis. All firms were publicly listed and operating in the same industry 
sector. Additionally, outliers in terms of firm size (total assets) were removed from the sample. 
In addition, the choice of a non-strategic sector, Transportation Equipment Manufacturing, 
enabled comparisons between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately-owned enterprises 
(POEs) as both types of firms operate in the sector, unlike in strategic industries, which are 
dominated by state-owned enterprises. Although a significant number of firms in the sample was 
located in Beijing and Shanghai, the sample included also firms from other industrialized areas 
of China, such as provinces Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hubei, Shaanxi, and Sichuan. The data for 
directors’ affiliations, which was used as a proxy for network ties, was for the year 2009. I 
applied a 2-year and 4-year lag for the outcome set (firm performance - ROA), as effects of 
board social capital on firm performance might not be observable shortly after new board 
appointments or decisions made in a given year. Therefore, observing firm performance over 
several years from 2009 offers a better perspective on the relationships.   
 
Causal conditions and set calibration  
The fsQCA methodology requires presentation of the selected causal conditions 
(variables) in a form of sets. The data has to be transformed in a way, which reflects chosen 
theoretical concepts, shows difference in kind and difference in degree amongst cases. 
Therefore, qualitative anchors (thresholds), ranging from 0 to 1, for set membership (1), non-
membership (0), and a crossover point of maximum ambiguity (0.5) have to be specified for 
each set. In the subsequent calibration process, membership scores in each set are assigned to 
the analyzed cases (observations). In this study, direct method of calibration was utilized, as 
described in Ragin (2008; 2006) and Fiss (2011), which transforms data into fuzzy-sets using 
log odds. Data calibration, similar to fsQCA analysis, was conducted using R software (Thiem 
& Dusa, 2013). 
Drawing upon previous research on social capital and social networks of boards (e.g. 
Hillman, Cannella, Paetzold, 2000); six causal conditions were selected for fsQCA analysis and 
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transformed into sets to reflect external and internal social capital: ties to business group, 
business ties, political ties, nonbusiness ties, internal social capital, and state ownership, which 
served as a dummy variable. The conditions operationalizing network ties intended to reflect 
strength of particular types of ties. Similarly to previous studies, strength of ties was measured 
as a ratio of a given type of ties to all network ties (Borgatti, Everett, Johnson, 2013; Haynes & 
Hillman, 2010). Firm performance was operationalized using return on assets (ROA). In the 
following description of measures, names of the sets are assigned in brackets to names of the 
selected causal conditions. Thresholds for set calibration are presented in Table 1. 
Ties to business group (strong ties to business group) were operationalized as a 
proportion of network ties that connect the firm to its controlling shareholders. The ties were 
established by board members holding positions in boards of directors of the shareholding 
companies. Distinction of this type of ties was particularly important in the empirical context of 
this study, in which the majority of firms operate as business groups (Carney, 2008; Keister, 
2000). The measure reflects firms’ embeddedness within business groups. The corresponding set 
labeled as ‘strong ties to business group’ was designed to capture high embeddedness of firms 
within business groups. It was conceptualized as a predominant presence of directors affiliated 
with the business group in the board of the focal firm. Hence, firms in which more than 57% 
(90th percentile) of external affiliations of board members were within the same business group 
were considered to have strong ties to business group, and thus to be fully in the set. Firms with 
less than 28% (50th percentile) were placed out of the set. The 75th percentile (41%) of the 
sample was selected as a crossover point.   
Business ties (strong business ties) were measured as a proportion of network ties of 
board members to other firms (board interlocks), excluding shareholding companies. In this 
example, a network tie was created when a board member of the focal firm had, at the same 
time, a position on a board of another firm. The set meant to capture firms with extensive 
network ties to other firms. Therefore, if 70% (90th percentile) of external affiliations of board 
members in the focal firms were interlocks to other firms, then the firms were considered to 
have strong business ties and full membership in the set. Firms with less than 40% of business 
ties (50th percentile) were considered to be out of the set.  The 75th percentile (60%) of the 
sample was selected as a crossover point.   
To differentiate between firms and boards that had political connections, a binary variable 
for political ties (existing political ties) was included in the study. The variable, and the 
corresponding crisp set, assigned the value of 1 for full membership to firms that had at least 
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one political connection created by a board member, and 0 for non-membership if political 
connections were not detected. This set included various types of political connections, since the 
connections may be created in multiple ways. Political ties may be created through board 
appointments of politicians, who work in ministries, central or local governments. In this was a 
direct link between a firm and government is formed. However, especially in the context of 
China, where the dominant Communist Party has a complex and wide-spread structure, 
politically connected individuals are also commonly employed in state-owned enterprises. These 
individuals serve as members of Party Committees, which are leadership structures of the Party 
formed in state-owned enterprises.     Knowing that reporting of political connections is a 
sensitive issue and that the actual presence of this type of ties may be underrepresented in the 
data, using a binary variable was an optimal solution to address this problem. It allowed a clear 
split between firms, which do and do not have politically connected members in their boards. 
Moreover, in the case of political connections, the more does not have to mean the better, since 
even one political connection may be already of great importance for the firm.         
In a similar approach to  Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold (2000) network ties to actors in 
external environment, who were representing stakeholders or conducting nonbusiness activity, 
were classified as nonbusiness ties (strong nonbusiness ties). This condition was 
operationalized as a proportion of network ties to nonbusiness actors, namely educational 
institutions, charities, domestic and international associations. Although this set could 
potentially include also ties to the government, because of the nonbusiness nature of this actor, 
for clarity of conclusions, all forms of political connections were classified in the set ‘existing 
political ties’. To capture high extensiveness of networking with nonbusiness actors, full 
membership of a firm in the set was considered only if more than 29% (90th percentile) of 
affiliations of board members were with these types of actors. Less than 13% (50th percentile) of 
nonbusiness affiliations was a threshold for non-membership in the set. The 75th percentile 
(22%) of the sample was selected as a crossover point.   
Internal social capital (extensive internal social capital) was captured by network 
density amongst board members (Borgatti, Jones, Everett, 1998; Kim, 2005; Oh, Labianca, 
Chung, 2006). In this case, network density is a proportion of the actual number of ties amongst 
board members to the number of possible ties. The measure was calculated based on the 
transformation of two-mode network data into one-mode data (Borgatti, Everett, Johnson, 
2013). Data transformation allowed for capturing the extent to which board members of one 
board shared positions in firms or nonbusiness institutions with other members. Therefore, the 
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transformed network data included only social ties, which were created amongst board members 
of one firm through working or being members of the same organizations. The corresponding 
set intended to capture cases with a high extent of internal networking amongst board members, 
thus with extensive internal social capital. Therefore, the threshold for full membership in the 
set was chosen to be at a density level of 0.428, which was the 90th percentile of the sample. 
Firms with network density amongst board members lower than 0.140 (50th percentile) were out 
of the set. The 75th percentile (0.290) of the sample was selected as a crossover point.   
The condition for state ownership was employed as a binary variable for differentiation 
between state-owned enterprises (SOEs), namely the enterprises in which the state was a 
controlling shareholder, and privately-owned enterprises (POEs). This condition was calibrated 
as a crisp set, thus only the qualitative anchor for full membership (1) and non-membership (0) 
had to be specified. This condition is particularly important for the empirical context of this 
study, considering the widespread activity of SOEs in China’s economy and still prevalent 
ownership of companies by local and central government (Chan, 2009; Groves et al., 1994; 
Naughton & Tsai, 2015). The inclusion of ownership condition allowed for capturing 
contingency of board social capital and differentiation between causal configurations affecting 
performance of SOEs and POEs.   
Firm performance (high firm performance) was operationalized by return on assets 
(ROA), which is a commonly utilized measure in previous studies (Jackling & Johl, 2009; 
Kusewitt, 1985; Morgan, Vorhies, Mason, 2009). The calibration of this condition required 
proper qualitative assessment of ROA. For this purpose, data from five leading firms in the 
sector was collected and compared to set a benchmark for other companies. The impact of 
strategic decisions made at the board level might not be captured immediately after the decision 
was made. Thus, it is worth observing firm performance over several time periods. In order to 
avoid biases and to include effects of long term strategic decisions that could affect ROA over 
time, the average ROA was observed over two and four years after the year of 2009. The 
differentiation of time periods allowed not only for a robustness check of results, but 
additionally, for conclusions regarding short-term and long-term performance. The set was 
constructed to include all firms that were performing better than the sample average. Hence, the 
threshold for full set membership was set at the midpoint between the sample average and the 
benchmark from the leading firms, namely at 0.07 for the average ROA over 2 years and 0.06 
for the average ROA over 4 years. Firms that reported a ROA lower than the sample average 
were out of the set. The sample average ROA indicated a crossover point.     
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 Table 1.  Causal conditions, sets and calibration thresholds 
 
 
Analytical procedure  
The fsQCA analytical procedure starts with analysis of necessity, which aims to identify 
necessary causal conditions for an outcome to occur (Ragin, 2008; Schneider & Wagemann, 
2012). Necessary causal conditions are inevitably linked to occurrence of an outcome. 
Regardless of whether conditions are calibrated as crisp sets or fuzzy sets, the conditions are 
considered necessary for the outcome if their consistency scores are equal or higher than 0.9 
(Ragin, 2006). 
In the next step, the fsQCA procedure identifies sufficient conditions for an outcome. The 
statement of sufficiency indicates that a given condition leads to an outcome, but there can be 
other conditions that create alternative paths to the same outcome. The literature recommends 
applying Quine-McCluskey’s algorithm for analysis of sufficiency to minimize a truth table, 
which contains assigned set membership scores. Also, the literature suggests thresholds for 
parameters, in order to make claims of sufficiency. Particularly, the sufficiency consistency 
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score is recommended to be set at 0.8 and the frequency threshold at 1 (Ragin, 2006; Ragin, 
2008; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). These recommendations were applied in this study.   
The output of sufficiency analysis includes three types of solutions, namely combinations 
of causal conditions leading to an outcome: complex solution, intermediate solution, and the 
most parsimonious solution. The solutions differ based on utilized simplifying assumptions 
regarding the expected relationships between the presence or absence of causal conditions and 
an outcome. The complex solution does not apply any simplifying assumptions. The 
intermediate solution allows for inclusion of simplifying assumptions, which are consistent with 
theoretical expectations (so called ‘easy counterfactuals’). The most parsimonious solution is the 
least complex, yet utilizes simplifying assumptions to the highest extent and allows inclusion of 
all logical reminders regardless of theoretical expectations. It is important to note that reduced 
complexity of solutions derives from the inclusion of simplifying assumptions that have to be 
carefully selected and theoretically justified. While intermediate solution includes theoretically 
driven ‘easy counterfactuals’, the most parsimonious solution includes ‘difficult counterfactuals’ 
and is the most concise expression produced through logical minimization. The QCA literature 
recommends interpretation of intermediate solution (Ragin, 2008) and comparison with the most 
parsimonious solution to identify core and complementary conditions. The core conditions occur 
in intermediate and the most parsimonious solution. The complementary conditions occur in 
intermediate solution, but not in the most parsimonious solution.  
For assessment of results fsQCA, similarly to other analytical techniques, utilizes 
parameters of fit, which in this case are measures of consistency and coverage that are computed 
according to the following formulas:  
 
 
where xi is a set membership score in a condition X and yi is a set membership score in an 
outcome Y.  
 
The consistency measure, which ranges from 0 to 1, can be loosely interpreted as a numerical 
expression of the extent to which a statement of sufficiency is consistent with empirical 
information at hand. The coverage measure expresses numerically empirical importance of a 
combination of conditions or a solution for explaining occurrence of an outcome. The measure 
54 
 
of coverage can be calculated for combinations of conditions and for the whole solution term, 
thus there are three types of this measure: row coverage, unique coverage, and solution 
coverage. The row coverage shows the importance of a given combination of conditions, namely 
a single path, in explaining an outcome. The unique coverage shows the degree in which an 
outcome is uniquely explained by a given path. The solution coverage shows the importance of 
all paths; taking together all sufficient combinations of conditions, in order to explain an 
outcome.       
Though fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) allows for exploration of 
complex causal relationships underlying board social capital and other organizational 
phenomena, the analysis is typically cross-sectional and static. The literature indeed recognizes 
this issue and emphasizes insufficient developments of the method to analyze time effects 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Recently an advancement of the method was proposed by 
Garcia-Castro and Ariño (2016), who integrated QCA with panel data analysis and developed 
relevant measures that capture consistency and coverage over time. Although this 
methodological advancement enables inclusion of time dimension into QCA analysis, its 
application to this study was problematic, because of limited data availability. The study utilized 
secondary data, which was carefully verified and coded to demonstrate variety of network ties 
formed by board members. However, construction of a longitudinal dataset when it comes to 
network ties is a considerable challenge for social network research (Borgatti, Everett, Johnson, 
2013). Even though CSMAR database provided the best available data on networks of board 
members of publicly listed firms in China in 2009, insufficient reporting or disclosure of such 
information in previous years limited the possible time frame of the analysis. For this reason, yet 
being aware of the implied limitations, the study applied a cross-sectional approach. However, 
separate QCA analyses were performed to investigate the relationships between board social 
capital and short-term and long-term performance. In this way the study to some extent 
addressed the limitations of cross-sectional analysis and offered a partial solution, which is 
recognized in the literature (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010, 2012).     
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RESULTS 
Configurations of network ties leading to high firm performance   
Following the fsQCA analytical procedure, firstly analysis of necessity was performed. A 
summary of the results is presented in Table 2. The analysis was conducted for all conditions 
and for negations of these conditions. The results demonstrated that neither individual 
conditions, nor negations of these conditions, met the criteria for necessity.   
 
Table 2. Analysis of necessity 
 
Subsequently, I performed analysis of sufficiency to identify configurations of network 
ties inducing high performance. At this stage I have applied directional expectations based on 
the literature on social connections of board members and their positive associations with firm 
performance (Harris & Helfat, 2007; Lester et al., 2008; Mahmood & Mitchell, 2004; Mizruch, 
1996; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988; Tian, Haleblian, Rajagopalan, 2011; Zona, Gomez-Mejia, 
Withers, 2015). The utilized directional expectations assumed that the presence of all conditions 
except state-ownership (absence of state-ownership) was leading to high firm performance. The 
assumption regarding the relationship between state-ownership and firm performance was 
driven by the evidences from previous studies exploring state-owned enterprises in China and 
the related market reforms (Lardy, 1993; Naughton, 2007; Naughton & Tsai, 2015). Although 
China’s economy has been successively transitioning towards the market economy model, still 
state-owned enterprises remain under control of the government and do not recognize profit 
maximization and stakeholder value as priority, because of soft budget constraints, widespread 
practice of politically connected promotions, and incentive systems not directly linked to actual 
performance (Li & Xia, 2008; Peng & Luo, 2000; Redding, 1990; Redding & Witt, 2007).  
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The results of analysis of sufficiency are presented in Table 3. For reporting of results, I 
employed notation from Ragin and Fiss (2008). In the reported solutions large circles indicate 
core causal conditions, namely the conditions that occur in the most parsimonious and the 
intermediate solutions. Small circles indicate complementary causal conditions, namely the 
conditions that occur only in the intermediate solution. Additionally, full circles indicate 
presence of a condition, while crossed out circles indicate its absence. Blank spaces indicate 
irrelevant conditions. For interpretation of results, it is important to mention that absence may 
not imply complete absence of a given condition. For example, if results show absence of 
“strong ties to business group”, it should be interpreted as absence of strong ties or not strong 
ties rather than as complete absence of ties to business group.   
 
Table 3. Configurations of causal cognitions leading to high firm performance 
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The results presented in Table 3 show sufficient configurations of causal conditions 
inducing high short-term (2-year ROA) and high long-term performance (4-year ROA). Three 
configurations were identified for short-term performance: solutions A1, A2, and A3. The 
solution term encompassing the alternative paths leading to high short-term performance 
covered 0.398 of fuzzy set membership in the outcome set, with consistency of 0.921. The 
configurations B1, B2, and B3 were found sufficient for high long-term performance. The 
solution term covered 0.251 of set membership in the outcome set, with consistency of 0.964.  
The analysis of sufficient configurations for high short-term performance (2-year ROA) 
revealed three alternative paths. Solution A1 suggests that boards of state-owned enterprises, 
which comprise of members with strong ties to nonbusiness actors in external environment, and 
which have a high extent of internal social capital amongst members, represent a sufficient 
combination of network ties leading to high short-term performance. Similarly to solution A1, 
solution A2 asserts that present of strong nonbusiness ties and political ties combined with 
extensive internal social capita amongst board members is sufficient for high short-term 
performance. The importance of political ties, particularly in boards of private firms, is 
emphasized in solution A3. The solution demonstrates that in private firms presence of these ties 
induces high short-term performance.   
The results for high long-term performance revealed three alternative configurations. 
Solution B1 illustrates the same pattern as solution A3, namely that in private firms presence of 
political ties induces high performance. Therefore, the results show that in private firms political 
ties of board members are relevant for high short-term and long-term performance. Solution B2 
presents an alternative causal path leading to high long-term performance of private firms. It 
suggests that presence of strong business ties to other firms and absence of extensive internal 
social capital leads to high long-term performance. Another alternative causal path is presented 
by solution B3. The solution, similarly to solution B1, emphasizes the relationship between 
presence of political ties in the boards of private firms and high long-term performance. 
However, in solution B3 political ties occur in combination with absence of strong business ties 
and absence of ties to business group.    
 
Configurations of network ties leading to firm underperformance   
The majority of traditional methodological approaches, like regression analysis, assume 
symmetry of the investigated relationships. However, reversed configurations of causal 
conditions that are sufficient for high firm performance may not explain underperformance. The 
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fsQCA methodology allows for exploration of asymmetric causal relationships. In order to 
explore this angle, this study proceeds with analysis of combinations of causal conditions 
leading to firm underperformance. The results are presented in Table 4.  
 
Table 4. Configurations of causal cognitions leading to firm underperformance 
 
 
 
The results show alternative combinations of network ties amongst underperforming firms 
in short-term (2-year ROA) and long-term (4-year ROA). The solution term for short-term 
underperformance covered 0.518 of set membership in the outcome set, with consistency of 
0.930. The solution term included four alternative configurations of causal conditions: C1, C2, 
C3, and C4. The results explaining underperformance in the long-term had solution coverage of 
0.279, with consistency of 0.912. The results for long-term underperformance revealed three 
alternative causal paths: D1, D2 and D3.  
The results show that in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) extensive board interlocks with 
firms within the same business group and presence of political ties combined with absence of 
interlocks with other firms and absence of strong nonbusiness ties induce short-term 
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underperformance (solution C1). Solution C4 presents an alternative causal path leading to 
short-term underperformance of SOEs. The solution combines presence of strong business ties 
with absence of ties to business group, nonbusiness ties and lack of extensive internal social 
capital amongst board members. Solutions C2 and C3 explain short-term underperformance of 
private firms. The causal configuration included in solution C2 associates absence of business, 
political, and nonbusiness ties with short-term underperformance of private firms. Alternatively, 
this outcome may be caused by absence of ties to business group combined with lack of political 
and nonbusiness ties (solution C3).      
The analysis of sufficient configurations inducing long-term underperformance revealed 
three alternative solutions. Solution D1 demonstrates the same pattern as solution C1 and 
confirms that presence of strong to business group and political actors combined with absence of 
business and nonbusiness ties is associated with short-term and long-term underperformance of 
state-owned enterprises. Solution D2 presents an alternative causal path, which links presence of 
strong business ties, absence of ties to business group, political and nonbusiness actors, and lack 
of internal social capital amongst board members with long-term underperformance of SOEs. 
Similarly to solution D2, solution D3 is relevant only for SOEs and associates absence of 
internal social capital and ties to business group, political and nonbusiness actors with long-term 
underperformance.       
 
Robustness check 
In set-theoretic methods, robustness check ought to verify if results hold under alternative 
calibration of conditions and different consistency thresholds (Schneider & Wageman, 2012). 
Firstly, the analysis was rerun, as advised in the literature, with at least two alternative 
consistency levels (Schneider & Wageman, 2012). Secondly, alternative calibration strategies 
were employed. Additionally, the analysis was rerun with return on equity (ROE) as an 
alternative performance measure.   
While in the initial analysis the consistency level was set at 0.8, in the robustness check, 
the level was lowered to 0.75, which is a lower-bound level of consistency acceptable in the 
literature (Fiss, 2011). The results were subsequently checked also with consistency set at 0.85. 
The increase in the level of consistency (0.85) caused changes in the solution paths and the 
parameters of fit, because less truth table rows were used in truth table minimization. The new 
solutions were in subset relation to the corresponding solutions obtained with consistency 
threshold at 0.8. When the consistency threshold was decreased to 0.75, the results were less 
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consistent, showed higher coverage, and were in superset relation to the solution terms obtained 
in analyses with higher consistency levels. Hence, the results are robust, since no substantial 
changes have occurred after changing thresholds for consistency.      
The initial calibration intended to capture a very high extent of networking activities 
performed by board members. Hence, the thresholds for set memberships were set relatively 
high (90th percentile) in order to grasp fairly extreme examples of networking. Deployment of 
alternative calibration strategies required keeping this principle in mind, while changing the 
thresholds for set membership, non-membership, and the crossover point. Specifically, two 
alternative strategies were applied to verify robustness of results. In the first strategy, the 
qualitative anchors were lowered by 10 percentile points. In the second strategy, the qualitative 
anchors were increased only by 5 percentile points, as the anchors for full membership were 
initially set at very high levels (90th percentile). The alternative calibration strategies were 
thoroughly designed to ensure that the new sets operationalize the same theoretical concepts 
investigated in the initial analysis. In both cases, results did not change substantially and 
demonstrated similar patterns regarding the analyzed relationships. Moreover, rerunning these 
models with different consistency thresholds (0.75 and 0.85) showed that solutions were in 
subset-superset relations, and thus confirmed robustness of results. The alternative calibration 
strategies were employed only to the causal conditions, which were initially calibrated using a 
percentile scale. As calibration of the outcome sets was conducted using strong qualitative 
assessment, which averted biased perception of the sets, it had not been changed for the 
robustness check. However, the analysis was rerun with return on equity (ROE) as an alternative 
outcome set. The results demonstrated similar logic of networking as identified for ROA. 
Although utilization of an alternative performance measure affected coverage (lower solution 
coverage), the results were not substantially different, thus robustness was confirmed.    
 
Post QCA analysis – illustration of findings  
While the analysis of sufficiency has identified causal configurations of network ties 
amongst high performing and underperforming firms, in this section the results are taken a step 
further to uncover more nuances of boards and social networks. It is also recommended in the 
literature to ‘go back to cases’ and link the obtained causal configurations with empirical 
examples (Ragin, 2008). Therefore, this post QCA analysis illustrates empirical examples of 
firms and their boards, which were forming the identified combinations of network ties 
contributing to high performance or underperformance. The detailed analysis of cases performed 
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at this stage revealed that the results were driven by shared patterns of forming network ties by 
board members and ownership types. The characteristics of the typical firms for each causal 
configuration are presented in Table 5.  
Solution A1 presents a causal path relevant for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Amongst 
SOEs typical for this solution there were also MNEs, which in this study were conceptualized as 
firms that own foreign subsidiaries. The causal configuration presented in the solution 
emphasizes the importance of non-business ties and extensive internal social capital for high 
short-term performance. The detailed analysis of networking patterns has shown that in these 
firms, inside directors held external positions in firms affiliated within the same business 
groups. It could have become a foundation for internal social capital within the board. Such 
activity also outside the board could have enhanced trust and information sharing. However, 
CEOs of these firms typically did not hold any external affiliations. On the contrary, the 
independent directors were not connected to this group. They were connecting the firm to 
nonbusiness actors, such as universities (e.g. Nantong University, Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University), research institutes (e.g. Tongji University China Scientific & Technological 
Management Research Institute), and professional associations (e.g. Shanghai Federation of 
Industry and Commerce, Shanghai Association of Automobile). These single nonbusiness ties 
have increased heterogeneity of network ties and diversity of potential resources. Therefore, 
these firms demonstrated a balanced combination of network ties in which connections to the 
business group created by inside directors were complemented by ties of independent directors 
to nonbusiness actors.     
Similarly to solution A1, solution A2 is also relevant for SOEs and MNEs. The 
combinations of causal conditions presented in solution A1 and A2 are alike, yet solution A2 
includes also presence of political ties. The political ties were usually formed by inside board 
members, including vice board chairmen and board chairmen, who were holding positions of 
Secretaries of Party Committees and in this way were included in the leadership structures of the 
Communist Party in state-owned enterprises linked to the same business group as the focal 
firms. Moreover, it was not unusual for CEOs to also hold such position in other business group 
affiliates and in this way form political connections. Apart from holding political ties, inside 
directors typically held directorships in firms affiliated with the same business group. These 
homogenous external affiliations may have had a positive impact on social relationships 
amongst the inside directors and in turn induce accumulation of board internal social capital. In 
the typical firms independent director were usually connecting the focal firms to diverse 
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nonbusiness actors, such as Washington State China Relations Council, China National Heavy 
Truck Technology Centre, or Changchun Institute of Taxation and China Chief Accountant 
Association. However, some of the independent directors had also political connection through 
being involved in political advisory, for example by working for Shanghai Municipal Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Therefore, the typical firms could have 
potentially benefited from political connections of inside and independent directors.  
Solution A3 and solution B1 demonstrate a causal path leading to high short-term (A3) 
and long-term (B1) performance of private firms (POEs). In the group of typical firms that 
represented this causal configuration there were also MNEs. The solutions suggest that presence 
of political ties in networks of private firms is associated with high performance in short term 
and long term. In the typical firms political ties were usually formed by independent directors, 
who held positions of Secretaries of Party Leadership Groups and Committees or consultants to 
the local governments, such as Guangzhou People’s Government or employees of Ministry of 
Finance. It was less likely for inside directors to have political ties, although such ties were 
identified in one firm in which an inside director was also a Secretary of Party Committee in a 
state-owned enterprise. Although the solution does not reflect other aspects of the networks 
created by the board members of the typical firms, a detailed analysis of network data revealed 
the following common patterns. Inside directors in these firms, CEOs, and board chairmen 
usually held external position in firms affiliated with the same business group as the focal firms, 
but also in nonaffiliated firms and nonbusiness actors, such as Society of Automotive 
Engineering of China, Wuhan University of Technology, China Association of Automobile 
Manufacturers, China Township Enterprise Association, etc. Hence, the external networks of 
insiders were encompassing diverse actors in firms’ environment. Although the independent 
directors were typically linking the firms to political actors, they also held directorship positions 
in other firms. Business ties of the independent directors also included ties to financial 
institutions, for example, China Pacific Insurance (Group) Co., Ltd. and Bank of Beijing. 
Moreover, the independent directors were also connected to nonbusiness actors, such as Renmin 
University of China and Fudan University Financial Futures Research Institute. Hence, both 
inside and independent directors of the typical firms were connected to actors with diverse 
profiles.     
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Solution B2 associates high long-term performance of private firms (POEs) with presence 
of strong business ties and absence of extensive internal social capital. In the typical firms CEOs 
and board chairmen held external board posts in firms directly affiliated with the same business 
group, but also in not affiliated firms. That was the case also for inside directors, who through 
numerous external directorships in other firms, not necessarily affiliated with the business 
group, created wide networks of business ties. Similarly to inside directors, independent 
directors also held board posts in other firms, yet not as commonly as the inside directors, and 
also single affiliations with nonbusiness actors, such as Shanghai University of Finance and 
Economics. Typically in these firms both inside and independent directors rarely held positions 
in the same firms, with exception of firms affiliated with the same business group. This diversity 
of external affiliations was also reflected in absence of extensive board internal social capital.       
Solution B3 presents a similar pattern to solution B1 and A3, namely it emphasized that 
presence of political ties of board members may be associated with high performance of private 
firms (POEs). This particular configuration combines presence of political ties with absence of 
strong business ties and ties to business group. The external networks of firms typical for this 
causal configuration had similar characteristics to firms demonstrating patterns B1 and A3. 
Particularly political connections of independent directors were a distinct characteristic of these 
firms. The independent directors formed these ties through holding positions of Secretaries of 
Party Leadership Groups in state-owned enterprises. Although the solution suggests that 
political ties combined with absence of business ties and ties to business group induce high 
long-term performance, it does not mean that board members did not hold any external 
affiliation. Some of inside and independent directors held external board post in other firms. 
Inside directors, apart from posts in firms affiliated with the same business groups as the focal 
firms, held directorships in other nonaffiliated firms and also positions in universities, such as 
Tongji University and Jilin University.  
Solution C1 and D1 demonstrate a possible causal path explaining underperformance of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in short term (C1) and long term (D1). The causal path includes 
presence of strong ties to business group. Indeed in the typical firms inside directors, and 
sometimes CEOs and board chairmen, held board post in the business groups, which the focal 
firms were affiliated with. Moreover, external connections of inside directors were also 
connecting the typical firms to political actors, as some of them were involved in Party 
Committees in other SOEs. The strong ties of inside directors to the business groups and 
political actors have formed foundations of external networks of the typical firms. In these firms 
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independent directors held only single external affiliations usually in other firms, including also 
firms operating in financial services sector, for example China Galaxy Securities Co., Ltd., 
Western Securities Co., Ltd. and in universities, such as Northwestern Polytechnical University 
School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University School of Economics & Finance, and 
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics.           
Solution C2 presents an alternative causal path leading to short-term underperformance. 
However, this path is only relevant for private firms (POEs). Although the causal configuration 
associates underperformance with lack of business, nonbusiness and political ties, it should not 
be interpreted that the typical firm for this configuration did not have any external ties. In fact 
CEO, who also served as board chairman, was affiliated with the same business group as the 
focal firm. Similar connections were also established by inside directors, though only few. Also 
the external networks of independent directors were not widespread and encompassed few 
connections to other firms that were established through board directorships.  
Similarly to solution C2, solution C3 shows an alternative causal path leading to 
underperformance of private firms (POEs) and associates this outcome with absence of political 
and nonbusiness ties. However, in solution C3 these conditions occur in combination with 
absence of strong ties to business group. In fact the external networks of the typical firms 
included numerous network ties of few inside directors and board chairmen. Although these 
individuals held board posts in various firms, only few of them were actually in firms affiliated 
with the same business groups as the focal firms. Independent directors in these firms rarely had 
any external affiliations, and if they had these were single board posts in other firms or academic 
positions at, for example, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. Therefore, the firms’ 
external networks were emerging from individual networks of few inside directors and board 
chairmen, who were actively performing various roles in boards of other firms.  
Solution C4 is relevant only for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Amongst typical firms 
that demonstrated such networking pattern there were also MNEs. The solution associates a 
combination of strong business ties and absence of ties to business group, nonbusiness actors 
and internal social capital with short-term underperformance of SOEs. In the typical firms 
representing this networking pattern inside directors, as well as CEOs and board chairmen, held 
numerous positions in firms not affiliated with the same business groups as the focal firms. 
Moreover, connections to the business groups rarely occurred in the networks and usually took 
form of single ties formed through holding directorships by few inside directors or board 
chairmen. These ties, however, were not dominant in the networks, yet sometimes were also 
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combined with political ties, since inside directors could also simultaneously performed the 
roles of Secretaries of the Party Committees in other SOEs. Nevertheless, the external networks 
of the typical firms were dominated by diverse business ties of inside directors. Independent 
directors in these firms rarely held any external connections. Most often only few of them 
actually had single external affixations with other firms, which operated in financial sector (e.g. 
Penghua Fund Management Co., Ltd. and Minsheng Investment Management Co., Ltd.) and 
with universities, such as Tongji University.  
Solution D2 presents a possible causal path leading to long-term underperformance of 
SOEs. This causal path is also relevant for MNEs. The solution associates presence of strong 
business ties and simultaneous absence of internal social capital, ties to business group, political 
and nonbusiness actors with long-term underperformance. The firms typical for this 
configuration had wide-spread external networks, which were created by inside directors. In 
these particular firms inside directors held multiple simultaneous board posts in other firms, 
which were not necessarily affiliated with the same business groups as the focal firms. The 
external networks of inside directors included, for example, firms operating in financial services 
(e.g. Beiche Investment Leasing Co., Ltd; Shandong JianBang Investment Management Co., 
Ltd) or other firms in the automobile industry (e.g. Jialing –Honda Engine Co., Ltd; Jialing 
Motor America Co., Ltd.; Beijing Huade Neoplan Bus Co., Ltd.) In fact majority of the board 
posts held by the inside directors were in nonaffiliated firms. The key actors in the typical firms, 
namely CEOs, board chairmen, assistant general managers, also held numerous board posts in 
other firms and the number of their external positions often made them the most connected 
individuals in the boards. Independent directors, in contrast to inside directors, either held single 
external affiliations or did not have any at all. Although numerous external affiliations were 
characteristic for inside directors, usually the directors were not affiliated with the same firms. 
Hence, their affiliations created disperse external networks and did not build up internal social 
capital inside the boardrooms.  
Solution D3 shows an alternative causal path explaining long-term underperformance of 
SOEs and is also relevant for MNEs. The causal path suggests that absence of ties to business 
group, political and nonbusiness actors combined with absence of extensive internal social 
capital leads to underperformance. However, this does not suggest that board members in the 
typical firms did not hold any external affiliations. In fact, the collected network data 
demonstrated that some of inside directors held few external affiliations and sometimes CEOs or 
board chairmen held the biggest number of external positions, though still few, in firms that 
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were not a part of the same business group as the focal firms. In the case of CEOs and board 
chairman connections to the business group were quite rare, as in the case of inside and 
independent directors, who usually held positions in nonaffiliated firms or did not have any 
external affiliations. Similarly to the firms representing solution D2, independent directors held 
external positions infrequently. Those board members, who actually had external board post, 
usually did not hold directorships in the same firms as their colleagues from the focal firms, thus 
this activity did not contribute to internal social capital accumulation.          
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION    
The existing  research on board social capital tends to concentrate on particular types of 
social ties, such as board interlocks (Davis, 1996; Shipilov, Greve, Rowley, 2010; Martin, 
Gözübüyük, Becerra, 2015), political connections (Hillman, Cannella, Paetzold, 2000; Lester et 
al., 2008; You & Du, 2012), or informal ties amongst board members (Stevenson & Radin, 
2009; 2014). This quite simplistic approach, however, ignores the fact that social ties of board 
members established to actors inside and outside the organization form an integrated system. 
Knowing this shortcoming of the literature, this study recognizes that social connections of 
board members ought to be analyzed from a system perspective. Moreover, it goes further into 
exploring nuances and performance implications of the interplay between social ties integrated 
into the system. Consequently, the relationship between internal and external social ties of board 
members and firm performance is conceptualized and empirically investigated in terms of 
complementarities and substitutions between the resources driving from social ties.  
Based on the empirical findings, complementarity exists, and leads to high short-term 
performance of state-owned enterprises, between strong nonbusiness ties and internal ties 
amongst board members. This result demonstrates positive consequences of bonding and 
facilitating role of internal social capital in decision making and group effectiveness (Coleman, 
1988, 1990; Oh, Chung, Labianca, 2004). The presence of strong nonbusiness ties in this 
combination highlights the fact that, as already shown in previous research (Hillman, Cannella, 
Paetzold, 2000), appointment of directors, who are active in a boarder community and bring 
ideas from nonbusiness actors in the firm’s environment, such as universities, business 
associations, economic forums, etc. may have positive impact on firm performance. The 
identified alternative solution adds presence of political ties in the board to this combination. 
This alternative solution demonstrates the pattern typical for emerging and transitioning 
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economies in which the state still holds significant stakes in firms and may have a significant 
impact on their performance (Douma, George, Kabir, 2006; Li & Xia, 2008; Tian & Estrin, 
2008; Tran, Nonneman, Jorissen, 2014; Zeitun, & Gang Tian, 2007). Moreover, direct or 
indirect support from the state in the form of, for example, governmental subsidies, protection 
from fierce market competition, or other favorable regulations make politicians and politically 
connected individuals attractive candidates for board directorships in state-owned and private 
firms (Estrin & Prevezer, 2011, Park & Luo, 2001; Peng & Luo, 2000; You & Du, 2012). The 
case of private firms has been confirmed also by the results of this study that clearly 
demonstrates association of the presence of political ties in boards of private firms with high 
short-term and long-term performance. In the case of private firms, high long-term performance 
is not only associated with the presence of political ties, but also with simultaneous absence of 
strong business ties and ties to business group. It suggests that in some cases absence of 
extensive external social capital may actually induce high firm performance. This 
counterintuitive finding may be explained by the previous evidences, which assert that although 
board members, who hold multiple board posts, act as boundary spanners and bridge boundaries 
between firms and environment, they may also be affected by downsides of extensive external 
social capital. While being overwhelmed by their responsibilities in other firms, directors may 
not dedicate enough attention to strategy development and management control in the focal 
firm, and consequently have negative impact on firm performance (Ferris, Jagannathan, 
Pritchard, 2003; Ruigrok, Peck, Keller, 2006). Therefore, the results show that board members 
without accumulating obligations may contribute better to firm performance and that absence of 
strong network ties, which conventionally could have been associated with underperformance, 
actually induces high long-term performance. Nevertheless, the results acknowledge the 
potential of bridging external social ties to business actors and their function as conduits for 
resource flow (Peng, 2004; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) that positively affect firm performance, 
yet in combination with absence of extensive internal social capital. Again, the results have 
demonstrated that absence of social capital may have positive performance implications. In this 
study internal social capital amongst board members derives from common external affiliations 
in other firms, also those within the same business group. Such interactions outside the 
boardroom of the focal firm may bond board members and build trust amongst them. However, 
recalling the arguments from the faultline theory, it is likely that members of a team split into 
subgroups based on their common attributes (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). Moreover, the members 
of the subgroups tend to show higher level of agreement than the overall level of the entire team 
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(Lau & Murnighan, 2005; Tuggle, Schnatterly, Johnson, 2010). Hence, dominant groups may 
emerge within the board, negatively affect decision making processes, and in turn, deteriorate 
firm performance (Harris & Helfat, 2007; Stevenson & Radin, 2009). 
The results explaining underperformance of firms in short and long term, in the case of 
private firms, have confirmed the conventional assumption that absence of external social 
capital may negatively affect performance. As argued by resource dependence theorists: “board 
size and composition are not random or independent factors, but are, rather, rational 
organizational responses to the conditions of the external environment” (Pfeffer, 1972: 226). 
Hence, boards that lack external social capital lower their capacity to bridge organizational 
boundaries and address environmental dependencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Moreover, the 
results also emphasize absence of political ties, which in the case of private firms operating in 
emerging markets often have greater impact on performance than in state-owned firms (Li & 
Zhang, 2007; Peng & Luo, 2000). While underperformance of state-owned firms can also be 
explained by absence of social capital, both internal and external, what may indicate that board 
members of these firms had small professional networks and lacked cooperative orientation, yet 
it can be also caused by domination of particular types of social ties in the board. If board 
members hold simultaneously numerous board posts in other firms, thus form strong business 
ties, and at the same time the board lacks other types of ties, including internal ties amongst 
board members, then such orchestration of social ties leads to underperformance. This evidence 
confirms the arguments regarding negative influence of ‘busy boards’ on firm performance 
(Ferris, Jagannathan, Pritchard, 2003; Ruigrok, Peck, Keller, 2006). Moreover, this argument 
was also echoed in the context of firm bankruptcy, in which multiple board interlocks were 
more likely to occur in firms ending up in bankruptcy than in non-bankrupt firms (De Maere, 
Jorissen, Uhlaner, 2014). Furthermore, the results have shown that a combination of strong ties 
to business group and political ties, in absence of other types of social ties, is associated with 
short-term and long-term underperformance of state-owned firms. Hence, the results confirm 
negative consequences of mixing political interest with business activity of state-owned firms, 
namely when political goals overshadow operational efficiency and profit maximization (Li & 
Xia, 2008; Tian & Estrin, 2008; Redding, 1990). The results also highlight negative effect of 
state-ownership on firm performance. The condition representing state-ownership has been 
found sufficient in five out of seven causal configurations inducing firm underperformance and 
only in one out of six configurations leading to high performance. This finding reflects a 
common pattern in emerging economies, where private firms have stronger incentive to manage 
70 
 
their earnings and implement profit-maximizing strategies than state-owned firms, which 
capitalize on state support, through for example subsidies, and legitimacy of the state 
(Naughton, 2007; Naughton & Tsai, 2015; Tran, Nonneman, Jorissen, 2014). Moreover, 
political influence on internal promotions and lack of performance-based incentive system 
demotivate employees and harm organizational efficiency, which in turn negatively affects firm 
performance (Gabriele, 2010; Li & Zhang, 2007; Ralston et al., 2006).   
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it demonstrates that board 
social capital is a more complex phenomenon than has been assumed in previous studies and can 
be better understood by adopting a holistic approach to social ties of board members that form 
an integrated system. In this way it adds on top of the existing studies that predominantly have 
been focusing on the effects of particular types of social ties, such as ties to political actors in 
the context of developed (Goldman, Rocholl, So, 2009; Hillman, 2005; Lester et al., 2008) and 
developing economies (Li & Zhang, 2007; Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Park & Luo, 2001), and board 
interlocks (Mizruchi, 1996; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1994; Zona, Gomez-Mejia, Withers, 2015). 
The study emphasizes that in order to understand how board social capital affects organizations 
and their performance scholars ought to recognize that it derives from the system of social ties 
that board members may establish with numerous types of actors, such as firms affiliated with 
the same business group and other firms in the environment, like also to political and 
nonbusiness actors, for example, universities or professional associations.  
Second, the study uncovers the overlooked nuances of the interplay between the resources 
deriving from external and internal social ties. It particularly argues that the resources may be 
orchestrated in such a way to enhance their effect on performance, thus to complement each 
other. Therefore, it encourages conceptualizing and analyzing social ties of board members in 
terms of causal combinations. The empirical evidences show that, in the case of social ties, the 
more does not mean the better outcome, as also absence of social ties may be a part of a causal 
combination leading to high firm performance. Moreover, the study proposes and empirically 
investigates substitutions between the resources deriving from social ties of board members. In 
this way it reveals the possible alternative causal combinations leading to high performance. The 
notions of complementarities and substitutions may be also applied to explanation of firm 
underperformance, and consequently contribute to better understanding of the relationship 
between board social capital and firm performance.     
Third, the study thoroughly discusses social relationships of board members with actors 
inside and outside the organization. It argues that board members are in fact individuals, who 
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over the course of their careers may establish numerous social ties to diverse actors. In this way 
the study highlights the ‘human side’ of boards (Huse, 2007, Osterloh, Frey, Frost, 2001) that is 
often overlooked in corporate governance research. The study, therefore, brings the behavioral 
aspects of boards and governance again into light, by emphasizing social relationships of board 
members and their impact on firm performance.    
Finally, the use of fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) in this study 
illustrates that different methodologies can enhance understanding of supposedly well-known 
notions in corporate governance. FsQCA brings novelty into modeling in corporate governance 
research, as it enables empirical investigation of complex causal relationships and complements 
research focused on linear causality. The mechanisms of complementarity and substitution often 
appear in corporate governance, as in the example of governance practices (Garcia-Castro, 
Aguilera, Ariño, 2013). Hence, set-theoretic methods hopefully bring corporate governance 
research closer to practice and help to develop more applicable recommendations. 
While this study provides several contributions of the literature, it still has some 
limitations. First, this study is based on secondary data, and thus reflects board social capital 
only to some extent. However, obtaining primary data on social ties of directors and executives 
is a considerable challenge for researchers. Therefore, the utilized database, which is an 
acknowledged source of data for research on Chinese listed firms (e.g. Markóczy et al., 2013), 
was considered to provide the best available approximation of social ties of board members. 
Replication of the study using survey data could enrich the results through a more nuanced 
calibration of internal and external social capital, which could not have been captured within the 
scope of this study.  
Second, while investigating the relationship between social capital and firm performance, 
I employed return on assets (ROA) as a suitable measure of performance. It is a commonly 
applied measure (Mizruchi, 1996; Zona, Gomez-Mejia, Withers, 2015), which enables 
comparability of results with previous studies. Moreover, an alternative performance measure, 
return on equity (ROE), was additionally applied to verify robustness of results. However, the 
study recognizes limitations of using accounting measures of performance and that firm 
performance is a multidimensional concept. Therefore, for future research it is recommended to 
adopt measures that capture multiple aspects of performance, such as stock-based Tobin’s Q. 
Moreover, board social capital is a rich concept that influences organizations in multiple ways. 
Future studies could provide new insights into configurations of network ties leading to other 
organizational outcomes or processes, such as director selection or firm strategic orientation.  
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Third, the applied method (fsQCA) imposes few limitations on the study, although it 
indeed enables exploration of overlooked nuances of the relationship between board social 
capital and firm performance. Because of specificities of the method only a limited number of 
causal conditions may be taken into consideration in empirical analysis. This is the case also in 
this study, which has investigated only conditions approximating social ties of board members 
and ownerships type in relation to firm performance. The sampling process, which eliminated 
outliers for the sample and increased comparability of the cases, has partially addressed this 
issue. Moreover, the performed post-QCA analysis added more detailed insights to the primary 
results. Nevertheless, the performed analysis does not control for all possible sources of variable 
in firm performance. In addition, it has to be kept in mind that fsQCA is sensitive to set 
calibration and specification of thresholds for consistency. This study includes several positive 
robustness checks, thus robustness of results has been confirmed. Another limitation derives 
from the static nature of the method. FsQCA, similarly to other set-theoretic methods, is 
typically applied to cross-sectional data and still it is problematic to include time effects into 
analysis. To address this limitation, the study includes separate analyses explaining short-term 
and long-term outcomes – firm performance. Conducting separate analyses in order to, at least 
some extent, explain complex causal relationship over time is recognized in the literature as a 
partial solution to the problem (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). However, future research could 
apply a novel approach proposed by Garcia-Castro and Ariño (2016), who have combined QCA 
with panel data econometrics. Their approach offers measures of consistency and coverage that 
are applicable to panel data, and thus advances longitudinal QCA research. It is worth 
mentioning that corporate governance and management scholars are paying more and more 
attention to methodological developments of set-theoretic methods and acknowledge the 
advancement proposed by Garcia-Castro and Ariño (2016) to harness the analytical power of 
QCA (Misangyi et al., 2017).  
Lastly, the study provides evidences from an emerging economy, what can be considered 
as an advantage. Still, the choice of the empirical context imposes also limitations on 
generalizability of the results. The result may be generalized to other emerging economies, 
which are going through institutional transition and where the state is still a powerful actor in 
the business environment. Moreover, also in other emerging economies the underdeveloped 
market institutions are the reason for greater reliance on social ties than on contracts and 
regulations governing economic activity. It is in a stark contrast to developed economies, where 
firms respect and trust the rule of law and, therefore, do not use social ties in economic activity 
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to the same extent as firms in emerging economies (Naughton & Tsai, 2015; Redding & Witt, 
2007). Moreover, the results are only generalizable to sectors with similar characteristics to 
those analyzed in this study, namely to the sectors, which are not dominated by state-owned 
firms and which are considered as non-strategic. Having in mind the empirical evidences of this 
study, and the revealed importance of political ties for firm performance, future studies could 
elaborate on this issue also in the context of developed economies. There are numerous 
evidences in the literature showing that political connections are also important in this context 
(Goldman, Rocholl, So, 2009; Hillman, 2005; Lester et al., 2008) and a thorough investigation 
of this issue could further uncover the link between business and politics. Regardless of the 
limitations, this study hopefully opens a discussion on how board social capital has hitherto 
been researched and how the existing research can be advanced through adopting new 
perspectives, such as complementarities and substitutions between resources, and new 
methodological developments, such as fsQCA.    
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Chapter 3: Social Capital of Board Chair and its Performance 
Implications 
 
 
 
Abstract: This study challenges the traditional view on the role of board chair by emphasizing its social 
dimension. Board chair, similarly to CEO and directors, may have wide-spread social connections within 
and outside the firm. Therefore, the study proposes analyzing performance implications of 
complementarities and substitutions between external and internal social capital of board chair, CEO, and 
the board. The empirical findings confirm the rational for analyzing this complex causal relationship as 
alternative configurations of conditions. Apart from advancing research on board chair and social capital 
in board of directors, the study contributes to uncovering behavioral aspects of governance by 
emphasizing the role of social relationships within and outside the boardroom. Moreover, the study 
shows how application of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) may advance the existing research 
and tackle causal complexity underlying social capital phenomenon.        
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance scholars have put considerable attention to uncovering the human 
side of boards of directors (Huse, 2007; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005; Van Ees, Gabrielsson, Huse, 
2009). For this reason, board research started focusing on social capital of CEO and directors. 
Existing research in this domain has been particularly concentrating on causes and consequences 
of social connections of CEO and directors, and their potential performance implications (Daily 
& Johnson, 1997; Davis, Yoo, Baker, 2003). Because of multidimensionality of this problem, 
even nowadays individual social capital of key actors in boards of directors is a recurrent topic 
in corporate governance and management studies (Geletkanycz & Boyd, 2011; Martin, 
Gözübüyük, Becerra, 2015). Despite the growing body of literature regarding social capital in 
boards of directors, previous studies have overlooked social capital of board chair. Only recently 
this topic appeared in research agenda (Krause, Semadeni, Withers, 2016; Krause, 2017). 
Ignoring the role of board chair social capital results in an incomplete picture of social 
relationships within the boardroom and omits an important individual, who as a member of 
corporate elite may hold resourceful social connections to actors in firm’s environment. 
Building on the latest empirical evidences and the extant literature on CEO and board social 
capital (Geletkanycz & Boyd, 2011; Haynes & Hillman, 2010; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Westphal, 1999; Zajac, & Westphal, 1996), this study aims to address the shortcoming of the 
literature and explore social capital of board chair with its possible performance implications.    
The literature traditionally discusses the role of board chair in the context of CEO duality. 
Separation of CEO and board chair positions is a mean to limit CEO power in the boardroom 
and to enhance internal control (Boyd, 1995; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
However, the role of board chair does not have to be limited to control function. Board chair is a 
liaison between CEO and directors, and is involved in complex relationships within the 
boardroom. Board chair through her/his social relationships with CEO and directors may 
influence board effectiveness. Moreover, through her/his social relationships with external 
actors, board chair may provide valuable resources and span firm’s boundaries. Furthermore, 
internal and external social relationships of board chair potentially have an impact on firm 
performance. Despite this quite intuitive extension of board chair’s role, scholars have only 
recently acknowledged it and its performance implications (Krause, Semadeni, Withers, 2016). 
However, firm performance does not solely depend of social capital of board chair. Boards of 
directors engage a number of individuals, who come with different industry background, can 
have wide-spread professional networks, or even get to know each other over the course of their 
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careers while working in other firms. Therefore, boards of directors encompass complex sets of 
social relationships amongst their members, including CEO and board chair, as well as their 
relationships with other firms, governments, business associations, etc.           
Taking into account embeddedness of board chair in internal relationships within the 
boardroom and her/his external relationships, this study explores how social capital of board 
chair may induce high firm performance and if it can also cause firm underperformance. Since 
boards of directors comprise complex sets of internal and external relationships, firm 
performance is affected by combinations of relationships rather than by a single relationship. 
Therefore, performance implications of board chair social capital ought to be investigated in 
configurations with internal and external social capital of CEO and the board. Knowing that the 
key actors in the board of directors may have extant professional networks outside the firm 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; McDonald, Khanna, Westphal, 2008), complementarity and 
substitution are proposed between external social capital of board chair, CEO, and the board. 
Internal social relationships between CEO and the board, like also amongst directors, may build 
trust and facilitate collaboration (Harris & Helfat, 2007; Westphal, 1999). Board chair owing to 
internal relationships within the boardroom may perform the role of a liaison more effectively 
and consequently increase board effectiveness. Therefore, this study proposes complementarity 
and substitution between internal social capital of board chair, CEO, and the board. To 
empirically investigate combinations of external and internal social capital of board chair, CEO, 
and the board; and their possible performance implications, I applied fuzzy-set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin, 2006, 2008). The method is particularly relevant for 
empirical exploration of combinations of factors leading to a given outcome, and thus for 
studying complex causal relationships. This methodological approach is still new in the 
literature. However, it is becoming more recognized and has been recently applied in strategic 
management studies (Garcia-Castro & Francoeur, 2016; Greckhamer, 2016), corporate 
governance (Garcia-Castro, Aguilera, Ariño, 2013, Misangyi & Acharya, 2014), and 
international business (Pajunen, 2008; Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop, Paunescu, 2010).   
This study offers the following contributions to the literature. First, the study advances 
research on board chair through challenging the predominant perspective in this field and 
focusing on social dimension of boards of directors. It argues that apart from the traditionally 
assigned control function (Boyd, 1995; Fama & Jensen, 1983), board chair may perform a 
boundary-spanning role and improve collaboration within the boardroom. The study 
consequently enhances understanding of firms that split the roles of CEO and board chair. 
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Second, the study proposes analyzing performance implications of social capital of board chair, 
CEO, and the board in terms of complementarities and substitutions. This approach is 
subsequently supported by the empirical findings that reveal the existing complex causal 
relationships between internal and external social capital of board chair, CEO, and the board 
with firm performance and underperformance. Third, the study adds also to research on 
behavioral aspects of governance and boards of directors (Huse, 2007; Van Ees, Gabrielsson, 
Huse, 2009), as is puts emphasis on performance implications of social relationship of board 
chair, CEO, and directors. Lastly, the study offers a methodological contribution by 
demonstrating how complex causal relationships can be empirically investigated using fuzzy-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). Moreover, it presents advantages of configurational 
methodologies and opens area for future advancements in corporate governance studies. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides theoretical background for 
the study with emphasis on the concepts of external and internal social capital of board chair, 
CEO, and the board. Further, propositions regarding their association with firm performance are 
developed. Next, fsQCA method is described and applied to the studied relationship. Discussion 
of empirical findings and research limitations conclude the study.   
 
THEORETICAL BACKGOUND 
Traditional corporate governance research has been applying an economic approach to 
studying boards of directors (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Although this 
approach shed light on formal control mechanism aimed at protecting shareholders from 
opportunistic managers, it has not gone deep into the actual board behavior and often produced 
ambiguous results. This shortcoming triggered development of new directions in board research 
that were focusing on behavioral aspects of boards of directors (Daily, Dalton, Cannella, 2003; 
Osterloh, Frey, Frost, 2001; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004). Since then corporate governance 
scholars have been looking into boards trying to understand their behavior, decision making 
process, arising conflicts, bargaining, but also cooperation amongst board members (Huse, 
1998; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005). The recognition of the human side of corporate governance and 
boards as decision-making groups of individuals (Huse, 2007) has reoriented board research to 
studying abilities of board members to actually perform their control and strategy roles. For this 
reason, numerous scholars started exploring professional background and qualifications of board 
members, thus exploring the role of their human capital (Carpenter, Sanders, Gregersen, 2001; 
Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009; Tian, Haleblian, Rajagopalan, 2011). Individuals appointed to 
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board of directors have various backgrounds and employment history, thus may provide 
expertise and knowledge deriving from their current and previous appointments (Carpenter & 
Westphal, 2001). On top of that, the current and previous appointments, together with other 
affiliations of board members, constitute a pool of connections and resources deriving from 
these connections, such as expertise, access to resources, legitimacy, reputation etc. that 
potentially benefit the firm and support decision-making in the boardroom (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). This demonstrates a social dimension of boards, their interactions with stakeholders and 
actors in firm’s environment, and also potential resource provision through social ties of board 
members. 
The social dimension of boards is embraced by the concept of board social capital, which 
is defined as actual and potential resources accumulated within board’s network of social 
relationships (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Board members can 
establish social connections to actors within and outside the firm. For this reason, scholars tend 
to differentiate between internal and external social capital (Kim & Cannella, 2008; Tian, 
Haleblian, Rajagopalan, 2011). External social capital derives from social ties to actors outside 
the firm that are created through holding multiple board posts, memberships in non-business 
organizations, professional associations, political activity, etc. In this way directors through 
social ties formed to external actors cross boundaries between the firm and its external 
environment. This perspective expands the role of directors to boundary-spanning activities, 
which may help firms to gain competitive advantage (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Wu, 2008), 
capture opportunities (Li et al., 2014), and positively influence firm performance (Barroso-
Castro, del Mar Villegas-Periñan, Casillas-Bueno, 2015). 
The literature conceptualizes social capital of CEO in a similar manner. The high status of 
executive position makes CEO a member of corporate elite (Davis, Yoo, Baker, 2003; Jensen & 
Zajac, 2004; Useem, 1979). It allows CEO to establish connection to important actors in politics 
or in industry. In this way CEO gets an alternative perspective on strategy and organizational 
practices that may consequently increase firm performance (McDonald, Khanna, Westphal, 
2008; McDonald & Westphal, 2003; 2010). External social capital constitutes also a dimension 
of CEO power, namely a prestige power that derives from social ties to high profile actors. 
Social ties of CEO can extend beyond peers to alumni groups of prestigious universities, 
professional associations and forums (Finkelstein, 1992). Moreover, CEOs are desirable 
candidates for directorships nominees (Fich, 2005). Therefore, such opportunities provide CEO 
with a wide access to other companies, information, and potentially resourceful connections.     
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Previous research has devoted considerable attention to external social capital of directors 
and CEO. However, it failed to recognize the potential resources deriving from external social 
capital of board chair. Conventionally the role of board chair has been seen as liaising between 
CEO and the board, organizing board work and meetings. In some cases, the role may be offered 
to a stepping down CEO or a former CEO (Quigley & Hambrick, 2012). Similarly to CEO, 
board chair holds an important position within organization, but also can be active outside 
through holding multiple board posts, memberships in business associations, lobby groups, etc. 
Serving on multiple boards of directors exposes the chair to different functional areas and 
professional contacts with actors outside the firm. Consequently, board of directors may 
perceive the chair as a resource and her/his social connection as important assets for the firm 
(Krause, Semadeni, Withers, 2016). In addition, board chair may become a source of advice and 
expertise to CEO. In this case, collaborative orientation of board chair would add to positive 
performance implications (Krause, Semadeni, Withers, 2016; Krause, 2017). In stark contrast to 
the traditional perspective on the role of board chair, which has been associated with control and 
eliminating CEO duality, the role may go beyond the conventional functions. Therefore, 
similarly to CEO and corporate directors, board chair may also perform a boundary-spanning 
role in the firm.   
Board chair over the course of career may hold multiple positions, develop potentially 
resourceful connections, and thus accumulate external social capital in her/his network of social 
relationships. External social capital of board chair can benefit the firm and have potentially 
positive effect on its performance. However, the board chair does not function in a vacuum and 
is not exclusively affecting organizational outcomes. Firm performance is affected also by social 
capital of other actors, since board chair is a member of the group responsible for strategic 
decision making, management, and oversight of the firm. Therefore, the performance effect of 
board chair external social capital ought to be perceived from a perspective, which takes into 
account social capital of other actors in the board. Typically board chair, CEO, and directors are 
highly qualified individuals with relevant professional experience. Over the years the board 
chair, as well as CEO and directors, may accumulate substantial resources in their social 
networks through interacting with professionals and executives in other firms. As members of 
the corporate elite they may use their external connections to seek advice of other executives, in 
order to overcome organizational challenges (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009; McDonald & 
Westphal, 2010). Their professional career path may, for example, lead the board chair, CEO, or 
a director to engage in political activity or a lobby group. Moreover, accepting board posts in 
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another firm may enhance industry knowledge of these individuals (Hillman, Cannella, 
Paetzold, 2000). Therefore, the knowledge, expertise, and other resources deriving from social 
connections established through current and previous professional experience of the board chair, 
CEO, and directors may be complementary and lead to better decision making, thus potentially 
increase firm performance. It is consequently proposed that:  
 
Proposition 1: Complementarities between the resources deriving from the external social 
capital of the board chair, CEO, and the board will contribute to high firm 
performance. 
 
Alternatively, as resources deriving from social connections to external actors, and thus 
external social capital, can be accumulated over time and through diverse professional 
experiences (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009), it is possible that the board chair, CEO, or directors 
may actually lack external social capital, because they have not developed it over the course of 
their careers. Board of directors is a pool of resources to which each actor can contribute by 
bringing the resources deriving from her/his individual network of social connections. If some 
actors in the board lack external social capital, the resources deriving from social connections of 
other actors may still effectively support strategic decision making and oversight of the firm. 
Therefore, external social capital of one individual, either the board chair, CEO, or a director, 
may be compensated or substituted for by the external social capital of another individual. The 
value of the resource deriving from external social connections is subjective and not necessarily 
linked to the function or the position of the individual, who is bringing them to the board. For 
this reason, substitution between the resources of the board chair, CEO, and directors is 
possible, and because of the potential contribution of the resources to decision-making process, 
it may also lead to high firm performance. Considering this feature of external social capital of 
the key actors in the boardroom, it is proposed that:  
 
Proposition 2: The resources deriving from the external social capital of the board chair, CEO, 
or the board may compensate for the absence of external social capital of the 
other actors in the boardroom and contribute to high firm performance.   
 
Apart from forming connections to external actors, board chair, CEO, and directors may 
establish social relationships within the firm. These internal relationships constitute a foundation 
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for internal social capital of individuals, such as board chair and CEO, but also for a group, 
namely the entire board of directors. Therefore, internal board social capital captures resources 
available through social ties created within a firm, including also connections to other board 
members and CEO. Repeated social interactions of board members strengthen their internal 
social relationships and in consequence accumulate resources, such as trust, common norms and 
beliefs, and understanding amongst the members (Coleman, 1988). These resources lower 
coordination and transaction cost (Pfeffer, 1983; Williamson, 1975), increase propensity of 
board members to collaborate and improve board effectiveness (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). 
Internal social capital has also been recognized for facilitating teamwork (Harris & Helfat, 
2007). Moreover, internal social relationships make directors more willing to share knowledge 
and information with others, and consequently may increase effectiveness of decision-making 
process (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Oh, Chung, Labianca, 2004; Oh, Labianca, Chung, 2006). 
Internal social capital of CEO, especially in the case when it derives from social ties to 
board members, is full of nuances and seems to be characterized by a recurring tradeoff between 
control and collaboration (Boyd, Haynes, Zona, 2011). Social connections between CEO and 
board members are polarized in the literature by distinction of two divergent board models: 
independent and collaborative (Westphal, 1999). The independent model builds on the 
arguments from the agency theory that separation of management and control functions supports 
effective monitoring of managerial opportunism and prevents potential entrenchments (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Hence, CEO should not hold social ties with board 
members, in order to ensure objectivity and effectiveness of internal control mechanism. In 
contrast to this perspective, the collaborative board model advocates for cooperation between 
CEO and the board (Westphal, 1999). Therefore, presence of social ties between CEO and the 
board may help to build trust and facilitate cooperation in the boardroom (Ashford & Northcraft, 
1992). Moreover, social connections may increase propensity of CEO to seek advice amongst 
board members and increase overall board effectiveness through better communication and 
willingness to share knowledge (Oh, Chung, Labianca, 2004; Oh, Labianca, Chung, 2006; 
Roberts & O'reilly, 1974). 
While serving as a liaison between CEO and directors, the board chair is exposed to the 
relationships between and amongst these actors. It does not mean, however, that board chair is 
not involved in these relationships. Moreover, the board chair may actually have lasting social 
relationships with CEO and directors that could have been established in the past, since these 
individuals likely hold simultaneous positions in other firms (Geletkanycz, & Boyd, 2011; 
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Martin, Gözübüyük, Becerra, 2015; Quigley & Hambrick, 2012). The existing literature has 
overlooked the presence of internal social relationships of board chair and their organizational 
implications. Presumably presence of internal social relationships may encourage board chair to 
take a collaborative approach to governance. Following Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003), 
taking a collaborative approach to governance means that “directors and executives seek to 
become a cohesive ‘governing team’ ” (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003:400). In such case, the 
board chair may seek to become an approachable source of guidance and support, apart from 
liaising between CEO and directors (Krause, 2017). In fact, the board chair in performing 
her/his role does not have to compromise between collaboration and control of CEO, but focus 
on constructive inputs and effective teamwork.   
Previous research has shown that social ties between CEO and directors build trust, 
increase propensity to seek reciprocal advice and consequently may have positive performance 
implications (Westphal, 1999). Also, social ties amongst directors have been associated with 
greater knowledge sharing and collaboration (Harris & Helfat, 2007). Therefore, the presence of 
social ties between the board chair, CEO and directors may additionally enhance trust between 
them and facilitate teamwork. The intertwined internal relationships in the boardroom that carry 
such resources as trust, empathy, mutual understanding and obligations, etc. consequently may 
improve internal dynamics and have a positive impact on working relationships. This 
demonstrates the possible complementarity between the resources transmitted through internal 
relationships of the key actors in the board. The conjugated positive impact of the resources on 
board effectiveness, as the accumulated trust make board members more willing to cooperate, 
share knowledge with others, and seek guidance, also suggests their association with high firm 
performance. Therefore, it is proposed that:      
 
Proposition 3: Complementarities between the resources deriving from the trust-building 
internal relationships that shape the internal social capital of the board chair, 
CEO, and the board will contribute to high firm performance.  
 
Taking an alternative perspective on internal social relationships, it can be argued that 
boards of directors are groups of different individuals, who may, but not necessarily, 
demonstrate abilities for cooperation. Although boards do not comprise randomly selected 
members, still cooperation with some members may be easier than with others. Moreover, 
changes to board composition may bring new people, who have to fit into the established group. 
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Therefore, sometimes boards may experience low levels of trusts, communication problems, and 
even difficulties in making decisions that result from shortage of internal social capital. Trust, 
common norms and beliefs that derive from social relationships amongst group members have a 
positive effect on group performance (Coleman, 1988). However, boards of directors are groups 
of professionals, who first of all establish professional relationships with each other. 
Nevertheless, on top of the professional relationships governing board’s affairs, cooperation in 
the boardroom may be improved by trust-building internal relationships. The presence of CEO-
board relationships or relationships amongst directors, because both are positively associated 
with teamwork, may contribute to building up consensus seeking abilities in the boardroom. 
Moreover, because of the positive effect on board effectiveness, trust and collaborative 
orientation deriving either from the internal relationships between CEO and the board or from 
the relationships amongst directors may be associated with high firm performance. The 
constellation of internal relationships, however, also includes board chair, who acts as a liaison 
between CEO and the board, and in this way is constantly involved in board’s affairs and 
affected by internal relationships amongst board members. The board chair acts as a bridge 
between the two powerful actors, who make crucial decision for the firm. If these actors lack 
communication or understanding, it is the responsibility of board chair to step in, negotiate, and 
ease teamwork. Therefore, internal social capital of board chair may as well serve as a substitute 
for CEO-board relationships or relationships amongst directors. Consequently, it may improve 
board effectiveness and have positive performance implications. Taking into account the 
abovementioned properties of internal social capital, it is proposed that: 
 
Proposition 4: The resources deriving from the internal social capital of the board chair, CEO, 
or the board may compensate for the absence of trust-building internal 
relationships amongst board members and contribute to high firm performance.   
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
The posed research question regarding performance implications of the possible 
complementarities and substitutions between social capital of board chair, CEO, and the board 
has motivated the choice of methodology. The analyzed problem implies consideration of 
multiple configurations of interdependent factors, thus the methodology ought to build on 
configurational logics. Therefore, fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) was 
chosen as a research method. The literature sees major advantages of the method in the ability to 
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capture causal complexity, namely conjunctural causation, equifinality, and causal asymmetry 
(Ragin, 2008; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Conjunctural causation assumes that 
conjunctions of causal conditions are leading to an outcome, rather than individual conditions. 
This approach is fundamentally different from the predominant methodological approach in 
management studies in which scholars tend to focus on individual effects of causal conditions. 
Equifinality suggests that there is no ‘one size fits all’ combination of causal conditions, but 
rather there are possible alternative combinations that can lead to the same outcome. Causal 
asymmetry implies that reverse configuration of causal conditions may not lead to absence of a 
given outcome, but there would be other combinations causing absence of the outcome. 
Therefore, analyses deeming to identify combinations of causal conditions leading to presence 
or absence of the outcome ought to be conducted separately, thus causal symmetry should not be 
routinely presumed. Harnessing the methodological power of QCA allows exploration of 
complex causal relationships that prevalent research methods in management studies fail to 
unravel. Nowadays, QCA is still considered as a novel methodological approach, though 
scholars have presented its exploratory power in management studies (Fiss, 2005, 2011; 
Greckhamer, 2016), corporate governance (Bell et al., 2013; Garcia-Castro, Aguilera, Ariño, 
2013; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014) and in international business research (Pajunen, 2008; 
Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop, Paunescu, 2010).         
     
Sample description  
This study utilizes secondary data from listed firms in China. The empirical setting was 
selected because of several characteristics suitable for the researched problem. First, separation 
of CEO and board chair position is a common practice in China. However, the role of board 
chair usually has been discussed from internal control perspective (e.g. Peng et al., 2010) rather 
than from social capital perspective, despite strong cultural and institutional premises. Second, 
institutions in China are still relatively underdeveloped, compared to developed countries, and 
for this reason social relations are considered as important factors influencing social dynamics 
and economic activity (Peng & Luo, 2000). Last, highly relationship-oriented society in China 
offers a unique opportunity to explore the role of individual social capital, and particularly social 
capital of board chair, in relation to firm performance. 
The data was extracted from China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
database, which is an acknowledged data source for research on publicly listed firms in China. 
The CSMAR database encompasses data from annual reports of listed firms and has been used 
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in previous studies in the Chinese context (e.g. Markóczy et al., 2013). The design of the sample 
intended to contrast performance implications of social capital in strategic and non-strategic 
industries. For this reason, the sample included data from two industries, namely from a non-
strategic Transportation Equipment Manufacturing and a strategic Production and Supply of 
Electricity, Steam & Hot Water. In our data source we identified 97 publicly listed firms in the 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing and 60 in the Production and Supply of Electricity, 
Steam & Hot Water. Since application of fsQCA methodology imposes a limitation in terms of 
the number of possible variables included in the model, in the sampling process I have tried to 
control for sources of variation in firm performance. Such approach intended to increase 
comparability of the analyzed cases, by choosing firms with similar characteristics. Hence, cases 
in the final sample were either from the chosen strategic or non-strategic sector, all firms were 
publicly listed. Moreover, detected outliers in terms of firm size, measured as the value of total 
assets, were removed from the sample. Moreover, the cases that displayed missing or 
insufficient information were dropped from the sample. Another important criterion for sample 
design was separation of CEO and board chair roles. Therefore, firms in which CEO was also 
holding a position of board chair were removed from the sample. As a result, the final sample 
encompassed 83 publicly listed firms (cases) of which 38 were from the non-strategic industry 
and 45 from the strategic industry. To provide industry specific insights and check robustness of 
the results, supplementary fsQCA analyses were performed on separate samples from the non-
strategic and the strategic industry. To observe short-term and long-term association of social 
capital with firm performance, the data on social capital were selected from year 2009, while the 
performance data was lagged by 2 and 4 years.  
 
Measures and calibration 
 In order to apply fsQCA method, the selected causal conditions (variables) have to be 
transformed into sets. In the literature the concept of set is defined as “a mental representation of 
an empirical property” (Mahoney, 2010:2). Therefore, for each set qualitative thresholds 
defining set membership, non-membership, and a cross-over point or a point of maximum 
ambiguity (only for fuzzy-sets) have to be specified. The thresholds can be understood as 
boundaries for inclusion and exclusion from the set. The QCA literature advises selecting 
qualitative thresholds with regards to theoretical premises and advanced case knowledge 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). For each case degree of membership in each set is determined 
during calibration process. I utilized direct method of calibration for conditions calibrated as 
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fuzzy-sets and qualitative calibration for crisp-sets (Ragin, 2008). In the description below 
names of the causal conditions are followed by names of the corresponding sets in brackets. 
Proxies for social capital of CEO, board chair, and board of directors have been developed on 
the grounds of previous studies, such as Kim (2005), Kor & Sundaramurthy (2009), Krause, 
Semadeni, Withers (2016), and Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong, Kor (2014).  
CEO external social capital (extensive CEO external social capital) was measured as a 
number of external social ties created through having positions in other firms (e.g. board 
interlocks), memberships in business associations, and academic positions that CEO held in a 
given year. The threshold for full set membership was set at 3 ties (90th percentile). Less than 1 
(50th percentile) external network tie was set as a non-membership threshold, while 2 external 
network ties were chosen as a cross-over point (75th percentile).      
CEO internal social capital (existing CEO internal social capital) was measured as a 
binary variable indicating presence (1) or absence (0) of common external connections of CEO 
and other board members. The common external connections specifically could have been 
established through holding board positions at the same firms, except the focal firms, working at 
the same educational institutions, or memberships in the same business associations. Literature 
suggests that interacting outside the boardroom of the focal organization facilitates 
establishment of bonding social ties (Stevenson & Radin, 2009). Therefore, CEO internal social 
capital was calibrated as a crisp set demonstrating existence of common external connection of 
CEO and board members from the focal firm.   
Board Chair external social capital (extensive board chair external social capital) was 
operationalized as a number of external network ties. The ties could have been established 
through holding board post at other firms (board interlocks) or having memberships in non-
business organizations, including also political agencies and educational institutions. In order to 
capture board chair with widespread social connections, 5 external ties (90th percentile) ware set 
as a threshold for full membership in the set. Board chairmen with 2 (50th percentile) or less 
external connections were considered to be out of the set. The cross-over point was set at 3 ties 
(75th percentile).   
Board chair internal social capital (existing board chair internal social capital) was 
measured in a similar manner to CEO internal social capital, namely a binary variable was 
created to indicate presence (1) or absence (0) of common external connections of board chair 
and other board members, including CEO. As board chair may hold board posts in other firms, 
be a member of business associations, academic or governmental institutions, it may be not 
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uncommon that other board members hold positions in the same organizations as board chair. 
The corresponding set to this variable was calibrated as a crisp set to show presence of common 
external affiliations of board chair and other board members.      
Board external social capital (extensive board external social capital) was measured as 
a sum of network ties of all board members, excluding CEO and board chair, that were created 
to other firms through board interlocks, or ties to non-business actors in firm environment, such 
as business associations, governmental agencies, and educational institutions. Boards with 33 
(90th percentile) or more accumulated network ties were considered to be completely in the set. 
Less than 19 (50th percentile) external social connections were set as a threshold set non-
membership. The cross-over point was set at the level of 26 (75th percentile) external network 
ties.   
Board internal social capital (extensive board internal social capital) was captured by 
network density amongst board members, excluding CEO and board chair. Network ties created 
outside the firm indicate additional interactions of board members apart from board meetings of 
the focal organization. Therefore, it is a vital approximation of internal social capital within the 
board, as board members could also interact at board meetings of other firms, participation in 
the same professional interests groups or associations, etc. Moreover, network density is a well-
recognized measure of internal social capital (Borgatti, Jones, Everett, 1998; Kim, 2005; Oh, 
Labianca, Chung, 2006). Accordingly, firms with network density amongst board members over 
0.297 (90th percentile) were considered completely in the set, while below 0.11 (50th percentile) 
completely out of the set. The 75th percentile (0.214) was set as the cross-over point.  
Strategic industry was employed as a binary variable for differentiation between firms 
operating in strategic and non-strategic industries. The condition was calibrated as a crisp set 
with 1 indicating full set membership, thus firms operating in the strategic industry.     
As in the previous studies (Jackling & Johl, 2009; Morgan, Vorhies, Mason, 2009), firm 
performance (high firm performance) was measured as a returned on assets (ROA). To 
differentiate between short-term and long-term performance, the average ROA was captured 
over 2 and 4 years. In order to properly qualitatively assess performance, five leading firms from 
each industry were selected as a benchmark using external sources of information. 
Subsequently, based on the sample data and the benchmark values, threshold for full 
membership was set at the midpoint between the sample average and the average ROA for the 
leading firms over 2 and 4 years. The 50th percentile was chosen as a qualitative threshold for 
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non-membership in this set. The mid-point between the threshold for complete set inclusion and 
exclusion was a cross over point.     
 
Table 1. Causal conditions, sets and calibration thresholds 
 
 
Analytical procedure 
In contrast to variance-based analytical techniques, fsQCA investigates set relations, 
namely identifies necessary and sufficient causal conditions inducing a given outcome, such as 
firm performance in this study. FsQCA method begins with analysis of necessity that aims to 
detect if any of the selected causal conditions is inevitably linked to the outcome (Ragin, 2008). 
Following the QCA literature, to consider a condition or a negation of this condition as 
necessary, the threshold for consistency scores ought to be set at 0.9 or above (Ragin, 2006; 
Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). 
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Subsequently, fsQCA explores sufficient conditions for an outcome to occur. The analysis 
of sufficiency identifies alternative combinations of conditions, which equally effectively induce 
the same outcome. In other words, it reveals alternative paths leading to the same outcome. The 
literature recommends application of Quine-McCluskey’s algorithm to perform analysis of 
sufficiency. Moreover, the minimum threshold for sufficiency consistency score ought to be set 
at 0.8 and the frequency threshold at 1 (Ragin, 2006; 2008; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). The 
analysis delivers three types of solutions, whose complexity depends on the extent of integrated 
simplifying assumptions: complex, intermediate, and the most parsimonious solution. The 
complex solution does not permit for inclusion of any simplifying assumptions. In contrast, the 
intermediate solution allows inclusions of assumptions that are theory driven. The most 
parsimonious solution includes assumptions that are theory driven and those that results from 
the empirical material at hand, but are not always consistent with theoretical expectations. As 
recommended in the literature, the intermediate and the most parsimonious solutions are 
reported in this study (Ragin & Fiss, 2008; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). In presentation of 
results I used notation from Ragin and Fiss (2008). Full circles indicate presence of conditions, 
while cross-out circles their absence. Large circles indicate core causal conditions, thus these 
conditions that occur in the intermediate and the most parsimonious solution. Small circles 
indicate complementary causal conditions, which occur in the intermediate solution and do not 
in the most parsimonious solution. Blank spaces designate irrelevant conditions for the given 
configuration. In this study theory-driven directional expectations are applied. The expectations 
presume that presence of external and internal social capital of board chair, CEO, and directors 
is associated with high firm performance (Harris & Helfat, 2007; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Krause, Semadeni, Withers, 2016; McDonald, Khanna, Westphal, 2008; Westphal, 1999). 
Because of the empirical context of the study, it is necessary to make a context-specific 
expectation regarding firms operating in the strategic industry. The substantial economic 
reforms, dating back to 1970s, had been reshaping institutional environment in China and 
leading it towards a market economy model (Lardy, 1993; Naughton, 2007). Positive outcomes 
of the reforms were reflected in rapid economic development, increasing productivity, trade, and 
high economic growth. Although successful opening of the economy resulted in ownerships 
reforms and consequent flourishing of private firms, even nowadays state-owned firms dominate 
strategic industries in China (Boisot & Child, 1996; Redding & Witt, 2007). Soft budget 
constraints, incentive systems not based on performance, and promotions linked to political 
connections, demotivate mangers of state-owned firms to seek increasing efficiency and profit-
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maximization (Li & Xia, 2008; Peng & Luo, 2000). Therefore, it is expected that actually not 
operating in a strategic industry is associated with high performance. The analysis of necessity 
and subsequent analysis of sufficiency were conducted using R software (Thiem & Dusa, 2013).      
FsQCA employs two measures, consistency and coverage, as parameters of fit. Therefore, 
results of sufficiency analysis can be further assessed. The consistency measure captures 
correspondence of the identified combinations with empirical data. The coverage measure 
reflects relevance of the identified combinations for explanation of an outcome. The parameters 
of fit are computed as follows:   
 
 
where xi is a set membership score in a condition X and yi is a set membership score in an 
outcome Y.  
Despite the clear advantages of fsQCA, the method has a static cross-sectional nature and 
investigation of time effects is problematic (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Only recently 
Garcia-Castro and Ariño (2016) presented a possible application of fsQCA to panel data and 
provided diagnostic tool for assessment of consistency and coverage over time. This awaited 
advancement to set-theoretic research opens new possibilities for tackling causal complexity in 
corporate governance and management studies. Application of fsQCA to panel data, however, 
requires high quality longitudinal data suitable for calibration over several years. Depending on 
the nature and availability of data, this requirement may become a constraint. This study relied 
on secondary network data, which were reported by executives in annual reports. In spite of the 
possible perception biases, since the executives reported their networks themselves, this type of 
data was the best available approximation of the actual networks inside and outside the analyzed 
firms. The data selected for this study described networks in 2009. Because of poor quality of 
data from previous years that would enforce dropping too many cases from the sample, 
construction of a panel dataset and subsequent application of fsQCA was not possible. It is often 
recalled in the literature that unavailability of high quality longitudinal network data is a major 
constraint in social network research (Borgatti, Everett, Johnson, 2013). For this reason, and 
recognizing this limitation, the study applied static cross-sectional approach to the investigated 
relationship. To overcome this limitation, at least to some extent, separate fsQCA analyses were 
performed to investigate short-term and long-term associations between social capital and firm 
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performance. This partial solution for capturing dynamics in fsQCA is recognized in the 
literature (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012), yet it imposes limitations on this study.     
 
RESULTS 
Configurations of individual social capital in high performing firms 
To investigate set relations between individual social capital and firm performance, 
analysis of necessity was performed in the first place. The obtained results, which are presented 
in Table 2, demonstrate that none of the selected causal conditions and none of negations of the 
conditions meet the requirements for necessity.  
 
Table 2. Analysis of necessity 
 
 
Following the fsQCA analytical procedure, analysis of sufficiency was subsequently 
performed. The results presented in Table 3 include combinations of causal conditions, which 
are sufficient for inducing high firm performance in short-term (2-year ROA) and long-term (4-
year ROA). The analysis revealed three configurations for high performing firms in short-term, 
namely solution A1, A2, and A3. These alternative solutions jointly covered 0.210 of 
membership in the outcome set, with consistency of 0.908. Solutions B1, B2, and B3 present 
alternative causal paths for high long-term performance. The solutions reported joint coverage at 
the level of 0.181 and consistency of 0.933.  
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Table 3. Configurations of individual social capital in high performing firms 
 
The empirical results suggest that the following combinations of conditions are sufficient 
for inducing high short-term performance. Solution A1 propose that presence of extensive board 
chair external social capital combined with absence of CEO internal social capital is associated 
with high performance over the short term in firms operating in the non-strategic industry. 
Alternatively, high short-term performance of firms in this industry result from extensive 
external social capital of board chair, CEO, and the board that occur in combination with board 
chair and CEO internal social capital, yet in absence of board internal social capital (solution 
A2). A similar configuration of factors is suggested by Solution A3, namely a simultaneous 
presence of CEO and board external social capital, CEO and board chair internal social in 
combination with absence of extensive board internal social capital. These results show that 
board chair external social capital may have a positive effect on short-term performance when 
there is no social tie between CEO and board of directors (solution A1). When such tie exists, 
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presence of board chair external social capital may be still associated with high firm 
performance, when board chair has also internal ties to board members, whose are not densely 
connected amongst each other (solution A2). Moreover, even when board chair is not affiliated 
with many external actors, his internal ties to the board in combination with other factors may 
induce high short-term performance (solution A3). 
 The analysis of combinations of factors leading to long-term high performance revealed 
the following causal paths. Solution B1 demonstrates that in firms operating in the non-strategic 
industry external social capital of board chair may be linked to high long-term performance, if 
combined with absence of board chair internal social capital. Solution B2 corresponds to some 
extent to solutions A2 and A3. However, the solution (B2) shows that the same combinations of 
factors as in solution A2 and A3 may lead to long-term performance when board chair actually 
does not have wide-spread external networks, in other words, in absence of extensive board 
chair external social capital. The analysis also provided insights into long-term high 
performance of firms operating in the strategic industry (solution B3). Based on the results, in 
the strategic industry extensive external social capital of CEO, board chair, and the board 
combined with presence of internal social capital of CEO and board chair lead to high long-term 
performance. The empirical evidences show that external and internal social capital of board 
chair are important conditions, which in specific combinations with other factors induces high 
long-term performance. Moreover, board chair social capital is a relevant condition for firms 
operating in strategic and non-strategic industries. The causal paths identified for the non-
strategic industry (solution B1 and B2) include presence of either internal or external social 
capital of board chair. In contrast to this patter, the causal path typical for firms in the strategic 
sector (solution B3) includes presence of both conditions. Hence, for high long-term 
performance in the strategic industry, presence of board chair internal and external social capital 
is essential.                    
 
Configurations of individual social capital in underperforming firms 
To thoroughly investigate performance implication of board chair social capital, in the 
next step it is analyzed in the context of underperforming firms. The aim of this approach is to 
show if social capital of board chair may actually be also associated with firm 
underperformance. Moreover, the results presented in this section allow juxtaposition of insights 
from high performing firm with evidences from underperforming firms. The results are 
presented in Table 4. The empirical analysis revealed three alternative combinations associated 
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with short-term firm underperformance: solution C1, C2, and C3. These solutions jointly 
covered 0.392 of set membership in the outcome set, with consistency of 0.888. The results 
explaining long-term firm underperformance suggest three alternative causal paths: D1, D2, and 
D3. The overall coverage of the solutions was 0.409, with consistency of 0.871.       
 
Table 4. Configurations of individual social capital in underperforming firms 
 
 
The empirical analysis of underperforming firms delivered the following causal 
configurations. Solution C1 suggests that extensive CEO external social capital in combination 
with absence of board external and internal social capital is associated with short-term 
underperformance. Solution C2 demonstrates a reversed pattern, compared to solution C1. It 
shows specifically that amongst firms operating in the strategic industry absence of extensive 
CEO external social capital and presence of extensive board social capital lead to 
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underperformance. Solution C3 proposes an alternative causal path for firms operating in the 
non-strategic industry, namely a joint absence of internal and external social capital of board 
chair and the board. These results demonstrate that in the non-strategic industry absence of 
board chair external and internal social capital is actually associated with short-term 
underperformance of firms.          
The empirical results suggest the following causal paths as explanations of long-term 
underperformance. Solution D1 combines absence of external social capital of CEO, board 
chair, and the board, and absence of internal social capital of CEO with presence of board 
internal social capital. This configuration, however, is relevant only for the non-strategic 
industry. Solution D2 shows that in firms operating in the strategic industry long-term 
underperformance may be explained by simultaneous presence of extensive board social capital 
and CEO internal social capital, and absence of CEO external social capital. In a similar manner 
to solution C3, solution D3 emphasizes that absence of external social capital of CEO, board 
chair, and the board combined with absence of internal social capital of board chair and the 
board led to long-term underperformance of firms in the non-strategic industry. The results 
explaining long-term underperformance present similar insights regarding board chair social 
capital to the evidences from firms underperforming in the short term. The results stress that in 
firms operating in the non-strategic industry absence of board chair external or internal social 
capital in particular configurations may be a cause of underperformance.      
 
Post QCA analysis  
The empirical results present a variety of possible alternative causal path leading to high 
performance and underperformance of firms in the selected industries. After obtaining the initial 
results, it is recommended in the QCA literature to actually ‘go back to cases’ and link the 
revealed causal configurations to particular empirical cases (Ragin, 2008). Therefore, to further 
explore social capital of board chair, in this section the results are related to empirical examples 
of firms that represent the identified combinations of conditions. An overview of board and firm 
characteristics typical for each causal combination is presented in Table 5.  
Solution A1 is relevant for state-owned (SOEs) and private (POEs) firms operating in the 
non-strategic industry. The solution emphasizes importance of board chair external social capital 
for high short-term performance. Indeed in the typical firms board chairs was usually affiliated 
with numerous external actors. External affiliations of board chair often included board posts in 
firms operating within the same industry, firms from financial sector, such as China 
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Construction Bank, and firms owned by the same business groups as the focal firms. Moreover, 
not uncommonly directors in the focal firms were actually also connected with the business 
groups by holding board posts in other affiliates. Apart from having other business affiliations, 
board chair was also active in non-business institutions. Particularly in SOEs board chair was 
performing the role of Deputy Secretary or Secretary of Party Committee in other firms, thus 
had a politically connected position. In POEs board chair was active in numerous business 
associations, such as China Township Enterprise Association, China Enterprise Federation, etc. 
It is important to mention that typically for this configuration CEOs of these firms did not have 
external affiliations with other firms. Therefore, external social capital of board chair was 
actually spanning organizational boundaries of the firms, considering also few external 
affiliations of directors.       
Solution A2 is relevant only for state-owned enterprises operating in the non-strategic 
industry. This configuration is typical for firms in which the role of board chair was performed 
by well-connected individuals, who usually were holding board posts in other firms. The 
external affiliations of board chair often included posts in firms affiliated with the same business 
group as the focal firm. Moreover, board chair could have had also non-business connections, 
owing to membership in associations, such as Asia Capital Forum or China Venture Capital 
Association. In one case board chair had also political ties, which were deriving from his 
position of Secretary of Party Leadership Group in a business group affiliate. It is worth 
mentioning that typically board chair was holding at least one board post in the same firm as 
CEO and some of directors. Therefore, in the typical firms board chair was not only performing 
a boundary-spanning role, but also contributing to internal social capital accumulation within the 
board and possibly foster its collaborative orientation.       
Solution A3 presents a pattern that occurs amongst state-owned and private firms in the 
non-strategic industry. It shows that presence of board chair internal social capital, in 
combination with other causal conditions, leads to high performance over the short term. Board 
chair in these firms usually had single external connections, typically to firms affiliated with the 
same business group as the focal firms. Moreover, affiliation with these particular firms was 
also present amongst directors and CEO. Board chair was performing chairman or vice 
chairman role in other firms. However, in SOE board chair external duties were encompassing 
also the role of Secretary of Party Committee, thus a politically affiliated position in another 
state-owned firm. These examples show that even single connections of board chair may 
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contribute to strengthening of internal ties through holding post is the same firms, and 
strengthening of external ties, such as ties to the business group and political actors.   
Solution B1 demonstrates a causal configuration typical for state-owned firms in the non-
strategic industry. Similarly to the solution A1, it highlights the association of board chair 
external social capital with firm performance, here also over the long term. In the typical firm 
board chair was holding positions of supervisor or independent director in other firms, such as 
China Construction Bank. The chair had also an academic position in Renmin University of 
China. The external connections of board chair were not overlapping with connection of 
directors or CEO, who in fact did not have any external affiliations. Hence, in this case, external 
affiliations of board chair were significantly contributing to enlarging firm’s external network 
and accumulating its external social capital.     
Solution B2 is relevant for state-owned and private firms operating in the non-strategic 
industry. Again, it highlights the role of board chair internal social capital for inducing high 
performance, yet in this case it is actually combined with absence of board chair external social 
capital. In these firms board chair had only single external board posts typically in firms 
affiliated with the same business group as the focal firm. Moreover, CEO and some of directors 
also were holding post in these firms. It was also possible for board chair in SOEs, in addition to 
his regular post, to be a Secretary of Party Committee in another SOE. Since, board chair, CEO, 
and some directors were holding board posts in the same firms; it could have enhanced their 
collaboration in the boardroom.  
Solution B3 presents a causal configuration that induces high long-term performance of 
firms in the strategic industry. All firms in this industry were state-owned. The configuration 
demonstrates that in these firms external and internal social capital of board chair complement 
each other. Board chair usually had a wide-spread external network to other firms in the industry 
and particularly to firms affiliated with the same business group as the focal firm. Also board 
chair was commonly performing the role of Secretary of the Party Committee, thus had a 
political affiliation in at least one firm he was affiliated with. Moreover, CEO and directors of 
the focal firms were holding external position in the same firms as board chair. In fact the 
typical focal firms were capitalizing on external connections of board chair, but also on external 
affiliations of CEO and directors, since their boards encompassed well-connected individuals.       
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Solution C1 is relevant for state-owned firms operating in the non-strategic and the 
strategic industry. It does not associate board chair social capital with firm short-term 
underperformance, but explain it by a combination of CEO external social capital with absence 
of board external and internal social capital. However, this does not mean that board chair in a 
typical firm did not have any external affiliations. Although only single, the external ties of 
board chair were connecting the focal firm with other actors in the environment, including other 
business group affiliates. Regardless the industry, board chair was usually preforming the role of 
Secretary of the Party Committee in another firm. Moreover, board chair had common external 
affiliations with directors, yet not necessarily with CEO. While in this configuration social 
network of board chair is not mentioned as a condition leading to underperformance, it in fact 
existed and connected the focal firm to other external actors and also possibly had an impact on 
internal relationships within the board.      
Solution C2 presents a causal configuration leading to short-term underperformance of 
state-owned firms in the strategic industry. Similarly to the solution C1, this causal 
configuration does not include board chair social capital. However, in majority of typical firms 
board chair actually was holding a position in another firm in which other directors also had 
board posts. Therefore, this common external affiliation also possibly had an impact on internal 
relationships between board chair and directors. Yet, it was not a causal condition leading to 
underperformance, since based on the results it was caused by extensive board social capital and 
absence of CEO external social capital.                    
Solution C3 demonstrates a pattern relevant for state-owned enterprises operating in the 
non-strategic industry. This causal path suggests that, amongst other conditions, absence of 
board chair internal and external social capital leads to short-term underperformance. In typical 
firms board chair either had only single external affiliations or did not have any at all. The 
external affiliations were usually formed by holding board posts in other firms in the industry, 
which were not affiliated with the same business group as the focal firm. Moreover, affiliations 
with these particular firms were uncommon amongst directors and CEO. Therefore, external 
affiliations of board chair did not substantially enlarge firm’s external network and had no effect 
on building up internal social capital within the boardroom.     
Solution D1 is relevant for state-owned firms operating in the non-strategic industry. The 
solution associates lack of board chair external social capital, in combination with other factors, 
with firm long-term underperformance. Typically for these firms, board chair had had only 
single external affiliations in other firms, which were owned by the same business group as the 
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focal firms. Moreover, such affiliations were present also in external networks of directors. In 
fact the common external affiliations of directors resulted in relatively high board internal social 
capital. As shown in the solution, this condition combined with absence of external social 
capital of board chair, CEO, and the board, also in absence of CEO internal social capital led to 
long-term underperformance.      
Solution D2 presents a causal configuration relevant for state-owned firms operating in 
the strategic industry. This configuration does not include, however, neither external nor internal 
social capital of board chair. In typical firms board chair was holding only few external 
affiliations with other firms, including those within the same business group. Not uncommonly 
board chair, apart from having a board post in other state-owned firms, was also performing the 
role of Deputy Secretary or Secretary of Party Committee, thus had a politically affiliated 
position. Moreover, in some cases CEO and directors were also affiliated with the same firms as 
board chair. This reflects to some extent CEO’s internal social capital, which is one of the causal 
conditions leading to underperformance.  
Solution D3 demonstrates another configuration typical for state-owned firms operating in 
the non-strategic industry. It presents a causal path similar to the pattern identified by solution 
3C, yet here the causal conditions are also combined with absence of external social capital of 
CEO. This configuration highlights that absence of internal and external social capital of board 
chair, in combination with other conditions, leads to long-term underperformance. In typical 
firms board chair was affiliated only with one firm, apart from the focal firm, or did not have 
any external affiliations. Moreover, this firm could have been, but not necessarily, affiliated with 
the same business group as the focal firm. Furthermore, neither CEO nor directors were holding 
posts in this firm. Hence, this external affiliation of board chair potentially was not affecting 
internal relationships within the boardroom.    
 
Robustness check        
 In order to verify if the obtained results hold under different model specifications, the 
analysis was rerun with alternative consistency thresholds and alternative calibration of 
conditions. In the primary version of the model consistency level was set at 0.8. For robustness 
check consistency was decreased to 0.75, which is a lower-bound acceptable level, and 
subsequently increased to 0.85. This is in line with recommendations in the literature regarding 
robustness check in fsQCA (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). The findings of analysis conducted 
with the increased consistency level to 0.85 to some extent differed from the initial results and 
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were in subset relation. However, the results were still corresponding to the original findings 
and capturing similar patterns. The decrease of consistency threshold to 0.75 resulted in 
increased coverage of solutions, which were in superset relations to the original results. Since 
changing of the consistency thresholds has not caused substantial divergence of results, 
robustness was confirmed.        
Verification of robustness through alternative calibration was conducted with respect to 
the initial assumptions regarding design of the sets, namely by ensuring that qualitative 
characteristics of sets remained unaffected. The original design of sets aimed to include boards 
and individuals, such as CEOs and board chair, who possessed extensive social connections 
outside organizations. The same approach to capturing extent of social capital was utilized in 
calibration of board internal social capital. In consequence the thresholds for set memberships 
were set at high level of 90th percentile. As in robustness check the intension was to keep the 
qualitative characteristic of social capital, alternative thresholds were increased by 5 percentile 
points and subsequently lowered only by 10 percentile points. For calibration of the outcome 
set, the original thresholds were applied, because of strong qualitative premises. The obtained 
results closely corresponded to the original findings and demonstrated analogous patterns. 
Therefore, robustness was confirmed.    
 
Insights from non-strategic and strategic industries – a supplementary analysis 
To enrich our findings with industry-specific insights regarding board chair social capital, 
additional separate fsQCA analyses were performed on samples from the strategic and the non-
strategic industries selected for this study. In the analysis of the non-strategic industry a variable 
for state-ownership was included in the model, to identify configurations of conditions typical 
for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately-owned enterprises (POEs). This binary 
variable and the crisp set, which was created accordingly, assigned value of 1, and thus full 
membership in the set, to firms in which the state was a controlling shareholder either directly 
through its agencies or through other state-owned enterprises. The value of 0 was assigned to 
private firms. For further analysis of the strategic industry there was no need to include an 
ownership variable, since all firms in the sample were SOEs. However, for insightful analysis of 
this particular sector, the thresholds for high performance were adjusted, because the initial 
results (see Table 3) explaining high short-term performance have not included any 
configurations typical for the strategic industry. For this reason, the outcome set (high firm 
performance) was redesigned and thresholds for set membership adjusted following the 
111 
 
approach in Fiss (2011). Despite the adjusted thresholds, the new set still intended to capture 
high performing firms. Therefore, the 75th percentile was selected as a threshold for full 
membership in the set, to include firms that have reported above-average performance. For 
short-term performance this threshold was set at the level of 0.052 and for long-term 
performance at 0.05. To exclude average or below average performing firms from the set, the 
50th percentile was selected as a threshold for non-membership in the set (0.04 for short-term 
and 0.046 for long-term). The mid-point between these two thresholds was set as a cross-over 
point (0.046 for short-term and 0.048 for long-term). The results of these supplementary 
industry analyses are presented in Appendix in Table 1 and Table 2.  
The analysis of the non-strategic industry (see Table 1 in Appendix) has revealed that 
presence of board chair internal social capital in combinations with other factors lead to high 
performance over short-term and long-term. Moreover, it is relevant for state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) as well as for private firms. In SOEs board chair internal social capital in combination 
with board internal social capital (solution E1), board chair external social capital and absence 
of CEO external social capital (solution E2) is associated with high short-term performance. 
Solution E3 is relevant for both types of firms and shows that high performance over short term 
may be caused by a simultaneous presence of board chair and CEO internal social capital, CEO 
and board external social capital, yet in absence of board chair external social capital. The 
results explaining high performance in the long term have demonstrated similar patterns. 
Solution F1, similarly to solution E1, emphasizes that in state-owned firms a simultaneous 
presence of board chair, CEO, and board internal social capital induced high long-term 
performance. Solutions F2 and F3 are relevant for SOEs and private firms. Solutions F2 and 
solution E3 correspond to some extent, since F2 also shows positive performance implication of 
a combination of CEO and board external social capital, CEO and board chair internal social 
capital, yet with absence of board internal social capital. Solution F3 demonstrated the same 
pattern as solution E3. Hence, this configuration leads to high performance over short and long 
term.          
  The empirical findings for underperforming firms in the non-strategic industry suggest 
the following causal paths that show similar patterns to the initial results (see Table 4 for 
comparison). The findings show that actually absence of board chair internal and external social 
capital in combination with absence of board internal and external social capital induces short-
term underperformance in state-owned firms (solution G2). The analysis has revealed also two 
other alternative causal paths leading to short-term underperformance, yet none of these paths 
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include social capital of board chair as a causal condition. Solution G1 also explains 
underperformance of SOEs, but by a combination of absence of board internal and external 
social capital with presence of extensive CEO external social capital. Solution G3 demonstrates 
that in private firms short-term underperformance may derive from presence of extensive CEO 
external social capital and board internal social capital. Similar patterns explain also long-term 
underperformance. The results have shown that in SOEs absence of board chair internal and 
external social capital in combination with absence of CEO external social capital and board 
internal social capital leads to long-term underperformance (solution H2). Solution H1 shows 
that same pattern as solution G1. Hence, absence of board internal and external social capital 
combined with extensive CEO external social capital induces short-term and long-term 
underperformance of state-owned firms. Solution H3, similarly to G3, demonstrates that in 
private firms CEO external social capital may be associated with underperformance, yet in 
combination with extensive board chair external social capital it actually leads to long-term 
underperformance. 
The analysis of the strategic industry (see Table 2 in Appendix) has demonstrated that 
presence of board chair internal social capital, in combinations with other conditions, may lead 
to high short-term and long-term performance. To induce high short-term performance, internal 
social capital of board chair ought to occur jointly with absence of board chair extensive 
external social capital and absence of CEO internal social capital (solution I1). Solution I2 offers 
an alternative causal path, namely a combination of external and internal social capital of CEO 
and board of directors. Solution J1, similarly to solution I1, shows that internal social capital of 
board chair is a causal condition leading to high performance also in the long term, if combined 
with absence of board chair external social capital and CEO internal social capital, yet in the 
presence of board internal social capital. Solution J2 demonstrates an analogous pattern to 
solution I2; however, apart from including CEO and board internal and external social capital, it 
shows that to induce long-term high performance these conditions ought to occur together with 
internal and external social capital of board chair.  
Although the analysis of underperforming firms provided similar results to the initial 
findings presented in Table 4, some new patterns have been also revealed. The results suggest 
that underperformance of firms in the strategic industry may be explained by the following 
causal paths. Solution K1 and K2 clearly demonstrate that in particular combinations of 
conditions board chair external social capital is associated with short-term underperformance. In 
solution K1 presence of extensive board chair external social capital occur simultaneously with 
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board external social capital and absence of CEO external social capital. In like manner, solution 
K2 combines board chair external social capital with absence of CEO external social capital, yet 
in this case these factors occur together with presence of CEO internal social capital and absence 
of board internal and external social capital. In contrast to the findings regarding short-term 
underperformance, the results explaining long-term underperformance do not associate this 
outcome with board chair external social capital. Solution L1 encompasses absence of CEO 
external social capital and presence of CEO internal social capital that occur together with 
extensive board external social capital. Solution L2 emphasizes that absence of board chair 
internal social capital, absence of board internal and external social capital combined with CEO 
internal social capital lead to long-term underperformance.  
The additional analyses have confirmed that social capital of board chair has significant 
implications for performance and underperformance of firms in the analyzed industries. 
Moreover, the evidences from the non-strategic industry emphasized that causal configurations 
leading to performance or underperformance may vary depending on firm ownership. The 
analysis of the strategic industry revealed possible alternative combinations inducing high firm 
performance and underperformance over short and long term. However, it is worth recalling that 
the insights from the strategic industry are only relevant for state-owned firms, since this was 
the only type of firm ownership present in this particular industry.   
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
The extant literature on social capital in boards is rich in studies focusing on CEO and 
directors, whereas board chair only recently has appeared in this context (Krause, Semadeni, 
Withers, 2016). For that reason, this study aims to contribute by enhancing knowledge on social 
capital of board chair and its performance implications. The study recognizes embeddedness of 
board chair in internal relationships within the boardroom and exposure to external relationships 
of CEO and directors. Therefore, performance implications of board chair social capital are 
investigated in combinations with social capital of CEO and directors, with differentiation 
between internal and external dimensions of social capital. This approach to conceptualization 
and empirical analysis reveals existing complementarities and substitutions between social 
capital of board chair, CEO, and directors that so far have not been explored in the literature.    
Board chair external social capital may substitute and complement external connections of 
other actors and lead to high short-term and long-term performance. As shown in the recent 
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study by Krause, Semadeni, and Withers (2016) board chair may perform a boundary-spanning 
role in a firm and provide numerous resources, knowledge, and expertise through her/his 
external connections. The results confirm that boundary-spanning role of board chair has a 
positive association with firm performance. Moreover, board chair may contribute to achieving 
high firm performance by performing a boundary-spanning role, but also her/his internal 
relationships with board members may enhance collaboration within the boardroom. Board chair 
internal social capital complements internal social capital of CEO, in absence of board internal 
social capital. This result advocates for collaborative board model (Westphal, 1999) and shows 
that board chair may not only be included in the model, but accelerate its effectiveness in firms 
operating in strategic and non-strategic industries. The empirical evidences also assert that 
actually presence of board chair internal social capital and absence of the chair’s external social 
capital, in combinations with extensive external networks of CEO and the board leads to high 
firm performance. It may be presumed that to induce high performance, in this case, the role of 
board chair ought to be focused on control issues rather than on resource provision, since it can 
be substituted by CEO and the board. Previous studies have shown that, in the case of directors, 
holding multiple board posts may lead to accumulation of obligations and ineffective role 
performance by such director that in turn is detrimental to firm’s oversight and management 
(Ferris, Jagannathan, Pritchard, 2003; Ruigrok, Peck, Keller, 2006). It may be also applied to 
board chair, whose numerous board posts and memberships in non-business organizations may 
create a distraction from responsibilities in the focal firm. Therefore, the empirical evidences 
suggest that absence of external social capital may actually have positive implications for 
performance. In the aforementioned case board chair ought to serve as a counterbalance to the 
power deriving from external connections of CEO and directors. Alternatively, if CEO and the 
board are not connected and do not possess extensive external social capital, board chair acting 
as a boundary-spanner would contribute to high performance.    
The evidences from analysis of underperforming firms suggest that absence of social 
capital is associated with firm underperformance. This also includes absence of internal and 
external social connections of board chair. Directors and CEO may use their external networks 
to span firm’s boundaries, provide knowledge and resources, and get external viewpoints on 
strategic initiatives to increase firm performance (Geletkanycz & Boyd, 2011; Haynes & 
Hillman, 2010; Hillman, Cannella, Paetzold, 2000). Therefore, a shortage of external 
connections of board chair, CEO, and the board may have a detrimental effect on performance. 
Moreover, lack of internal agreement and cooperation, which typically is enhanced by internal 
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social capital (Harris & Helfat, 2007; Oh, Chung, Labianca, 2004), decreases board 
effectiveness and only adds up to the negative effect on performance. The empirical findings 
suggest that firm underperformance may be caused by extensive external social capital of one 
key actor in the board when others do not have wide-spread external connections. External 
social capital gives a sort of power, such as prestige power of CEO (Finkelstein, 1992), since it 
derives from connections to potentially powerful actors in firm’s environment. The accumulated 
power may encourage the rent-seeking CEOs or directors to put their opportunism before firm’s 
interest and consequently lead to underperformance. Moreover, if the board consists of directors, 
who hold multiple board appointments simultaneously, it may affect its effectiveness, because 
directors may not give considerable attention to oversight of the focal firm. Therefore, a ‘busy 
board’ may be the cause of firm underperformance (Ferris, Jagannathan, Pritchard, 2003; 
Ruigrok, Peck, Keller, 2006). In addition, if CEO is connected with such ‘busy board’ and does 
not have an established external network, then it may also lead to underperformance. In such 
case, CEO may not be able to counterbalance the powerful directors. 
This study offers also industry insights regarding board chair social capital and its 
performance implications. In the analyzed strategic and non-strategic industries, board chair 
internal social capital was identified as one of the causal conditions leading to high performance 
over the short and the long term. This condition occurred almost in all causal configurations and 
confirmed the crucial role of social ties between board chair and other board members that may 
encourage collaborative approach to governance. As described by Sundaramurthy and Lewis 
(2003), collaborative approach to governance aims at forming a ‘governing team’ of directors 
and executives. Since board chair acts as a liaison between CEO and directors, it could be 
her/his big task to facilitate collaboration and ensure effective governance. Therefore, as the 
empirical results have shown, board chair internal social capital may complement and substitute 
internal social capital of CEO and the board. Moreover, internal social capital of board chair, in 
combinations with other factors, may induce high firm performance in strategic and non-
strategic industries, regardless firm ownership.        
This study offers the following contributions to the literature. First, it challenges the 
traditional perspective on the role of board chair, through demonstrating that this role is 
performed by an individual, who actually may have wide-spread social relationships within and 
outside the firm. This study argues that board chair has not only a control function in the board, 
as conventionally presumed (Boyd, 1995; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983), but her/his 
role goes beyond to boundary-spanning and teamwork facilitator. A position of board chair may 
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be held by a high-profile individual, who over the course of career has developed a wide-spread 
network of professional connections. This individual may contribute to resource provision and 
span firm’s boundaries to the same extent as any director or CEO. Since, board chair is a liaison 
between CEO and directors, her/his internal connections within the boardroom may accelerate 
cooperation and support collaborative approach to governance.  
Second, the study advocates for analyzing social capital in boards of directors in terms of 
complementarities and substitutions. This approach not only reveals nuances of social 
relationships within and outside the boardroom, but also brings empirical research closer to 
actual board behavior. The empirical findings support the rational for adopting such approach by 
confirming and further exploring the proposed relationships between internal and external social 
capital of board chair, CEO, and directors.  
Third, this study contributes also to a greater body of literature that investigates behavioral 
aspects of boards of directors and governance (Huse, 2007; Van Ees, Gabrielsson, Huse, 2009). 
It presents boards of directors as complex sets of social relationships amongst board chair, CEO, 
and directors, and their relationships with external actors in firms’ environment. This approach 
goes beyond showing boards of directors as governing bodies and demographics of their 
members, and put emphasis on their social dimensions.  
Finally, this study also shows that unconventional research methods, such as fsQCA, 
provides more refined results and answers research questions that otherwise could not have been 
answered. It is becoming more recognized that causal complexity can and should be studied to 
advance the existing research (Misangyi et al., 2017). Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) 
offers a methodological possibility to empirically study causal complexity. This study presents 
valuable contributions of the method to uncovering complementarities and substitutions in the 
context of board chair social capital.      
Although this study provides new insights into social capital in boards of directors, and 
social capital of board chair in particular, it is not free from limitations. First, the applied 
configurational method (fsQCA) indeed enables analysis of complex causal relationships, yet it 
imposes several methodological limitations. The method permits a limited number of causal 
conditions to be included into empirical analysis. For this reason, only causal conditions 
approximating social capital of board chair, CEO and directors could have been taken into 
account in combinations with industry type. This limitation was partially addressed in the post 
QCA analysis and in the supplementary analyses of strategic and non-strategic industries that 
provided complementary results and even more detailed insights. Moreover, to increase 
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comparability of the cases, outliers were removed from the sample. However, it is admitted that 
not all possible sources of variance in firm performance could have been controlled for. It is also 
worth mentioning that results of QCA analysis are sensitive to different set calibrations. 
Robustness of the results of this study has been confirmed by rerunning analyses with 
alternative set calibrations and thresholds for consistency. Yet, it is important to emphasize that 
sensitivity of results should be taken into account and checked whenever QCA method is 
applied. The qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is typically applied to cross-sections data, 
as in this study, and encounters difficulties in explaining complex causal relationships over time. 
This limitation was addressed by conducting separate analyses for short-term and long-term 
outcomes that to some extent reveled stability of the causal relationships over time. However, 
future research could focus on further development the method and its suitability for 
longitudinal research, as it has been done by Garcia-Castro and Ariño (2016). Their approach 
has been recognized for integration of QCA and panel data econometrics, and for development 
of measures of consistency and coverage suitable for longitudinal QCA analysis (Misangyi et 
al., 2017). Knowing the static nature of QCA and its consequent limitations, the approach 
proposed by Garcia-Castro and Ariño (2016) offers an interesting way of integrating time 
dimension into QCA.          
Second, this study relied on secondary data reported in annual reports of publicly listed 
firms in China that were extracted from CSMAR database. Knowing the difficulties in obtaining 
primary data regarding social connections of executives and directors in China, for the purpose 
of this study, it was decided that the secondary data provide the best available approximation of 
social networks. However, the results can be advanced by adopting alternative approaches to 
analyzing the role of board chair. For example, Krause (2017) recently has advanced research on 
board chair by investigating board chair orientation based on content-analysis of proxy 
statements. Therefore, future research may try to integrate secondary data from multiple sources 
and, if possible, collect primary data through surveys and interviews to validate the proposed 
causal relationships. In addition, to thoroughly investigate the relationship between 
configurations of social capital and firm performance, future studies may additionally apply 
market-based measures of financial performance, such as Tobin’s Q.      
Third, the empirical setting of this study, although provides evidences from China, also 
imposes limitations on external validity of the results. Moreover, the empirical evidences 
demonstrate patterns typical for firms operating in two types of industries: strategic (Production 
and Supply of Electricity, Steam & Hot Water) and non-strategic (Transportation Equipment 
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Manufacturing). Therefore, the results may be generalized to industries with similar 
characteristics, but generalizability to all industries is limited. Reliance on social networks and 
presence of powerful actors in firm environment is not only limited to China, but is typical for 
many countries going through institutional transition. Therefore, the results are relevant also for 
other developing economies in which social relationships tend to substitute market institutions. 
However, generalizability of the findings to developed economies is limited, because of 
different nature of business environment in these economies that are governed by contracts and 
regulations. For this reason firm operating in developed economies put trust in the rule of law 
rather than in social relationships. In developing economies this relationship is reversed 
(Akamatsu, 1962; Redding, 1990). Nevertheless, separation of board chair and CEO roles is a 
common practice also in developed economies, yet it has been studied mainly from internal 
control perspective (Boyd, 1995; Fama & Jensen, 1983). For this reason, a comparative study 
juxtaposing evidences from multiple countries could advance understanding of institutional 
factors determining the role of board chair and explore existing complementarities and 
substitutions between social capital of the key actors in the boardroom. Despite the above-
mentioned limitations, hopefully this study raises awareness of the shortcoming of the literature 
regarding board chair and social capital in boards of directors, and will encourage further 
theoretical developments in this area.          
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Chapter 4: Dynamics of Board Social Capital – Multiple Case 
Studies from China23 
 
 
Abstract: To address the shortcomings of the literature, this study explores dynamics of board 
social capital in the context of firm expansion. In the study we emphasize complexity of board 
social capital and disentangle its dynamics through investigating evolution patterns of external 
and internal networks formed by board members. The undertaken multiple case study analysis 
of publicly listed firms in China generates novel insights on how internal and external network 
may evolve when firms are transitioning between stages of expansion. Building on the findings, 
we propose that diversity of external network ties will follow an inverted U-shape pattern, as 
firms move from an initial to a later stage of expansion. Similarly, strength of external network 
ties will be subjected to an initial strengthening of weak ties and weakening of strong ties, 
followed by strengthening of strong ties and dissolution of weak ties. However, in contrast to 
these patterns, cohesion of the internal network amongst board members will be consistently 
increasing. This study shows that evolution patterns of external and internal networks differ, 
because the networks have different instrumental functions. Moreover, we demonstrate that 
network ties of board members may be temporal, as their value grow or decay over time and 
along with firm expansion. Furthermore, we present an effective combination of research 
methods suitable for investigating unexplored theoretical concepts. 
 
                                                     
2 This chapter is co-authored with Bella Butler (Curtin Business School, Perth, Australia)    
3 An earlier version of this study was accepted to AIB Southeast Asia Regional Conference (December, 2015) 
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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of board social capital recently became a popular topic in management 
studies, as it proposes a new perspective on boards of directors (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Haynes & Hillman, 2010). It particularly brings attention to the resources deriving from network 
ties of board members and their wide-spread organizational implications (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Therefore, the literature has been associating resource 
provision through network ties with numerous organizational outcomes, such as firm 
performance (Zona, Gomez-Mejia, Withers, 2015), competitive advantage over other market 
players (Wu, 2008), or dissemination of governance practices (Shipilov, Greve, Rowley, 2010). 
Moreover, board social capital has been acknowledged for its facilitating role in embracing 
strategic change (Haynes & Hillman, 2010), like also in stimulating growth of new venture 
companies (Han, 2006; Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2010).  
Despite the acknowledged importance of board social capital, the existing literature fails 
to thoroughly explore its dynamic facet. Moreover, scholars emphasize in general that “… to 
date we know very little about how organizations’ social capital develops over time, about the 
factors and processes enabling and constraining its development, and about possible related 
performance implications” (Maurer & Ebers, 2006, p. 262). This issue is particularly alerting, 
for social capital “like any other capital asset, has to be seen as being dynamic” (Prashantham & 
Dhanaraj, 2010, p. 967). It is acknowledged in the literature that board of directors, in order to 
perform its roles, utilizes the available resources, such as knowledge and expertise of members, 
but also the network resources that derive from their social connections (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 
2009; Mizruchi, 1996). Moreover, networks of board members may evolve for specific 
purposes, as their social relationships can be established, re-established, and dissolved. Board of 
directors may also appoint new members, to acquire unique resources, for example, foreign 
market knowledge (Connelly et al., 2011) or connections to political actors in firm’s 
environment (Hillman, Keim, Schuler, 2004; Lester et al., 2008). This shows that board of 
directors may instrumentally employ networks to support execution of firm strategy, thereby 
effectively performs its strategy role (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). Although scholars have 
been successfully investigating motivations behind formation of network ties, still the evolution 
process of networks remains a relatively unexplored phenomenon (Ahuja, Soda, Zaheer, 2012). 
This is problematic, because static approach to board social capital understates the dynamic 
relationship between the board, its networks, and firm-level outcomes. 
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To address the shortcomings of the literature, this study aims to explore dynamics of board 
social capital. As the construct encompasses a variety of social relationships formed by board 
members, in order to reflect its complexity, first we disentangle different types of networks and 
then look into their evolution patterns. Referring to the differentiation between internal and 
external social capital (Kim & Cannella, 2008), we argue that dynamics of board social capital 
encompass changes in networks, which board members form inside and outside the 
organization. Therefore, in this study we investigate how internal and external networks may 
evolve over time. To shed light on the relationship between evolution of networks and firm-level 
outcomes, we conduct our study in the context of firm expansion, since social capital is a 
recognized factor facilitating firm growth (Coviello, 2006; Maurer & Ebers, 2006; Prashantham 
& Dhanaraj, 2010). For the purpose of this study, we treat firm expansion as a process of 
establishing subsidiaries on domestic and international markets, and particularly focus on 
capturing a shift from an initial to a later stage of expansion. We argue that this shift is a well 
suited period in firm’s expansion history to investigate patterns of networks that evolve to 
address firm’s changing needs for resources. In the study, we emphasize a temporal nature of 
network ties, since networks are instrumental and their value may grow or decay over time and, 
in this case, simultaneously with firm expansion (Burt, 2002; Soda, Usai, Zaheer, 2004). ). 
Setting the study in this context helps us to demonstrate that networks “carry out specific tasks 
over a period of time” (Halinen & Törnroos, 2005). Taking into account the limited theoretical 
developments in this area, we develop theoretical propositions on how external and internal 
networks may evolve, when firms are transitioning between stages of expansion. 
In light of the limited theoretical developments regarding dynamics of board social capital, 
we applied a process approach (Pettigrew, 1990; Van de Ven, 1992) to carry out a multiple case 
study analysis of emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs) from China. To 
thoroughly investigate evolution patterns of networks of the selected firms, we performed a 
longitudinal social network analysis. In our methodology we aimed to emphasize the two 
dimensions of social capital, thus the network analysis covered: 1) changes in external social 
capital with focus on strength and diversity of external network ties; 2) changes in internal social 
capital captured by changes in cohesion of internal network. In order to link evolution of 
networks with firm expansion, we additionally applied an event-based approach (Halinen, 
Thörnroos, Elo, 2013) with establishment of new subsidiaries on domestic or international 
market as the key elements of expansion process. Moreover, to capture the shift in firms’ 
growth, we differentiated between expansion events that had occurred in an initial and a later 
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stage of expansion. The obtained empirical findings and evidences from the existing literature 
led to development of theoretical propositions 
The study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we disentangle dynamics of 
board social capital by showing that it encompasses evolution of networks that board members 
form within and outside the organization. Through investigating evolution patterns of internal 
and external networks of board members, we emphasize that these networks have different 
instrumental functions, and thus their evolutions patterns differ. Second, we advance 
understanding of motivation behind network development in the context of firm expansion. Our 
study confirms the facilitating role of social capital, especially in the initial stage of expansion 
(Coviello & Munro, 1997; Coviello, 2006), but also demonstrates novel patterns in social capital 
accumulation that has not been discussed in this context. While discussing our findings, we 
touch upon depreciating value of social capital and temporary nature of network ties. Although 
these issues are of great importance, still often are overlooked in social capital studies (Adler & 
Kwon, 2002). Finally, we combine two research methods, namely multiple case study analysis 
with social network analysis. By doing so we demonstrate how a combination of methods may 
help to advance understanding of unexplored theoretical concepts. Although the study has 
several limitations, the results challenge the existing findings and hopefully will trigger further 
research on dynamics of board social capital. 
The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, we introduce the theoretical background for this 
study. We continue with explanation of the applied methodology, case selection, and data. 
Further we carefully explain the process of case analysis and report our findings. Finally, we 
discuss the empirical results and develop theoretical propositions. Theoretical implications 
conclude the paper together with limitations of the study and directions for future research.    
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Board of directors comprises diverse members, whose accumulated network resources 
build up board social capital. These members are responsible for management oversight and 
control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), like also for provision of resources through their social 
connections (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Board of directors, however, also plays an important 
role in strategy formulation and implementation (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Zajac, 2004). 
This strategy role of the board makes board members active participants in designing and 
overseeing strategic focus of an organization. Hence, board of directors may be perceived as a 
strategic decision-making group (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). The decision making process is 
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supported by skills and expertise of board members, thus by their human capital (Kor & 
Sundaramurthy, 2009; Tian, Haleblian, Rajagopalan, 2011), but also by their aforementioned 
social connections and accumulated board social capital (Palmer, Jennings, Zhou, 1993; Stuart 
& Yim, 2010).   
Carpenter and Westphal (2001, p. 653) interestingly concluded that “behavior of directors 
depends on the strategic perspective and base of expertise provided by their appointments to 
other boards.” Therefore, it is in the interest of the organization to have a board composed of 
members capable to effectively support its strategic vision and, if necessary, appoint new 
members with complementary skills (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Kim & Cannella, 2008). A 
properly selected pool of skills, knowledge, and expertise may considerably reduce uncertainty 
and mitigate risk of failure for numerous strategic initiatives (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). 
Firm expansion represents a strategic initiative that particularly requires attention and 
commitment of the board. Decision about expansion, either on domestic or international market, 
is challenging. Moreover, the whole process has to be carefully navigated, as it increases 
organizational complexity and exposes the firm to institutional uncertainty of host countries 
(Delios & Henisz, 2003; Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). Hence, board of directors ought to 
represent a mix of resources and expertise that is relevant for sustaining firm growth and guiding 
it thorough organizational and institutional challenges.    
The importance of social connections of board members for successful international 
expansion has been demonstrated on the example of US firms expanding to China (Connelly et 
al., 2011). The findings argue for a positive influence of directors’ connections to firms, which 
have already successfully expended to China, on a successful expansion of the focal firm to this 
country. This is in line with the existing research arguing that boards may use board interlocks, 
that is connections to other firms established through simultaneous board posts, to acquire 
knowledge about institutional environment, business practices, or even cultural differences of 
host countries (Sharma & Blomstermo, 2003; Yli-Renko, Autio, Tontti, 2002). In this way, 
through observing behavior and practices of other firms, the board is able to reduce uncertainty 
that is associated with expansion or any other undertaken strategic initiatives (McDonald, 
Khanna, Westphal, 2008; Mizruchi, 1996; Useem, 1986). 
Imitation of strategy, with respect to foreign market entry, has been also observed amongst 
firms affiliated within the same business group (Westney, 1993). Owing to formalized 
ownership ties and likely shared directors, these firms establish strong channels of 
communication and information exchange. Moreover, affiliation of a firm with a business group, 
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which had expended its operations to a given foreign country, is likely to reinforce the firm’s 
strategy to also expand to this country and its experiences after foreign market entry (Guillén, 
2002). Affiliation with a business group has a far-reaching effect on firms. Apart from being a 
channel for knowledge sharing, connection to a business group is an important source of 
capability acquisition, including also R&D capabilities (Mahmood, Zhu, Zajac, 2011). 
Moreover, in emerging countries where business groups are the main organizational forms, 
intragroup connections are of utmost importance for firm growth and performance (Chang & 
Hong, 2000; Keister, 1998; Khanna & Palepu, 2000). In this context business groups serve as 
substitutes for market institutions, which are underdeveloped in emerging countries, and lower 
transaction costs for the affiliated firms (Caves & Uekusa, 1976; Chang & Choi, 1988). 
Moreover, business group affiliation adds value to a firm, as it gets access to pooled resources 
that can be easily distributed within a group (Guillén, 2000). Hence, firm growth and value 
creation, in the context of emerging markets, is greatly dependent on intragroup connections that 
drive resource distribution and capability development (Yiu, Bruton, Lu, 2005).   
Successful implementation of expansion strategy may be associated with inclusion of 
individuals, who represent powerful actors in firm’s environment, into leadership structures. It is 
particularly applicable to the context of emerging countries where relationship based societies 
and imperfect market institutions dominate business environment. Hence, appointments of 
politically affiliated directors are not uncommon, since reliance of government influence causes 
a significant issue for organizations (Li, Peng, Macaulay, 2013; Sun, Mellahi, Wright, 2012). 
Also, it has been shown that internationally expanding firms from emerging countries tend to 
have densely connected networks of interlocks with other firms and are more likely to appoint 
politically or even military connected individuals to serve on their boards, compared to firms 
that do not internationalize (Luo & Tung, 2007; Peng, Au, Wang, 2001; Sheng, Zhou, Li, 2011; 
Wang et al., 2012). The strategic importance of political ties has been acknowledged in the 
context of developed and emerging economies (Zheng, Singh, Mitchell, 2015; Faccio, 2006; 
Hillman, 2005; Li, Poppo, Zhou, 2008), though in the latter ones the effect on firm performance 
is more pronounced (Acemoglu et al., 2016; Boubakri, Cosset, Saffar, 2008). In the context of 
emerging countries, organizations not only utilize political ties to neutralize threats to their 
survival, but also for performance improvement in terms of sales growth (Zheng, Singh, 
Mitchell, 2015). Also in a broader perspective scholars generally agree that organizations 
engage in corporate political activity to influence and manage political actors, which through 
regulations shape the business environment (Hillman, Keim, Schuler, 2004). For this reason, 
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board members with political affiliations or connections to lobby groups, able to employ 
effective corporate political strategy, are often important elements of organizational networks 
that positively influence firm performance (Lester et al.,2008; Lux, Crook, Woehr, 2011). 
Board social capital is often conceptualized as actual and potential resources accumulated 
within board’s network of social relationships (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998). The social relationships may take a form of bonding ties amongst board members or 
bridging ties to actors outside the organization. Hence, social capital within a board may have 
either internal or external nature (Harris & Helfat, 2007; Kim & Cannella, 2008). Through 
creating network ties to external actors, board members span organizational boundaries and link 
the organization with its environment (Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Mintzberg, 1973). Hence, board 
members act as boundary spanners and facilitate flow of information and resources originating 
in the external environment (Mizruchi, 1992; Tushman & Scanlan, 1981). A pool of external 
actors encompassed in this way by firm’s network depends on previous professional experience 
and current occupation of board members (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009). As often directors and 
CEOs hold multiple board positions simultaneously, they get access to advice and expertise of 
other executives that in turn may be helpful for crafting strategic responses addressing internal 
challenges or external dependencies of the organization (McDonald, Khanna, Westphal, 2008; 
McDonald & Westphal, 2010). Likewise, an advice network may emerge from memberships in 
associations attracting prominent professionals, thus corporate elite members, or alumni clubs of 
prestigious universities, charities, and other non-profit organizations (Davis, Yoo, Baker, 2003; 
Useem, 1979). 
Network ties to external actors reflect organization specific environmental dependencies. 
It is highlighted in the literature that different types of ties require “different forms of co-
optation depending on the specific dependencies” of the organization and that different types of 
resources may be provided through different types of network ties (Zheng, Singh, Mitchell, 
2015: 1633). Hence, boards gain ability to influence stakeholders, access resources, and reshape 
the environment through cooptation, namely “the process of absorbing new elements into the 
leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a mean of averting threats to its 
stability or existence” (Selznick, 1949:13). Nevertheless, dependence on the external 
environment is mirrored not only in the types of actors embedded in the network, but also in 
strength of network ties. The tie strength is often conceptualized as “a combination of the 
amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and reciprocal 
services” (Granovetter, 1973: 1361). The literature distinguishes weak and strong network ties 
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through highlighting their different instrumental functions and context dependent value (Burt, 
1992; Granovetter, 1973). In the early studies on networks antecedent and consequences, 
scholars have perceived network structure and extent of connectedness amongst network actors 
as a predictor of their individual behavior. In the case of weak ties, which exist in large open 
networks where network actors do not know each other (Granovetter, 1973), actors can 
exchange information stemming from the ‘structural holes’, namely gain advantage by 
brokering information or resources unavailable to others (Burt, 1992). The role of social capital 
in such open networks is to encourage cooperation of actors (Putnam, 2000) and ‘bridge’ 
dissimilar actors who may provide new information and resources. In contrast, strong ties exist 
in closed networks of densely connected actors (Coleman, 1988). Social capital in such closed 
networks bonds actors with common norms, values, expectations and obligations. Moreover, the 
strong ties are associated with building trust amongst actors, collective conflict resolutions, and 
enhanced cooperation. As value of strong and weak ties is context dependent, actors can benefit 
from belonging to both open and closed networks (Antcliff, Saundry, Stuart, 2007; Putnam, 
2000).  
The concepts of ties strength and network connectedness are also relevant in the context of 
internal social capital. Boards of directors may be perceived as groups of frequently interacting 
actors, thus individuals forming internal social networks within organizations (Harris & Helfat, 
2007). Board members are consequently embedded in a network structure that has emerged 
within a board. This structural embeddedness, namely the pattern of network ties amongst 
members, determines relative advantage, power or constraint of individual actors (Granovetter, 
1992). Following Freeman (1978), a central position in a network enables an actor to have 
greater access and control over information, or other resources flowing through the network ties. 
Hence, the central actor is able to accumulate greater individual social capital. The advantage 
arising from network centrality relates to some extent to the concept of ‘structural holes’, 
namely to utilizing limited existence of network ties amongst actors embedded in a network 
(Burt, 1992). Densely connected networks where actors build strong relationships have 
considerable advantages in terms of communication and exchange of information (Granovetter, 
1985). Moreover, dense network connections facilitate building trust amongst network actors. 
Therefore, boards of directors characterized by cohesive networks amongst members are likely 
to have more effective decision making process, owing to enhanced cooperation and teamwork 
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999). This bonding effect of structural embeddedness may however be a 
constraint for actors. Being embedded in a particular network and sustaining strong relationships 
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with network members is associated with high maintenance costs, thus an actor may lose 
opportunities for extending its network outside a given group or an organization (Adler & 
Kwon, 2002). Moreover, strong social ties, typical for cohesive networks, may exert influence 
and pressure to conform on individual actors. Consequently, individual judgment of actors may 
be subjected to group pressure. This mechanism in boards of directors results in formation of 
influential cliques able to dominate decision making (Harris & Helfat, 2007). It is particularly 
pronounced, if board members hold prior relationships or interact outside board meeting 
(Stevenson & Radin, 2009, 2014).   
Given the complexity of board social capital, explanation of its dynamics requires a close 
up at evolution of social networks that it originates from. As the literature differentiates between 
internal and external board social capital (Kim & Cannella, 2008), internal and external 
networks of social relationships formed by board members should be encompassed by a 
dynamic perspective on the construct. Moreover, the dynamic perspective shall highlight 
particular dimensions of internal and external networks. The external network ties perform a 
boundary-spanning role and facilitate management of environmental dependencies (Hillman, 
Cannella, Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), thus an evolution process may unfold 
along with inclusion and exclusion of network actors and varying strengths of network ties. 
Likewise, the internal network amongst board members may evolve through changes in its 
cohesion. Simultaneous observation of development paths at internal and external level draws a 
complete picture of how board social capital may evolve over time. The wide-ranging influence 
of board social capital demonstrates that networks of board members may be instrumentally 
employed to support achievements of numerous organizational goals. The literature has shown 
evidences for social capital instrumentality in the context of international growth of enterprises 
(Maurer & Ebers, 2006; Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2010). As firm expansion is not a one-time 
event but a complex process, it is a useful context for investigating dynamics of board social 
capital. The expansion process on domestic and international markets requires accumulation of 
diverse organizational resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). 
The effect of board social capital will derive from instrumental utilization of external and 
internal networks of board members. While the resources deriving from the internal network 
affect cooperation and teamwork within the boardroom, the external network ties secure access 
to resources that the firm does not own. Yet, as the process unfolds, the resource requirements 
will be changing alongside with firm expansion. As it has been shown in the context of new 
ventures, importance of different network ties varies along with stages of firm expansion 
137 
 
(Coviello & Munro, 1997; Coviello, 2006). Similarly, external and internal network ties of 
board members may be reconfigured accordingly to support the firm at an initial and a later 
stage of expansion. Therefore, going through different stages of expansion will be associated 
with dynamic network changes, to align the available network resources with new requirements. 
Although, reconfiguration of network ties seems to be a logical way to address changing 
demands for resources, the literature lacks research on how internal and external networks of 
board members evolve along expansion process. This again highlights that little is known about 
social capital evolution in general (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2010), and 
particularly evolutions paths of board social capital.    
 
METHODS 
Given the limited theoretical developments regarding evolution of board social capital, we 
have applied multiple case study methodology together with longitudinal social network 
analysis in the context of Chinese multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating in transportation 
manufacturing industry (Borgatti, Everett, Johnson, 2013; Eisenhardt, 1989). Juxtaposition of 
findings from multiple case studies offers more robust results and, compared to a single case 
study analysis, is a good tool for theory building and development of parsimonious, testable 
propositions (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 1994). In the multiple case study analysis, we 
decided to compare evolution paths of board social capital in the selected firms along with their 
expansion. Moreover, we aimed to explain convergence and divergence of practices related to 
development of board social capital. Such research approach allowed to explore nuances of the 
evolution paths and to detect replication of logic across cases. 
As the evolution path of board social capital is of interest of this study, we applied process 
research to investigate the phenomenon (Pettigrew, 1990; Van de Ven, 1992). “Process research 
deals with how events come into being and unfold over time in a context” (Halinen, Medlin, 
Törnroos, 2012: 215). The process research deems appropriate as network relationships “grow 
or decay over time” (Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2010: 968) and are “recreated over and through 
time” (Halinen, Medlin, Thörnroos, 2012: 215). Consequently, the evolution process of board 
social capital was conceptualized as a “comprising sequences of connected events and activities 
that unfold over time in and around networks” (Halinen, Thörnroos, Elo, 2013: 1214). In order 
to capture patterns of the evolution paths and uncover the underlying mechanisms, we have 
focused on particular events in the process (Halinen, Thörnroos, Elo, 2013). In the case of this 
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study, the events were identified as establishments of new subsidiaries on either domestic or 
foreign markets.  
 The empirical setting of this study offers an advantage for studying social capital and 
influence of social relationships on economic activity, as the society in China is relationship-
oriented and market institutions are still underdeveloped. In the collectivists societies social ties 
or “personal trust” is more important than “system trust” (Ibeh & Kasem, 2011; Hofstede, 1980; 
Wong, 1996). Moreover, utilization of social networks and social capital by firms operating in 
emerging economies is more pronounced than in developed countries, because of market 
uncertainties (Butler & Purchase, 2008; Luo, 2003; Peng & Luo, 2000; Peng, 2003; Peng & 
Zhou, 2005). The market uncertainty is caused by the speed of changes and either 
underdeveloped or absent market-supporting institutions (Hoskisson, et al., 2000; Khanna & 
Palepu, 1999; Peng, 2003). While the market institutions in emerging economies remain weak, 
the governments there are still powerful actors in the business environment and the boundaries 
between market forces and government influences are blurring (Li, Peng, Macaulay, 2013).  
In order to obtained rich, not-biased, and comparable data, we have been considering 
selecting cases from non-strategic industries in which firms with diverse forms of ownership 
operate and actively engage in international and domestic business activity. The selection of a 
proper industry sector was particularly important, knowing that strategic sectors, not only in 
China, tend to be dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Finally, we decided to 
investigate firms from transportation manufacturing industry. For the last 30 years, along with 
the market reforms, the industry has been experiencing a rapid growth combined with increasing 
domestic demand and interest from foreign manufacturers seeking opportunities to establish 
production sites in China. Nonetheless, in this period Chinese transportation manufacturers also 
have been actively expanding on international markets through establishment of foreign 
subsidiaries or M&A. The scope of international expansion has been spreading across developed 
and developing countries. It is worth mentioning that not only SOEs started expanding 
internationally, but also private-owned enterprises (POE). Recently, international engagements 
of Chinese transportation manufacturers in Europe and the USA have been getting intense media 
coverage, for example when in 2010 Zhejiang Geely Holding acquired Volvo - a Swedish car 
manufacturer (The New York Times, 2010). Compilation of these factors motivated us to look 
closely into boards of multinational firms operating in this industry and investigate how board 
social capital has been evolving along with international and domestic expansion.   
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In order to select firms for further analysis, we applied theoretical sampling. It is accepted 
in the literature to adopt this kind of sampling for multiple case studies instead of random 
sampling. Hence, the cases were selected for theoretical reasons (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; 
Yin, 1994). We were particularly interested in depicting evolutions paths of board social capital 
and investigating if there were any commonalities in the ways it has been shaped over time. 
Therefore, we decided to identify comparable firms that were successfully operating on 
domestic and international markets, thus were quoted as leaders within the transportation 
manufacturing industry. Also, knowing that conducting this kind of study would require access 
and collection of large amount of archival data regarding affiliations of corporate directors, 
focusing on the leading firms was a mean to overcome problems associated with data 
availability and reliability. Having that in mind, we finally selected three firms that were 
important actors on the domestic market and also started expanding internationally around the 
same time. In the selection process, we presumed that the current leading position of these firms 
was indicating effective utilization of board social capital combined with successful deployment 
of growth strategies. With the aim to develop generalizable propositions, we made sure that 
characteristics and measures related to board social capital were varying among the selected 
firms. The overview of cases is presented in Table 1. 
Firm “A” was founded in 2002 as a subsidiary of a state-owned business group, which was 
one of the biggest market players in the automobile manufacturing sector in China. It is worth 
mentioning that the business group was ranked second amongst country’s top 100 machinery 
industry enterprises in 2014. In 2007 firm “A” got publicly listed in China on the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange, though it had been already listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Firm “A” 
is headquartered in Shandong province. However, its operations centralize in four hubs located 
in Shandong, Shaanxi, Chongqing, and Jiangsu province. By the time of IPO in China (initial 
public offering in 2007), the firm had been dynamically expanding on domestic and 
international markets. In 2007 it already owned 33 domestic subsidiaries spread across eleven 
Chinese provinces and one foreign subsidiary located in the USA. To further enhance its growth 
and international presence, in 2012 the firm initiated a strategic cooperation with KION Group 
Germany, which is a leading forklift manufacturer.  
Firm “B” is a private enterprise and was founded as a subsidiary of a Chinese business 
group operating in the construction machinery sector. The firm was established in 1994 in 
Hunan province in China and later got publicly listed in 2003 on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
In 2011 the Financial Times Global 500 ranked the firm on the list of the most valuable 
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companies in the world in terms of market capitalization. In 2003, thus by the time of its IPO, 
firm “B” was operating in three provinces in China. However, since 2006 it had been 
dynamically expanding its operations on the domestic and international markets. From 2006 
firm “B” established foreign subsidiaries, which also included R&D and manufacturing sites, on 
such diverse markets like Algeria, Belgium, Qatar, South Africa, or South Korea, to name a few.              
 
Table 1. Overview of the selected cases 
 
Firm “C” is a state-owned enterprise (SOE) founded in Shanghai in 1998. The firm’s 
controlling shareholder is a centrally managed state-owned enterprise, thus its assets are under 
management of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the 
State Council (SASAC). Firm “C” specializes in three areas: solar energy, manufacturing of 
high-end auto parts, and new composite materials application. The firm had been actively 
participating in international expos and became a strategic partner for globally recognized 
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players in the automotive industry, such as General Motors, Volkswagen, and BMW. Firm “C” 
got publicly listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1998. In the following years the firm had 
been successively deploying a growth strategy focused on the domestic market that resulted in 
formation of a subsidiary base scattered around Shanghai. The domestic expansion had 
continued until 2009 when firm “C” established its first foreign subsidiary in the Netherlands. 
That was a turning point in firm’s growth strategy. Since 2009 firm “C” not only had been 
expanding on international market, but also started geographically spreading its domestic 
operations through expansion across provinces in China. 
Board social capital derives from individual social ties of board members, thus its in-depth 
longitudinal analysis required access to detailed archival data. We utilized data on external 
affiliations of board members as a proxy for network ties, following the approach adopted in the 
existing studies (e.g. Martin, Gözübüyük, Becerra, 2015). The data was extracted from CSMAR 
(China Stock Market and Accounting Research) database that covers data on directors’ 
affiliations based on information published in annual reports of publicly listed companies. 
Having this data as a base for analysis allowed us also to identify the extent of overlap in the 
affiliations. To be more specific, we were able to identify to what extent directors from one firm 
simultaneously held positions in the same firms or organizations. In this way, the data revealed 
first snapshots of social networks created by the board members and enabled reference to the 
concepts of internal and external social capital that we intended to investigate. In addition, we 
collected data on board characteristics and board appointments to support interpretation of 
results.  
In order to link the evolution paths of board social capital with firm expansion we needed 
information regarding establishment of new subsidiaries in China or in other countries. For this 
purpose, we also used CSMAR database and extracted data on location of subsidiaries that had 
been reported in the annual reports. By comparing reported data from different years we were 
able to track establishment of new subsidiaries and draft expansion history of the selected firms. 
Additionally, we used company materials, publications, press releases, and other available 
external data sources to validate and complement the obtained information regarding expansion 
history and external affiliations. Utilizing archival data was particularly useful for this type of 
study, as we could get snapshots of firm expansion and social networks created by board 
members that were not biased by their own perception. However, data availability posed a minor 
constraint on the observation window. As the disclosure requirements apply only to publicly 
listed firms, the reported data on external affiliations and location of subsidiaries was only 
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available in the period following initial public offering (IPO) and continued until 2012. In the 
case of firm “C”, we realized that although the firm was listed in 1998, the data in CSMAR was 
only available from 2001. Hence, data unavailability had slightly limited the observation period 
for this firm. It is worth mentioning that 2001 was a year of important regulatory changes for 
corporate governance in China, namely China Securities Regulatory Commission issued 
‘Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed 
Companies’ and ‘Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China’. Issuance of 
these guidelines have introduced concepts of independent directors, separation of general 
manager (CEO) and chairman positions, and board independence (boards consisting in 1/3 of 
independent directors), like also opened doors for gradual dissemination of practices typical for 
the Western models of corporate governance. Moreover, it perhaps also facilitated board 
interlocks and development of business networks. As previous studies have shown, before 2001 
the extent of networks created through interlocking directorate was relatively small compared to 
the scale of such practices in the Western countries (Ren, Au, Birtch, 2009).       
 
Data analysis  
In the analysis of the collected data we linked multiple case studies methodology with 
longitudinal social network analysis (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Following the literature on case study methodology (Yin, 1994), firstly data for each case was 
analyzed and then the identified patterns were compared across the cases. In this way, this study 
applied multiple case study methodology on one hand. On the other hand, while analyzing 
individual cases, we conducted longitudinal social network analysis for each of the selected 
firms (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013). To elaborate further on this step, for each case data 
on directors’ external affiliations was collected from published annual reports on a yearly basis, 
making it possible to catch snapshots of networks created by board members in the given years. 
We were observing and comparing snapshots of the networks for each firm with yearly 
intervals. With the aim to reflect features of internal and external social capital, a series of 
network measures was further applied to the yearly data. The patterns of changes in these 
measures were compared year over year and interpreted with consideration of expansion events, 
namely establishment of new domestic and foreign subsidiaries. Moreover, to support 
interpretation of network changes we relied on additional data collected from CSMAR database, 
for example data on new board appointments. Details of the applied network measures are 
outlined in the following sections.  
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Having the data on directors’ affiliations, we aimed for an in-depth investigation of board 
social capital evolution patterns. Following previous studies, we distinguished between internal 
and external social capital to reflect complexity of the construct (Barroso-Castro, del Mar 
Villegas-Periñan, Casillas-Bueno, 2016; Kim & Cannella, 2008). In each case study, the 
external social capital was operationalized as a network of ties formed by board members to 
actors outside the firm. In the analysis of this dimension, we were particularly interested in 
relational diversity reflected in variety of network ties that board members have formed outside 
the organization (Harrison & Klein, 2007). Also, we wanted to investigate strength of these ties. 
Therefore, to capture strength of different networks ties, we firstly aggregated the data on the 
number and type of directors’ affiliations to a firm level. Then, the strength of each type of ties 
was reflected as a proportion of the whole network of the firm (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 
2013). The measures of tie strength were calculated for each type of ties across the analyzed 
time period. Prior to aggregation of network data, we aimed for as close as possible 
approximation of social relationships formed outside the selected firms. Hence, we 
differentiated between six categories of network ties. This classification was applied further also 
in the analysis of relational diversity. To obtain theoretical guidelines, we referred to prior 
classifications that have been introduced in other studies exploring network ties in 
organizational context (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Hillman, Cannella, Paetzold, 2000; Lester et al., 
2008). The obtained affiliation data was classified and coded accordingly into the following 
categories:    
 
1) Ties to shareholders – ties to shareholding companies (incl. business group). The ties are 
created through interlocking directorships or employment of board members of the focal firm 
in the shareholding firms; 
2) Business ties – ties to other firms (excl. shareholding firms). The ties are created by board 
interlocks or employment in other firms, excluding shareholding firms; 
3) International ties– ties to firms located abroad, including firms in Hong Kong. The ties are 
created through holding board directorships or other positions in firms located abroad;   
4) Political ties – ties to political and politically affiliated actors within firm environment. The 
ties are established through holding affiliations or positions in governmental agencies or 
memberships in the Party Committees;  
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5) Non-business ties – include a wide range of ties to non-business actors in firm environment, 
specifically to universities and other educational institutions, business associations and 
charities. The ties are formed through employment or membership.  
6) Ties to financial institutions – ties to banks and financial institutions created through board 
interlocks or other forms of employment.   
During the coding process we had to identify types of actors and organizations that board 
members were affiliated with. We were aware that while the data regarding business ties were 
relatively easy to validate, the data regarding political ties, considering sensitiveness of such 
information, might had been underreported in our sources. Still, having this limitation in mind, 
we proceeded with careful validation and coding of network ties. For identification of the 
external parties that board members were affiliated with, we utilized publicly available 
secondary sources. Also to obtain additional data, for example regarding ownership structure, 
we referred to CSMAR database. The solid archival work resulted in as close as possible 
approximation of the external network ties of board members with exceptionally detailed 
classification of network ties.   
The next step of analysis aimed to explore diversity of ties through analyzing the Blau’s 
(1977) index, which is a commonly accepted measure of diversity as variety (Harrison & Klein, 
2007). The Blau’s index assumes categorical scale of measurement. The values of the index can 
range from 0 to (K-1)/K, where K is a number of possible categories. The maximum value 
occurs when members of each category are equally represented (evenness) in a population. In 
the context of this study, it means that when all categories of ties are represented within the 
network in the same proportion, then the index reaches its maximum value. The Blau’s index is 
calculated according to the following formula: 1 - ∑pk2, where pk is a proportion of the 
population in each category. As the study applies six categories of network ties, the Blau’s index 
for relational diversity reaches maximum value at 0.83 ((6-1)/6). The value of the index 
increases when ties are distributed evenly among categories. Knowing the nature of ties in 
corporate boards, we did not expect maximum values of the Blau’s index, as it is not necessary 
for network ties to be equally represented, in order to provide resources. In fact, already 
previous studies have shown importance of weak ties in providing non-redundant, unique 
information (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1990). Overall, by using this measure we were able to assess 
to what extent board members were engaging in networking with diverse actors in external 
environment. In the subsequent step of analysis, we switched attention to internal social capital. 
It was operationalized as a network of ties amongst board members of the focal firm and 
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captured by the extent of affiliations they shared outside the firm. To give an example, if two or 
more board members were also members of the same business association or another board of 
directors, we presumed that these directors knew each other better, thus a social relationship 
existed between them. Such interactions outside the boardroom are known to increase board 
internal social capital (Stevenson & Radin, 2009).  
In order to explore this angle, we transformed the two-mode affiliation data obtained from 
CSMAR data base into one-mode network data. The data transformation was performed using 
UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002) software for social network analysis. The 
transformation output for each firm was a one-mode network of ties amongst board members. 
After data transformation we applied structural shape measures to assess cohesiveness of each 
network. For this purpose multiple measures of cohesion were adopted, such as average degree, 
density, number of components, component ratio, connectedness, and fragmentation. Average 
degree is an average number of ties for each node, thus it captures an average number of 
external affiliations directors shared with other members. Density is a number of actual ties 
divided by a number of all possible ties. This measure captures a proportion of the actual 
common affiliations amongst board members to the number they could possibly have. Number 
of components shows a number of weak components in the network. In other words, it captures 
a number of subgroups formed by members within the board. In each subgroup board member 
possesses direct or indirect social ties to other members of the group. Component ratio is 
computed as a number of components minus 1 divided by a number of actors minus 1. The 
values of the ratio can vary from 1, when each member does not share external affiliations with 
any other board member, to 0 if there is only one component in the network. The emergence of 
one component occurs when all board members are directly or indirectly, through other 
directors, connected with each other. Connectedness is computed as 1 minus fragmentation. 
Connectedness expresses proportion of pairs of nodes that are in the same component. In our 
study, it is a proportion of board members that are in the same subgroup within the board. 
Fragmentation is a proportion of pairs of nodes that are unreachable, in other words proportion 
of board members that do not share external affiliations with any other member. The measures 
of network cohesion were calculated using UCINET software (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 
2002).    
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RESULTS   
Evolution of external and internal networks 
In this section we present our case study results for firm A, B, and C. The case analysis 
was concentrated on several aspects of external and internal networks, such as external network 
size, identification of key boundary spanners, diversity of external network ties, and cohesion of 
internal network. To visually present the identified patterns of how external and internal 
networks have evolved over time and across cases, we graphically summarize our key findings 
in Figure 1.   
    
Firm “A”  
I. External network size 
We started case analysis of firm “A” from the year of its IPO on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, because of limited data availability. The analyzed period covered years from 2007 to 
2012. Looking first at the size of the external network created by board members, we concluded 
based on the data that it was medium, compared to the other selected cases (see Table 2 in the 
text and Table 1 in the Appendix). Just after the IPO in 2007, the network consisted of 24 ties to 
external actors. Although over the years the network size had not been increasing systematically, 
it was increasing until 2011 and then started decreasing. This pattern indicated that the year 
2011 was a pivotal point in which increasing trend turned into decreasing. From this point 
network size had shrunk from 42 ties reported in 2011 to 32 in 2012.    
The identified evolution patterns of network size had triggered questions about 
mechanisms driving these changes. Therefore, we decided to closely investigate actions of firm 
“A”, such as new board appointments, which potentially could have affected network size. 
According to our data, in the analyzed period the firm made only few new board appointments 
in 2008, 2011, and 2012 (see Table 7 in the Appendix). The new board members either did not 
have any external affiliations or held positions in the business group, which firm “A” was 
affiliated with. For this reason, the new board appointments had contributed only marginally to 
the overall increase of network size, yet with one exception in 2012 when the new members 
contributed in total with seven network ties to the firm’s network. We consequently presumed 
that other mechanisms than new board appointments must have been driving evolution of 
network size. This motivated us to look further into details of individual networks of board 
members and investigate evolution patterns at this level (see Table 2).    
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Figure 1. Evolution patterns of external and internal networks observed in the selected 
firms  
Firm A 
External network Internal network 
  
Firm B 
External network Internal network 
  
Firm C 
External network Internal network 
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II. Key boundary spanners 
Board of directors comprises individuals with different professional profiles. Moreover, 
individual networks of board members may differ substantially, because of their diverse 
professional experience and employment history. In the case “A”, individual board members 
had been demonstrating different extent of networking activities outside the firm. While 
typically several board members were holding single external affiliations outside firm “A”, two 
individuals in the board had relatively more wide-spread networks. After checking functional 
roles of these individuals, we found that CEO, who was also performing the role of board 
chairman, and an inside director could have been clearly called the key boundary spanners for 
firm “A”, because of their extensive external networks.  
Networking activities of these individuals contributed to the growth of firm’s network size 
and increased diversity of network ties, as the CEO and the inside director had been affiliating 
with numerous types of actors in firm’s environment. Although we had not observed a 
systematic increase in sizes of individual networks, a period of intensified networking activities 
occurred between years 2009 and 2011. It was particularly evident in the case of the inside 
director, who was stretching his network extensively in this period. To give an example, before 
2009 the inside director was holding a general manager position in one of the shareholding 
companies of firm “A”. He was also politically connected by holding a position of the Secretary 
of the Party Committee, which is a leadership position within the Communist Party structures 
operating in state-owned enterprises. Afterwards, he started extending his network through 
holding directorships in firms directly affiliated with the same business group as firm “A”. 
Moreover, he joined a board of a local bank and thus established a network tie to a financial 
institution. 
A different pattern was observed in CEO’s network. To avoid confusion, it is worth to 
mention that the role of CEO in firm “A” was performed by the same individual over the entire 
analyzed period. Similarly to the inside director, the CEO was actively extending his network 
between years 2009 and 2011. However, compared to the network of the inside director, the 
CEO’s network included more diverse actors. While holding several board posts in companies 
affiliated with the business group, the CEO was also politically connected through holding a 
position of the Secretary of the Party Committee. In addition, he had joined numerous 
professional and industry associations, such as China Entrepreneur Association and China 
Machinery Industrial Federation. In this way, the CEO spread the reach of his network to 
associations gathering key figures in the industry and business elite. The CEO and the inside 
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director were not replaced in the analyzed period and were contributing continuously to the 
growth of firm’s network. In 2012 the overall network size of firm “A” decreased and 
composition of network ties changed, owing to appointment of a new well-connected inside 
director. The director had been already affiliated with the same business group as firm “A” and, 
at the same time, he was holding several board posts in firms operating in the transportation 
manufacturing industry. In this way, firm “A” further strengthened its business ties and ties to 
shareholding companies.   
 
III. Diversity and strength of external network ties 
Board members, owing to their previous professional experience, may already have 
network ties to diverse actors in firm’s environment, for example to other firms in the industry 
or to professional associations. Over time, however, board members may form new network ties 
or dissolve the already existing ties. In this way diversity of actors encompassed in individual 
networks of board members, and thus in firm’s network, evolves over time. Moreover, it may 
directly affect strength of network ties to particular types of actors. To give an example, if an 
organization appoints a politically connected director, then dissolution of this tie, through 
contract termination for instance, not only lowers diversity of firm’s network ties, but also 
potentially weakens strength of ties to political actors.   
The collected data for firm “A” accurately demonstrate how diversity of network ties may 
evolve over time (see Table 3 in the text and Table 4 in the Appendix). Board members of firm 
“A”, and particularly the key boundary spanners identified earlier, had been networking with 
different types of actors, thereby affecting diversity of network ties and leading to its increases 
and decreases. At the time of IPO in 2007, the network of firm “A” was demonstrating richness 
and verity of ties. Board members had already owned strong business ties and ties to 
shareholding companies. Moreover, the network was encompassing weak international and 
political ties, like also ties to financial institutions and non-business actors. This high diversity 
of ties was also confirmed by the high value of the Blau’s index (0.78) calculated for this year 
(see Table 4 in the Appendix). Based on the values of the index, the diversity of ties was 
subsequently increasing and reached the highest value of 0.80 in 2010. In the following years, 
however, the diversity started decreasing, and thereby the values of the Blau’s index. In 2012 
the index dropped to of 0.56, which was the lowest value observed in the entire analyzed period. 
From the very beginning of our analysis, network of firm “A” was demonstrating strong 
business ties and strong ties to shareholding companies. This was a result of multiple network 
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ties crated by inside directors, who were simultaneously affiliated with firms from the same 
business group as firm “A” and other firms in the environment. Multiple board posts were also 
characteristic for the individuals, who we earlier identified as the key boundary spanners, 
namely the CEO and one of inside directors. In the analyzed time period, the CEO was holding 
several board post in firms from the same business group, likewise the inside director. The ties 
to shareholding companies and business ties remained relatively strong over the analyzed years. 
In fact these types of ties were predominant in the firm’s network. Interestingly, majority of 
these ties had been formed by inside directors. In comparison to networks of independent 
directors, inside directors held more external positions outside firm “A”, thus had bigger 
individual networks (see Table 1 in the Appendix). This was a typical pattern for the analyzed 
years 2007-2012.   
As shown in our data, independent directors played a significant role in connecting the 
firm to non-business actors. The independent directors often were members of professional and 
industry associations, such as China Machinery Industrial Federation. Moreover, at some point 
the CEO also became active in business associations and in this way strengthened the non-
business ties of firm “A”. Though irregularly, the strength of non-business ties was increasing 
until 2009, then in the following years the ties were consistently weakening and were finally 
dissolved in 2012.      
Firm “A” had also international connection in its network, as some of its independent 
directors were affiliated with firms in Hong Kong. This was already observed in 2007. The 
international ties had been strengthened also by the presence of a foreigner non-executive 
member in the board. This individual simultaneously held another board post in a firm in 
Europe. The foreign member was appointed already in 2002, thus even before the IPO, and had 
not been replaced over the whole analyzed period. Moreover, networking activity of other 
directors contributed to making international network ties particularly strong in 2007, 2009, and 
2010. 
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Table 2. Dynamics of board social capital: network size 
 
The network of firm “A” included also ties to financial institutions, owing to simultaneous 
board posts of inside directors in local banks and investment companies. These ties were 
gradually strengthening until 2010 and then weakened substantially in 2012. A similar trend was 
observed in the case of political ties. Particularly between 2007 and 2010, inside directors were 
extensively networking with political actors in firm’s environment. The political ties were 
additionally strengthened by a political affiliation of one independent director. Political 
affiliation of directors was mainly resulting from employment in governmental agencies, such as 
the Ministry of Constructions, and memberships in the Party Committees in other state-owned 
enterprises. To give an example, the individual network of the inside director, who we already 
identified as the key boundary-spanner, was encompassing several political connections. In 2010 
when political ties of firm “A” were the strongest, the director was a Deputy to the People’s 
Congress, a member of the National Committee of CPPCC (Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference), like also served as the Secretary of Party Committee in a business 
group. However, after consequent strengthening of political ties, the ties were dissolved in 2012 
by both inside and independent directors. This dissolution considerably affected diversity of ties 
in the entire network o the firm. 
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IV. Internal network cohesion  
The data for internal network of firm “A” (see Table 3 in the text, Table 13 in the 
Appendix, and Figure 1) demonstrated an overall pattern of growing cohesiveness. A careful 
tracking of individual networks of board members had shown that the identified key boundary 
spanners, namely the CEO and the inside director, were contributing significantly to the increase 
in cohesion of the network amongst board members. Their contribution was deriving from 
joining boards and associations where the other board members already had held posts or 
memberships. In addition, both the CEO and the inside director were holding board positions in 
another firm affiliated with the same business group as “A”. The CEO served there as a board 
chairman, while the inside director held a non-executive position. It is worth mentioning that the 
inside directors did not have any external affiliations in common with other board members, but 
only with the CEO. This indicates some extent of exclusiveness of the social relationship 
between these two boundary-spanners. 
The CEO played a particularly interesting role in formation of the cohesive internal 
network, as he commonly held post and memberships in firms and associations together with 
other members. Already by the time of IPO the CEO had been creating a cohesive network 
around him throughout external affiliations in firms from the same business group as firm “A” 
and his non-business ties. As a result the CEO had formed a subgroup of board members, who 
had common external affiliations with him. Still, it was the CEO who was keeping the central 
position in this internal network (see Figure 2).   
Despite commonality of having posts or memberships in the same organizations as the 
CEO or other directors, it was not the case for all board members. Some members either did not 
have any external affiliations at all or none in common with other members. Externally affiliated 
independent directors usually were linked to other firms through board interlocks, like for 
example the aforementioned foreign board member, or had memberships in professional 
associations. Externally affiliated inside directors typically were holding post in boards of firms 
affiliated with the same business group as firm “A”. In a broader perspective some of directors 
were isolated from the internal group of board members, which had formed around the CEO. 
This structure remained stable over time and was also reflected in the measures of network 
cohesion calculated for the analyzed years. The increasing average degree, density, and 
connectedness of the internal network confirmed the observed pattern that board members were 
becoming more connected to each other. The decreasing values of network fragmentation have 
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shown that although some of the board members remained isolated in the network this trend was 
declining over time. 
 
Firm “B” 
I. External network size  
In 2003 firm “B” got publicly listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and thus this year 
marked a starting point for our analysis, because of data availability and disclosure requirements 
for publicly listed companies in China. We analyzed the available data from 2003 to 2011. To 
start the investigation of firm’s network created by its board members, we first looked at the size 
of the network. In comparison to the other selected cases, network size of firm “B” was 
relatively small and this relation continued over the analyzed years (see Table 2 in the text and 
Table 2 in the Appendix). In the year of IPO the network contained only few network ties to 
shareholding companies and one tie to an investment company that had been created by an 
inside director (see Table 2 in the Appendix). The network enlarged substantially in 2005 and 
reached its biggest size in 2010. The increase of the network size between 2005 and 2010 
resulted from adding only single network ties. Also, in 2006 and 2009 we reported slight 
decreases in network size. The decreasing trend occurred again in 2011. Although we could not 
have obtained data on firm expansion in 2012, the network data for this year confirmed 
continuation of the decreasing trend. Hence, we concluded that 2010 was a pivotal point in 
evolution of network size, as it marked a significant change in the growth pattern. Similarly to 
the analysis preformed for firm “A”, in the next step we aimed to identify board members, who 
were leading changes in the firm’s network. As in the previous case, we labeled these 
individuals as the key boundary spanners.         
 
II. Key boundary spanners 
The substantial increase of network size observed in 2005 was resulting from extension of 
individual networks of the already appointed board members. Although firm “B” appointed six 
new board members in 2004 (see Table 8 in the Appendix), they did not have any external 
affiliations at that time. Nevertheless, a new independent director, who was appointed in 2004, 
started actively extending his external network in the following years. This independent director 
established a political connection through preforming a role of the Secretary of the Party 
Leadership Group in a state-owned enterprise. Moreover, he was also appointed a vice board 
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chairman in an investment company. This individual network extension enriched firm’s “B” 
network with a political tie and tie to a financial institution.                   
 
Table 3. Dynamics of board social capital: strength, diversity of ties, and network cohesion 
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Figure 2. Examples of network structures developed amongst board members of the 
selected firms in 2009 
Firm A 
 
Firm B 
 
Firm C 
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The further development of firm’s “B” network was a result of individual networking 
activities performed by the newly appointed independent directors. Interestingly, none of the 
inside directors or executives was engaged in the process of building up the firm’s external 
network to the same extent as the independent directors. The CEO of firm “B” played a rather 
passive role in this process. It is worth to mention that individuals serving as CEOs were 
replaced two times in 2004 and 2007. The individual, who was appointed first as CEO and 
served until 2004, did not have any external affiliations. Then he was replaces by an individual, 
who was serving as an independent director in another firm operating also in the construction 
machinery sector. Likewise, the CEO appointed in 2007 held only a board post in a firm 
affiliated with the same business group as firm “B”. In the following years, the CEO had not 
extended his network beyond this affiliation.  
Our investigation has shown that the process of accumulating external social capital was 
driven primarily by independent directors, who were jointly acting as boundary-spanners for 
firm “B”. This pattern continued over the entire analyzed period. Over time firm “B” attracted 
independent directors, who contributed to enriching its network with new connections to 
external actors. To give an example, in 2010 firm “B” appointed 10 new members out of whom 
6 had other external affiliations (see Table 8 in the Appendix). The newly appointed inside 
directors were already affiliated with the same business group as firm “B”, while the new 
independent directors had more wide-spread individual networks. For instance, they were 
holding board posts in other firms operating in the construction machinery sector and were 
members of prestigious industry associations, such as China Engineering Machinery Industrial 
Association.   
 
III. Diversity and strength of external network ties 
In the beginning of the analyzed time period the external network of firm “B” 
demonstrated a relatively low diversity of ties. In fact in 2003 and 2004 the network contained 
only single ties to shareholding companies and a tie to a financial institution, which was created 
by an inside director. Therefore, the Blau’s index reached a very low value in 2003 and even 
dropped to zero in 2004 (see Table 3 in the text and Table 5 in the Appendix). Although the 
values of the index increased in the following years, in comparison to the other analyzed cases, 
overall diversity of network ties was relatively medium (compare Tables 4,5, and 6 in the 
Appendix). Since 2005 the Blau’s index had been increasing, until it reached its highest value in 
157 
 
2008, which marked a pivotal point for evolution pattern of diversity. From this point diversity 
of ties started successively decreasing and its lowest value (0.58) was observed in 2012.          
Network ties to business type of actors, namely to shareholding companies and to other 
firms, were representing the strongest connections of firm “B” over the entire analyzed period 
(see Table 3 in the text and Table 5 in the Appendix). Particularly in years 2003 and 2004 these 
types of ties were the strongest, owing to homogenous external affiliations of board members. In 
the following years, despite the growing diversity of network ties, firm “B” sustained its 
relatively strong business ties and ties to shareholding companies through affiliations of already 
appointed inside and independent directors. Even after a substantial change in board 
composition that occurred in 2010 and brought ten new members to the board, strength of these 
network ties did not decrease. In fact the new inside directors had been already affiliated with 
the same business group as firm “B”, thus increased the strength of firm’s ties to shareholding 
companies. Likewise, the new independent directors simultaneously held board posts in other 
firms, thus strengthened business ties of the firm.     
Despite numerous ties to business actors, firm “B” was able to establish relatively strong 
non-business ties, particularly to universities. This type of ties appeared in the network owing to 
external affiliations of independent directors, who were holding academic positions 
simultaneously to directorships in firm “B”. Over time the connections to academic environment 
were sustained by already appointed and new board members. For example a new independent 
director, who was appointed in 2007, linked firm “B” to Renmin University of China where he 
had an academic position. Moreover, appointments of new independent directors in 2010 
strengthened the non-business ties through directors’ connections to industry associations, such 
as China Engineering Machinery Industrial Association and China Engineering Machinery 
Federation.    
In the analyzed period firm “B” did not establish any explicit international ties, as its 
board members had not held any external affiliations in foreign entities. Yet, in 2012 a foreign 
individual was appointed to the board. By the time of appointment, this board member had been 
already affiliated with the same business group as firm “B”. Moreover, he previously held a 
CEO position in a firm in Europe, which was acquired by the business group. After the 
acquisition, the CEO was nominated to the board of directors of the acquirer and subsequently 
to the board of firm “B”.     
External affiliations of independent directors were connecting firm “B” also to political 
actors and financial institutions, though these ties were relatively weak in comparison to other 
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network ties. These ties appeared in the network in 2005, owing to new external affiliations of 
the already appointed independent directors. Particularly one independent director was the only 
reported political connection for the firm, as in 2005 he had become the Secretary of the Party 
Leadership Group in another firm. However, he left the board in 2010, and thus the political tie 
was dissolved. The initial network ties to financial institutions, though also dissolved as a result 
of directors’ replacements in 2010, had been strengthened through affiliations of the 
independent director appointed in 2007. The new director linked the firm to Bank of Beijing, 
where he served as an independent director, and to an investment company.          
 
IV. Internal network cohesion 
Although the described changes in diversity and strength of network ties clearly 
demonstrate patterns of board members’ interaction with external actors, they also had an 
impact on the relationships inside the boardroom. Similarly to the case “A”, the performed 
analysis of internal network cohesion aimed to reveal patterns of how internal social capital had 
been accumulated over time (see Table 3 in the text, Table 14 in the Appendix, and Figure 1). 
While development of external network of firm “B” was driven by external affiliations of 
independent directors, the internal network was build up by dense connections amongst inside 
directors exclusively. Our data has shown that inside directors, likewise CEOs, were usually 
affiliated with the same business group as firm “B” and often it was the only external affiliation 
they had. Therefore, these common affiliations constituted a foundation for emergence of a 
subgroup within the board. The subgroup comprised inside directors, who were interacting also 
outside of the board meetings in firm “B”, because of their other board posts in the same firms. 
Moreover, the subgroup was exclusive in some way, as independent directors did not share any 
affiliations with inside directors, thus were disconnected from the subgroup. Furthermore, the 
independent directors did not have any common affiliations with each other (see Figure 2). 
Therefore, in the internal network they were acting as isolated actors. The isolation of 
independent directors was also captured by the measure of network fragmentation calculated for 
this period, though it had been decreasing over time (see Table 14 in the Appendix). This 
structure of internal network emerged in 2005 and sustained in the following years. Yet, before 
the emergence of the subgroup, board members had not shared common external affiliations. 
The calculated measures of network cohesion have shown that only from 2005 network average 
degree, density, and connectedness started increasing. These growths resulted from a growing 
number of inside directors who had common external affiliations with each other. Also, the 
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subgroup was growing along with appointments of directors, who had been already affiliated 
with the same business group as firm “B”. Interestingly, there was no central actor in the 
subgroup, since the members were bonded by the common affiliation with the business group.   
 
Firm “C”  
I. Network size 
Limited data availability for the period immediately following firm’s IPO forced us to 
adjust our case analysis and restrained the observation period. Therefore, even though the firm 
got publicly listed in 1998, we were able to track its network evolution from 2001 to 2012. 
Similarly to analysis of the other cases, we started with investigation of external network size. In 
case “C” the size of the external network was relatively big, in comparison to networks of the 
other selected firms (see Table 2 in the text and Table 3 in the Appendix). Owing to numerous 
external affiliations of board members, the number of network ties of firm “C” had been 
consistently outnumbering figures for the other selected cases. Initially the network consisted of 
strong ties created through board interlocks with shareholding companies. These simultaneously 
held board posts of inside directors had created strong ties between the firm and its shareholding 
companies. Such structure of the network had been sustaining until 2005, when board members 
started expanding their external networks. Although in the following years network size was 
slightly increasing, since 2008 it remained relatively stable, despite addition and dissolution of 
single network ties. To further investigate growth patterns of network size, we proceeded with 
analysis of individual networks of board members with the aim to identify the key boundary 
spanners for firm “C”.   
 
II. Key boundary spanners 
The network size of firm “C” remained relatively stable until 2005. Although over these 
years firm “C” appointed eight new board members, none of them was affiliated with external 
actors (see Table 9 in the Appendix). Therefore, these new appointments had not affected the 
network size. The following increase in the number of network ties, which occurred in 2005, 
expanded firm’s network across diverse actors in its environment. This increase was a result of 
intense networking performed by the already appointed board members. Though a new board 
member, who was already affiliated with the same business group as firm “C”, got appointed in 
2005 and also contributed to the network enlargement. Looking closely at individual networks 
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of board members, who were shaping the firm’s external network, we observed that particularly 
CEO, board chairman, and assistant general manager had the most extended external networks. 
Likewise, few inside directors were also affiliated with several external actors. Yet, these three 
individuals had been consistently contributing to the development of firm’s external 
connections, and thus were acting as key boundary spanners for the firm. Over the years, the 
CEO joined numerous boards of directors in firms operating within the same industry. Likewise, 
board chairman through his board interlocks linked firm “C” to its shareholding company and 
other business actors in the industry. Moreover, the board chairman was also a member of China 
Aerospace Science & Technology Group Research Institute. Similarly to the CEO and the 
chairman, assistant general manager was simultaneously holding several board posts in other 
firms, including a directorship in a foreign firm operating in China.  
Although firm “C” only slightly increased its board size over the analyzed period, 
significant changes in board composition occurred in 2008, 2009, and 2012. These changes 
included also CEO replacement in 2008 and then again in 2012. Board chairman was replaced in 
2002 and 2009. The replacements of key individuals in the board also affected assistant general 
manager. We detected three replacements for this role in 2008, 2009, and 2012. The 
replacements had not affected the network size, as the newly appointed individuals already had 
solid external networks. It was especially the case for individuals appointed for the role of 
assistant general manager. Often these individuals had the largest external network amongst all 
board members. Hence, the firm still benefited from extended external affiliations of its board 
members, despite the replacements. Furthermore, the replacements had more impact on diversity 
of ties included in the firm’s network rather than on network size.             
 
III. Diversity and strength of external network ties 
Initially board members were connecting firm “C” only to its shareholding companies. For 
this reason, the network that emerged from their combined external affiliations included only 
ties to one type of actors. Despite numerous external ties, the network was encompassing 
connections to homogenous actors and thus even the Blau’s index calculated for the first 
analyzed years equaled zero (see Table 6 in the Appendix). This composition of external ties 
had been sustaining until 2005, when board members established new external affiliations with 
actors outside the firm. It positively affected diversity of ties and increased the Blau’s index to 
0.56 (see Table 5 in the Appendix). Over the next years we observed consequent increase in 
diversity of network ties, yet with few exceptions in 2008 and 2009. At the final point of 
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analysis, namely in 2012, diversity of ties reached its highest level and the value of the Blau’s 
index increased to 0.68.   
Firm “C” kept sustaining relatively strong ties to its shareholding companies over the 
analyzed years (see Table 3 in the text and Table 6 in the Appendix). Already in the bagging of 
our analysis, we observed that this type of network ties was dominating the firm’s network. 
Although simultaneously to the enlargement of its size in 2005 the network gained new 
connections to other actors in the environment, strong ties to shareholding companies remained 
typical for this network. The network enlargement in 2005 was caused by new external 
affiliations of board members and, in particular, by new board appointments of CEO, board 
chairman and assistant general manager. In this way board members connected firm “C” to other 
actors, including other firms in its environment and also in the same industry. This type of 
connections, apart from ties to shareholding companies, had become an important element in 
firm’s network. Moreover, business ties remained the second strongest type of network ties for 
firm “C”. In terms of tie strength, business ties and ties to shareholding companies were the 
most significant over the analyzed years. 
Apart from strong ties to business actors, firm “C” was also connected to non-business 
actors, owing to affiliations of its independent directors. Our investigation of individual network 
ties had shown that only independent directors were providing connections to non-business 
actors (see Table 3 in the Appendix). Although the non-business ties were relatively weak in the 
network, and only appeared from 2005, firm “C” gained connections to such actors as Shanghai 
Tongji University and Shanghai Information Association. These ties, however, had remained 
relatively weak in comparison to the strength of other network ties.     
The enlargement of network size in 2005 resulted in formation of network ties to foreign 
entities. Since 2005 inside directors had been joining boards of international firms and foreign 
affiliates of the business groups that firm “C” was affiliated with. Also, we observed that it was 
not uncommon for inside directors to simultaneously hold board posts in the same foreign 
affiliates of the business group. Moreover, over the years the international ties had been 
successively strengthening and became the strongest in 2012. However, despite these strong 
international connections, firm “C” had not appointed a foreign board member, unlike the other 
analyzed firms.     
As board members had started expanding their networks beyond ties to shareholding 
companies, some of them joined also boards of financial institutions, such as Bank of 
Communications. Having ties to financial institutions was typical for inside and independent 
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directors, though these ties were formed infrequently. We observed that ties to financial 
institutions, similarly to political ties, were weak and irregular. In the case of political ties, we 
identified two inside directors with connections to the government through their affiliations with 
the Ministry of Science and Technology. Even though these single network connections were 
probably of a great importance to the firm, we also presumed that the actual presence of political 
ties in this board might have been underreported in our data sources.     
IV. Internal network cohesion 
The discovered patterns of networking behavior outside the firm provided valuable 
insights into external connections of firm “C”. Yet, this behavior indirectly had been also 
affecting dynamics inside the board. Starting from 2001 when several board members were 
holding simultaneous board posts in shareholding companies, the internal network begun to 
form through bonding ties of the board members, who were affiliated with the same firms. As 
presented earlier in our analysis, until 2005 the network of firm “C” comprised only ties to 
shareholding companies. Hence, affiliations with the same firms were leading to strengthening 
of internal network ties amongst board members. Moreover, based on the measures of internal 
network cohesion (see Table 3 in the text, Table 15 in the Appendix, and Figure 1), we 
confirmed that board members were typically holding other posts in the same shareholding 
firms. Therefore, the measures of network cohesion calculated for the period from 2001 to 2004 
reached maximum value of density and connectedness.       
In the following years, simultaneously to increasing network size and diversity of ties, this 
dense internal network started evolving to a more complex structure. The structure was still 
demonstrating a high level of connectedness amongst actors, but it became more fragmented in 
comparison to its state in the previous years. In fact the high level of connectedness was 
sustaining not only because of the already present common affiliations to shareholding 
companies, but also owing to appointments of new board members, who were affiliated with the 
same business group as firm “C”. We spotted this pattern also in replacements of the key figures 
in the board, such as CEO, board chairman and assistant general manager. 
Since 2005 board members had started forming two separate subgroups within the internal 
network that included individuals densely connected to each other. Even after the 
aforementioned replacements of the key figures in the board, the subgroups retained their 
characteristics. Therefore, since 2005 the internal network was containing two subgroups, which 
were structured as follows. In the internal network one subgroup was formed around CEO and 
assistant general manager. This subgroup included inside directors, who were sharing common 
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external affiliations with these individuals. The other subgroup was formed by board members 
sharing affiliations with board chairman. Only after 2009, and the following replacement of 
board chairman, CEO and the chairman were directly connected through a common external 
affiliation (see Figure 2), until then an inside director had been connecting these two individuals. 
The director could have been acting as a broker in the CEO-board chairman relations. Despite 
reshuffling of ties between CEO and board chairman, the network structure with clearly defined 
two subgroups remained stable over time.             
 
Network dynamics and firm expansion      
This section presents how the selected firms were expanding in the analyzed periods and how 
their external and internal networks were evolving over time. For each case we analyzed 
expansion events and network changes that occurred in an initial and a later stage of expansion. 
This differentiation between stages of expansion allowed for a clear identification of patterns 
typical for each stage. For better demonstration of results, in Figure 3, 4, and 5 we graphically 
present expansion timelines and for each case together with the identified evolution patterns of 
networks. We additionally summarize our findings in Table 4.    
 
Firm “A”  
I. Initial stage of expansion (from 2007 to 2010) 
The expansion process of firm “A” had already started before its IPO in 2007. By that 
time the firm was operating in eleven provinces in China through its 33 domestic subsidiaries 
(See Table 10 in the Appendix). Moreover, firm “A” already had one foreign subsidiary in the 
USA. Further establishment of foreign subsidiaries, however, had been postponed until 2009. 
Meanwhile, the firm kept expanding on the domestic market and as a result increased the 
number of domestic subsidiaries to 36 in 2008. The establishment of new domestic subsidiaries 
significantly increased the total assets of the firm, likewise contributed to the growing number of 
its employees and operating revenues. In 2009 firm “A” established new foreign subsidiaries in 
France, Morocco, and Hong Kong. Although it resulted in an increase of firm’s assets, it had a 
smaller impact on employment and revenues than the expansion events from the previous years. 
In the following year firm “A” again focused on expansion on the Chinese market. The three 
newly opened domestic subsidiaries were very important for the growth of the entire firm. The 
significant growth of asset base, number of employees, and operating revenues had shown that 
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the expansion of operations in 2010 affected firm “A” to a greater extent than the previous 
expansion events. It was in fact the highest reported growth in terms of total assets and operating 
revenues between years 2007 and 2012.  
 
Figure 3. Expansion timeline and dynamics of board social capital of firm “A” 
 
During the first analyzed years, namely in 2007 and 2008, the external network of board 
members, although its size remained constant, demonstrated a slight change in diversity of ties. 
The firm strengthened its ties to shareholding companies and political actors, while ties to 
international and non-business actors slightly decreased. For this reason we observed also a 
decreased value of the Blau’s index in 2008 (see Table 4 in the Appendix). However, already in 
2009 network size as well as diversity of network ties increased, as board members thorough 
their external affiliations had strengthened firm’s ties to financial institutions, non-business, 
political, and business actors. In the following year and simultaneously to the extensive firm 
growth, the external network did not show significant increase in terms of its size. However, 
diversity of network ties reached its maximum level reported for this period. The value of the 
Blau’s index in 2010 was 0.8 and this high value was a result of further strengthening of 
previously weak ties, such as international ties. Moreover, the key boundary spanners, namely 
the CEO and the inside director, were actively stretching their networks to accumulate potential 
resources deriving from political ties and ties to financial institutions. ,   
A thorough investigation of the internal relationships amongst board members has 
revealed the following pattern. In the initial stage of expansion board members typically had 
common external affiliations with the CEO and not necessarily with each other. This led to 
formation of a subgroup within the board that was centered around the CEO (see Table 4 in the 
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text). At this stage, however, the subgroup was only emerging and the entire internal network 
was still very fragmented, as demonstrated by the high degree of network fragmentation 
between 2007 and 2010 (See Table 13 in the Appendix). Despite the high fragmentation, the 
increasing values of average degree, density, and connectedness had confirmed that the internal 
network started becoming more cohesive over time.    
 
Table 4. Dynamics of board social capital and firm expansion 
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II. Later stage of expansion (from 2011 to 2012) 
In 2011 firm “A” entered a stage of intensive expansion in terms of the number of 
established domestic and foreign subsidiaries (see Table 10 in the Appendix). On the domestic 
market the firm had opened six new subsidiaries and expanded its operations across 16 
provinces in China. Moreover, three new foreign subsidiaries were established in the USA, the 
UAE, and Singapore. Although over this year firm “A” indeed spread its operations 
geographically and increased the value of its assets by about 18%, it did not report a substantial 
growth of employment. The data has shown that at this stage of expansion, firm “A” rather 
concentrated on geographical spread of its operations. After establishment of new foreign 
subsidiaries in 2011, the firm continued its international expansion. In 2012 the already diverse 
portfolio of foreign markets where the firm had its subsidiaries was further enriched through 
expansion to Russia, India, Luxembourg, Germany, and again to Singapore. The investment in 
these five new foreign subsidiaries caused a substantial increase in the number of employees 
working for firm “A”, yet it did not increase firm’s assets to the same extent. Also, on the 
domestic market the firm opened only one new subsidiary in 2012 and in total its operations 
were covering in 16 provinces in China.  
The geographical expansion of firm “A” covered with a substantial increase of network 
size. In fact in 2011 the network reached the biggest size reported for the period from 2007 to 
2012 (see Table 1 in the Appendix). However, diversity of network ties dropped from the high 
level observed in the previous year. The decrease was a result of weakening of already weak 
ties, such as ties to non-business actors, and strengthening of ties, which already had been strong 
in the network (see Table 4 in the Appendix). In other words, board members were networking 
with less dissimilar actors than in the previous years. Business ties and ties to shareholding 
companies, which in general were relatively strong in the entire analyzed period, became even 
stronger, because of the new board posts held by the CEO and the inside directors of firm “A”. 
In the following year firm “A” experienced a decrease in its network size. Moreover, when 
board members dissolved their ties to non-business and political actors, it had a substantially 
decreasing effect on diversity of network ties. Board members, however, still kept single 
international ties and ties to financial institutions, while at the same time business ties and ties to 
shareholding companies were being further strengthened. In this way the external network 
became more centralized around business actors, although it lowered the diversity of ties to a 
minimum level observed in the analyzed period. 
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The observed strengthening of ties to business actors and shareholding companies also had 
an impact on the relationships amongst board members. It facilitated further bonding amongst 
members through having common external affiliations outside firm “A”. The CEO, in particular, 
was actively developing his individual network in firms affiliated with the same business group 
as firm “A”. Moreover, the new board members, who were appointed in this period, usually, had 
been already affiliated with this business group. This increasing cohesiveness was clearly 
reflected in the increasing measures of network cohesion (see Table 13 in the Appendix). The 
measures indicated a growing number of ties amongst board members, increasing density and 
connectedness of the internal network. Hence, over time more board members had common 
external affiliations with each other, and particularly with the CEO. However, some of the board 
members remained isolated in the internal network, thus had not shred any external affiliations 
with other members. This was also shown by the high, yet decreasing, values of network 
fragmentation. The case of the inside director, who was identified as the key boundary spanner 
for firm “A”, is a good example depicting partial isolation in the network. Though the director 
had a wide-spread network outside firm “A” and was connected to the CEO, he had not engaged 
in networking with other board members. Also, it was the case for independent directors, who 
indeed had established network ties to numerous actors in firm’s environment, but did not have 
any affiliations in common with other directors.    
 
Firm “B”  
I. Initial stage of expansion (from 2003 to 2007) 
In the beginning of the initial stage of expansion firm “B” owned three domestic 
subsidiaries, which were operating in three Chinese provinces (see Table 11 in the Appendix). 
At that time, the firm did not have any foreign subsidiaries. Also in the following years the 
growth strategy was focus on expanding operations in the domestic market. Consequently, in 
2004 firm “B” established four new subsidiaries, which increased its total assets by more than 
50% and revenues by more than 20%, yet had not spread the operations geographically as the 
firm was still operating in four provinces. Although in 2005 the firm continued its domestic 
expansion, the achieved growth had a small impact on assets and revenues. In fact the firm 
reported a decrease of revenues compared to the previous year. These perhaps unsatisfactory 
results improved in the following year.  
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Figure 4. Expansion timeline and dynamics of board social capital of firm “B” 
 
From the strategy perspective the next two years were very important and characterized by 
crucial events for firm’s initial expansion. Apart from further domestic expansion, in 2006 firm 
“B” established its first foreign subsidiaries in India, Qatar, and Hong Kong. This domestic and 
international growth had turned into growth of firm’s assets, employees, and also substantially 
increased firm’s revenues. The results for the next year were even better, owing to further 
international expansion and strengthened position on the domestic market. By the end of 2007 
firm “B” established six new foreign subsidiaries in multiple locations, for example in South 
Africa, Brazil, Singapore and the US. Moreover, it experienced the biggest domestic expansion 
in terms of the number of owned subsidiaries. As a result the firm had in total 28 domestic 
subsidiaries operating across 15 Chinese provinces. This geographical spread of operations was 
also reflected in rapidly increasing value of assets, number of employees, and also revenues 
followed that trend. 
During the initial expansion stage board members were successively enlarging firm’s 
network through affiliating with numerous actors in firm’s environment. Despite only few 
network ties initially present in the network, in the following years the network size grew 
substantially, because of extensive networking activities of independent directors (see summary 
in Table 3). Starting from 2005, board members had created particularly strong network 
business ties with other firms and with shareholding companies. Apart from typically business 
actors, board members formed relatively weak ties with political actors, academic and financial 
institutions. Moreover, the new independent directors, who were appointed in 2007, further 
strengthened firm’s ties to financial institutions. This growing diversity of network ties was also 
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reflected by the increasing values of the Blau’s index calculated for this period (see Table 5 in 
the Appendix). From 2003 to 2007 the value of the index increased from 0.38 to 0.72 
accordingly. Apart from the year 2004 when the index value dropped to zero, because at that 
time board members were only affiliated with shareholding companies, the Blau’s index was 
continuously increasing throughout the entire initial stage of expansion. 
In the beginning of the initial stage of expansion in 2003 board members did not have any 
common external affiliations. This lack of internal connectedness amongst board members had 
continued also throughout 2004 (see Table 14 in the Appendix). Based on the diversity measures 
we could conclude that during these years the inside directors, who at that time were building up 
external network of the firm, were affiliated with the same type of actors, namely with 
shareholding companies. However, these were not the same shareholding companies. Therefore, 
even the calculated measures of internal network cohesion have shown that the inside directors 
remained disconnected from each other, as the component ratio reached its maximum value of 1. 
Therefore, at this stage the internal network consisted of disconnected individuals. In the 
following years growth of network size and diversity of ties disrupted this structure. We 
observed that since 2005 board members had been networking not only with similar types of 
actor, but also with actually the same actors. It increased connectedness amongst board members 
and reduced fragmentation of the internal network. However, we also observed that networking 
with the same actors, and thus formation of densely connected subgroup in the board, was 
typical only for inside directors. Though independent directors had been playing a significant 
role in connecting firm “B” to various external actors, in the internal network they remained 
disconnected from each other and from inside directors. Inside directors, however, were 
successively forming a cohesive subgroup within the internal network and thus within the board, 
owing to their affiliations with the same shareholding companies.                          
 
II. Later stage of expansion (from 2008 to 2011) 
For the purpose of our analysis we marked the year 2008 as the beginning of the later 
stage of expansion. This year was following a big firm’s growth on domestic and international 
markets. As a continuation of its expansion strategy, in 2008 firm “B” concentrated more on 
strengthening its international presence. In 2008 it subsequently established the biggest number 
of foreign subsidiaries, simultaneously to further expansion on the domestic market, yet on a 
smaller scale than in the previous year. This apparent international focus had spread firm’s 
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operations geographically to multiple locations, for example to Australia, Belgium, Ukraine, 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, and the United Kingdom. The scale of international 
growth was particularly evident in the increasing number of employees and revenues in this 
period (see Table 11 in the Appendix).  
Over the next year firm “B” kept focusing on international growth and marked its presence 
in the United Arab Emirates, South Korea, and Japan. The growth strategy implemented also in 
the following years had clearly shown that international growth was a priority in the later stage 
of firm’s expansion. In 2010 firm “B” expanded to the British Virgin Islands, South Africa, and 
Jordan, while keeping the domestic operations on a scale comparable to previous years. 
Nevertheless, firm’s assets, revenues, and number of employees grew substantially and clearly 
these expansion events were the most significant from the perspective of firm growth at the later 
stage. A slight turn in the growth strategy of the firm occurred in 2011, when it switched its 
focus again to domestic market. Over the year firm “B” had established the biggest number of 
domestic subsidiaries, thus strengthened its position on the Chinese market and spread 
operations across twenty provinces. 
The later stage of firm’s expansion was associated also with changes in its external 
network. Although in 2008 we did not observe any changes in the size of the network, diversity 
of network ties reached the highest level for the analyzed period, namely the Blau’s index 
reached the value of 0.73 (see Table 5 in the Appendix). From this point diversity of network 
ties had been subsequently decreasing, until it dropped to 0.58 in 2012. Also, the structure of 
external network experienced significant changes in 2010, when 10 new board members joined 
the board. Although individual networks of the new board members had increased the size of 
firm’s network, we observed a subsequent decrease in the following years. The new board 
appointments also did not disrupt the pattern of decreasing diversity of ties, as inside and 
independent directors had been strengthening firm’s non-business, business ties, and ties to 
shareholding companies. Yet, simultaneously to directors’ replacements, ties to financial 
institutions and political ties were dissolved. In the following years directors’ affiliations were 
linking the firm only to these three types of actors. Also, ties to shareholding companies and 
business ties remained the strongest in the network.             
In the dynamics amongst board members we observed a clear continuation of the pattern 
identified in the initial stage of expansion. Over the course of 2008 and 2009 the internal 
network slowly had been becoming more cohesive. This pattern continued further also in 2010 
after appointments of new directors (see Table 14 in the Appendix). The new appointments 
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positively contributed to the growth of network cohesiveness. The new inside directors had been 
already affiliated with the same business group as firm “B” and shared common external 
affiliations with the already appointed inside directors. Similarly to the pattern observed before, 
the new independent directors remained isolated in the internal network, as they still did not 
have common affiliations neither with each other nor with inside directors. This stable pattern 
was also reflected in the increasing average degree, network density, and connectedness. Still, 
because independent directors did not have common external affiliations with other board 
members, the internal network was demonstrating a high level of fragmentation, though 
decreasing over time.                              
 
Firm “C” 
I. Initial stage of expansion (from 2001 to 2008) 
In the begging of the initial stage of expansion firm “C” owned three subsidiaries, which 
were operating in Shanghai area (see Table 12 in the Appendix). At that time the firm did not 
have any foreign subsidiaries. Moreover, also in the following years, the firm was focusing on 
its growth on the domestic market. The consequent strategy resulted in an increasing number of 
established subsidiaries, yet concentrated geographically in Shanghai area. The domestic 
expansion had not been continuous, as the firm reported new subsidiaries only in 2002 and 
2005. Yet, indeed it successively strengthened firm’s position on the domestic market. The new 
domestic subsidiaries strongly contributed to the growth of firm’s assets, employees and firm’s 
operating revenues. However, since 2006 we observed stagnation in the firm’s growth. Over the 
next years the firm had postponed further domestic expansion and continued running the 
business through its fourteen subsidiaries located around Shanghai. This stagnant state began in 
2006 and lasted throughout 2008. It caused also a slowdown in the growth of firm’s assets, 
employees and revenues.            
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Figure 5. Expansion timeline and dynamics of board social capital of firm “C” 
 
Although the initial stage of expansion included only two significant expansion events in 
2002 and 2005, significant changes at the board level had occurred at that time. We observed 
that in the period from 2001 to 2004 the network initially contained homogenous ties connecting 
firm “C” to its shareholding companies. Only since 2005 the already appointed board members 
had been expanding their individual networks and formed connections to more diverse actors in 
firm’s environment (see summary in Table 4 in the text and Table 3 in the Appendix). The CEO 
together with board chairman and assistant general manager particularly contributed to this 
network enlargement. These three individuals, through their board post at other firms, linked 
firm “C” mostly to business actors. However, owing to affiliations of independent directors, the 
firm could have benefited also from connections to a non-business actor and a financial 
institution. Therefore, compared to the initial network structure observed in 2001, the network 
had evolved though establishment of more diverse network ties. Because of prevalent strong 
business ties and ties to shareholding companies, diversity of network ties in 2005 still remained 
relatively low. In the following years we observed a slow increase in diversity, yet in 2008 it 
was negatively affected by changes in board composition. As firm “C” appointed 14 new 
members, out of whom 12 already had developed extensive network connections, it further 
strengthened firm’s ties to business actors and reduced the overall diversity of network ties.       
The early networking pattern observed amongst board members was reflecting 
homogeneity of their external affiliations. As since 2001 to 2004 board members were holding 
simultaneous board posts in shareholding companies of firm “C”, it affected the internal 
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dynamic in the boardroom. Based on the calculated data on internal network cohesion, we 
observed a recurrent patter in these years for sustaining a dense internal network amongst board 
members sharing common external affiliations (see Table 15 in the Appendix). This network 
was particularly dense from 2002 to 2004, thus network density and connectedness research 
maximum values. This dense structure was further disrupted by changes unfolding in individual 
networks of board members. The disruption was therefore associated with a growing 
fragmentation of the internal network. While board members had been expanding their 
individual networks and forming ties to more diverse actors in firm’s environment, the internal 
network started reshaping into a structure encompassing two subgroups of densely connected 
actors. Finally one emerging subgroup included board members connected to CEO and assistant 
general manager, while the other subgroup formed around board chairman. 
 
II. Later stage of expansion (from 2009 to 2012) 
Based on observation of the expansion process, we marked the year 2009 as the beginning 
of the later stage of expansion. This choice was made purposely, as from that year firm “C” 
begun expanding on international markets and also further in China (see Table 12 in the 
Appendix). In comparison to the earlier stage, we observed a significant seed-up in 
strengthening of firm’s position on the domestic market that was carried out simultaneously to 
the first establishments of subsidiaries on foreign markets. Only in 2009 firm “C” opened three 
new domestic subsidiaries also outside Shanghai area, after stagnation for several years, and also 
established its first foreign subsidiary in the Netherlands. This expansion of operations was 
reflected in a significant growth of asset base. Also, it had a positive effect on the growth of the 
number of employees and revenues. After years of slowdown in firm’s growth between 2006 
and 2008, in 2009 “C” finally started expanding on a greater scale. In the following years the 
firm was geographically spreading its operations also on the domestic market. After the years of 
concentrating operations around Shanghai area, this geographical spread was indeed a new 
element in firm’s strategy. 
In 2010 the firm established three new domestic subsidiaries and in overall owned 20 
subsidiaries across four provinces in China. Firm “C” also expended further on the international 
markets through establishment of three foreign subsidiaries in Europe, specifically in Italy and 
Spain. The next years followed the same pattern of expansion, namely a simultaneous actions on 
domestic and international markets. Hence, in 2011 firm “C” strengthened its position on the 
domestic markets and spread its operations across another province and also expanded further in 
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Italy and Hong Kong. In 2012 the firm focused on domestic expansion and consequently was 
operating through its 27 domestic subsidiaries spread across 8 provinces. The international side 
of expansion in that year included establishment of two subsidiaries in Luxemburg and 
Germany. It is worth mentioning that these expansion events both on domestic and international 
markets had a substantially stronger effect on firm’s growth, in terms of assets, employees and 
revenues, than the events from the initial stage of expansion. Since 2009 the firm had 
accelerated in accumulation of asset base and employees. Also, firm’s revenues followed this 
increasing trend.      
Despite the accelerated growth of the firm, external network had not experience any 
substantial changes in terms of its size (see summary in Table 4 in the text and Table 3 in the 
Appendix). The network size was relatively stable, though demonstrated slight decreases and 
increases in the following years. However, an increasing diversity of network ties was typical 
for this period. Since 2009 the value of the Blau’s index had grown from 0.58 to 0.68 in 2012 
(see Table 6 in the Appendix). This was caused by an increasing engagement of inside directors 
in foreign affiliates of the business group that firm “C” was also affiliated with. The increasing 
diversity of ties was also associated with the presence of weak ties established by inside 
directors to political actors and financial institutions, like also with non-business ties established 
by independent directors. The firm, however, had sustained strong business ties and ties to its 
shareholding companies over the analyzed years. Despite changes in board composition in 2009 
and 2012 that replaced CEO, board chairman, and assistant general manager, diversity of ties 
and network size still followed the described pattern. This continuity had been supported by 
appointments of individuals with specific profiles matching the pattern. For this reason, even the 
new individuals appointed to the board continued strengthening firm’s ties to business actors, 
shareholding companies, and international entities.        
Continuation of the aforementioned pattern had an impact also on the internal network. As 
board members had been affiliating with the same firms associated within the same business 
groups and its foreign subsidiaries, it sustained cohesiveness of the internal network (see Table 
15 in the Appendix). Moreover, in this period we did not observe any substantial changes in the 
structure of the internal network. It was also confirmed by stability of measures that were 
calculated for investigating cohesion of the internal network. The measures have shown that the 
structure of the internal network was sustainable. Therefore, also in the later stage of expansion, 
the internal network consisted of two subgroups formed around the key boundary spanners.        
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that dynamics of board social capital 
encompasses evolutionary changes of social relationships formed within and outside the 
organization. Taking into account the limited theoretical developments in this area, a multiple 
case study analysis was performed on the selected firms from transportation manufacturing 
industry in China. To capture complexity of board social capital, the analysis was focused on 
internal and external dimensions of the construct. Therefore, the analysis covered evolution 
paths of internal and external networks formed by board members. In order to explain and link 
changes within external and internal networks with firm level outcomes, we applied a process 
approach to the case study data. As firm expansion is a process that requires acquisition of new 
resources and development of new capabilities, it is a good context for investigating how 
networks evolve to accommodate this process. It has been shown in the literature that firms face 
different needs for resources depending on their sage of growth (Yiu, Bruton, Lu, 2005; 
Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2010), and that firms’ networks may be used instrumentally as 
conduits for resource flow to facilitate expansion (Coviello & Munro, 1997; Coviello, 2006; 
Hite & Hesterly, 2001). For this reason, in each of our cases we have differentiated between an 
initial and a later stage of expansion, and then investigated how external and internal networks 
were evolving throughout these stages. In this section we show that when firms are moving from 
an initial to a later stage of expansion, it is associated with changes in their external and internal 
networks. While facing a transition between stages of expansion, board of directors likely will 
be reshuffling and optimizing its networks to address shifting needs for resources. Especially in 
this transitional period, the board must ensure that effective performance of its strategy role is 
sufficiently supported by the accumulated network resources and thus by board social capital. 
Therefore, to enhance understanding of how external and internal networks may evolve as firm 
transitions from an initial to a later stage of expansion, in this section we develop theoretical 
propositions. The propositions are based on our empirical findings and integrated into the 
existing literature. To show a clear link between our findings and the propositions, we visually 
present developments of the key concepts in Figure 6 and summarize in the results in Table 5.    
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Figure 6. Development of the key concepts across the analyzed cases 
External network size 
 
Diversity of external network ties 
 
Connectedness of internal network 
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Fragmentation of internal network 
 
 
The undertaken case study analysis has revealed a common evolution pattern of external 
network size. In the analyze time frame the sizes of external networks in cases “A” and “B” 
were initially increasing up to a point when the pattern shifted to decreasing (see Figure 6). In 
these cases evolution of external network size followed an inverted U-shape pattern. Network 
size of firm “C” has demonstrated a contrasting pattern, namely the network was initially 
increasing up to a point from which it kept a relatively stable size in the following years (see 
Table 5 and Figure 6). These results have shown that network size does not have to follow a 
linear growth pattern, but instead may grow up to a pivotal point after which it starts decreasing 
or remains stable. The identified pattern suggests a two-stage evolution process of external 
network size. In the first stage network size is increasing, while in the second stage it is 
decreasing or keeping a stable size. By implementing the process approach to our data, we have 
observed that the two-stage evolution process matches with expansion patterns of the selected 
firms. The first stage corresponds with the initial stage of expansion, when firms were active on 
the domestic market and only started to engage internationally. The second stage matches with 
the later stage of expansion, when firms had already gained experience on international markets 
and also keep expanding domestically.    
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Table 5. Summary of results 
 
In line with the dominant logics in the literature, our results have confirmed that network 
size may be increased through appointments of new board members and integration of their 
individual networks into firm’s network (Kim & Cannella, 2008; Hillman, Cannella, Paetzold, 
2000). However, a detailed analysis of individual networks of the new members has shown that 
some of them provided only single network ties or did not have any external ties at all. In 
contrast to this prevailing assumption about enlarging network size through new board 
appointments, our results have revealed that the already appointed board members may play a 
crucial role in expanding external network of an organization. While holding board posts in a 
given firm, the appointed board members may join boards of other firms, start political careers, 
or become members of industry associations. Hence, being appointed to one board does not 
constraint board members from forming new network ties to actors in firm’s environment. By 
doing so, they actually not only expand their individual networks, but also increase the size of 
firm’s external network. This applies to inside board members as well as to independent 
directors. As observed in our cases, firm’s external network may be developed by inside and 
independent board members. In two analyzed state-owned enterprises “A” and “C”, the growth 
of external network had been driven by actions of insiders, and in particular by individual 
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networking of CEO, board chair, inside director, and assistant general manager. In contrast to 
this pattern, the case of the private firm “B” has shown that firm’s external network may be as 
well expanded through actions of independent directors. Therefore, our findings suggest that the 
type of implemented development strategy for external network may be contingent on firm 
ownership.   
The literature generally agrees that social capital plays a facilitating role in firm growth 
and international expansion (Coviello & Munro, 1997; Coviello, 2006; Han, 2006; Hite & 
Hesterly, 2001). The evidences from our case studies also support this statement. In addition to 
previous findings, our results have shown that diversity of external network ties follows an 
inverted U-shape pattern, when firms are transitioning from initial to later stage of expansion. 
Similarly to the pattern identified for network size, diversity of ties also follows a two-stage 
evolution process, which corresponds with stages of firm expansion. In the initial stage of 
expansion diversity of ties was increasing in the cases “A” and “B” (see Figure 6), as their board 
members had been creating network ties with more diverse actors in the environment. Hence, in 
both cases being in the initial stage of expansion was associated with enlargement of external 
networks and inclusion of new, diverse, actors into the networks. Our analysis has shown that, 
despite the primary level of diversity, the initial stage of expansion was a period of forming 
or/and strengthening of weak ties. These ties had been created to political or non-business 
actors, financial or international institutions. In both cases inclusion of the weak ties caused 
disruption of the primary network composition, which until then had been dominated by 
business ties and ties to shareholding companies. Although the external network of firm “A” at 
the starting point of our analysis already was more diversified in comparison to the other 
analyzed networks (see Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6 in the Appendix), the Blau’s index further 
increased from 0.78 in 2007 to 0.8 in 2010. Similarly in case “B”, the index increased from 0.38 
in 2003 to 0.72 in 2007. Hence, throughout the initial stage of expansion the external network of 
firm “B” had evolved from a network dominated by homogenous ties to a network 
encompassing highly diverse actors.             
Firm expansion requires resources and development of unique organizational capabilities, 
thus it may be expected that firms are likely to utilize the existing network or form new ties to 
actors endowed with unique resources. Such pattern of networking is recognized in the 
literature, as external ties are known to provide access to resources that expanding firms are not 
able to develop internally (Oviatt & McDougall, 1994), such as foreign market knowledge 
(Sharma & Blomstermo, 2003; Yli-Renko, Autio, Tontti, 2002). Our findings confirm that firms 
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in the initial stage of expansion spread their external networks, both in terms of size and 
diversity of ties, to establish connections to actors in the environment and enrich their pool of 
network resources. Hence, an early firm growth is associated with seeking unique resources and 
intentional management of external networks to exploit structural holes (Hite & Hesterly, 2001).  
Our results indicate a pivotal point in which a previously increasing diversity of external 
network ties starts decreasing. Hence, at some point the evolution pattern of diversity shifts from 
a linear growth to an inverted U-shape. The evidences suggest that this shift may be associated 
with firm maturity, as in our cases it covered with entering a later stage of expansion. When 
firms “A” and “B” had entered a later stage of expansion, it was associated with decrease in 
diversity of ties encompassed in their external networks. For firm “A” the Blau’s index dropped 
from 0.8 in 2010 to 0.56 in 2012. Although in case “B” in 2008 we again observed an increase 
of the Blau’s index to 0.73 (from 0.72 in 2007), it was followed by an immediate decrease. 
Since then the values of the index had been successively decreasing to reach the value of 0.58 in 
2012. In both cases the decrease in diversity of ties was caused by dissolution of ties to political, 
non-business actors, or financial institutions. Hence, over time the weak ties, which had been 
established throughout the initial stage of expansion, were subsequently being dissolved in the 
later stage.        
In contrast to the inverted U-shape pattern observed in cases “A” and “B”, case “C” had 
shown a contrasting pattern. From the very beginning of our analysis, the external network of 
this firm consisted of homogenous network ties, namely ties to shareholding firms. For this 
reason, the values of the Blau’s index equaled zero from 2001 to 2004. In fact only since 2005 
the external network started becoming more diverse, what was also reflected in the growing 
values of the index. This case has shown a slow and consistent increase in diversity of ties over 
time. This pattern is well depicted in Figure 6. Although we could conclude that, similarly to 
cases “A” and “B”, firm “C” in its initial stage of expansion also increased diversity of external 
network ties from 0 in 2001 to 0.58 in 2008, it did not follow the inverted U-shape patter as the 
other cases. When firm “C” had entered the later stage of expansion in 2009, diversity of 
external network ties continued increasing and in 2012 the Blau’s index reached the value of 
0.68. We have observed that this case deviated also from the patterns identified for evolution of 
tie strength. Therefore, later in this section we discuss potential reasons for its deviating 
patterns.     
A common view in the literature suggests that firms at different stages of growth require 
different resources (Delmar & Shane, 2004). Hence, some network ties may be more important 
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than other at different stages of expansion, because of their unique resources (Coviello & 
Munro, 1997; Coviello, 2006). While our analyzed firms were moving from an initial to a later 
stage of expansion, the evolution pattern of diversity of ties had shifted from a linear growth to 
an inverted U-shape pattern. This shift may reflect changing demands for resources caused by 
transitioning to the later stage of expansion. Moreover, it may also show redundancy of some 
network ties, which have been useful only during the course of the initial stage. As pointed by 
Adler and Kwon (2002, p.22) “(…) social capital needs maintenance. Social bonds have to be 
periodically renewed and reconfirmed or else they lose efficacy”. In addition, maintenance costs 
of being part of a particular network might make it difficult for directors to extend their 
individual networks outside the firm (McFadyen & Cannella, 2004). Hence, maintenance cost of 
redundant network ties may be too high and lead to dissolution of social relationships. 
Nonetheless, the decrease in diversity of ties, thus a decrease in amount of potentially novel 
information or resources provided through the network, could also be explained by a “network 
memory”, namely the accumulated social capital resulting from past network relationships 
(Soda, Usai, Zaheer, 2004). Hence, based on our findings we propose:     
 
Proposition 1: An increase in diversity of ties in firm’s external network will be followed by a 
decrease, as the firm moves from an initial to a later stage of expansion. 
 
Diversity of network ties is closely linked to the concept of tie strength. These two 
concepts combined present a variety of actors embedded in a network and intensity of network 
relationships. Establishment, maintenance, and dissolution of network ties are contingent upon 
firm’s current needs for resources (Delmar & Shane, 2004; Hite & Hesterly, 2001). The 
established network ties may be either weak or strong, as the social relationships between firms 
and external actors vary in terms of intensity and reciprocity (Granovetter, 1973). The evidences 
from our cases have shown that firms modify the strength of network ties to external actors 
depending on their stage of expansion. In general our case firms kept relatively strong ties to 
business actors and their shareholding companies over the entire analyzed period. However, we 
observed strengthening and weakening of particular types of network ties, while the firms were 
going through an initial and a later stage of expansion. In the beginning of the initial stage, 
external network of firms “A” and “B” were consisting of strong business ties and ties to 
shareholding companies. Typically for both cases, the strength of these ties was slightly 
weakening, as the firm was progressing with its expansion. Simultaneously to the weakening of 
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strong ties, firm “A” was strengthening, and firm “B” actually established, weak ties to other 
actors in their environment, such as non-business and political actors, firms located outside 
China, and financial institutions. Based on this observation we could conclude that the initial 
stage of expansion was characterized by weakening of strong ties to business actors and 
shareholding companies, and simultaneous strengthening of weak ties to other actors. This 
conclusion is consistent with the prior findings that suggest a continuous accumulation and 
appreciating value of social capital for expanding firms, while their networks are spreading to 
diverse actors (Coviello, 2006; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Moreover, the weak ties to diverse 
actors play a significant role in the expansion process, because they bridging nature enables 
access to novel resources and information (Burt, 1992; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). Strong 
ties reflect closeness between actors and often imply reciprocal services (Coleman, 1988). 
Strong ties to business group may lower transaction costs for the affiliated firms and facilitate 
capability development within the group (Caves & Uekusa, 1976; Guillen, 2000). Therefore, 
although in the initial stage of expansion the strong ties to shareholding companies were 
weakening, still firms “A” and “B” could have capitalized on the relationships to their business 
groups, in order to get access to resources and develop capabilities to expand.           
While firms “A” and “B” were transitioning to the later stage of expansion, the strengths 
of network ties started adjusting as well. As we observed in cases “A” and “B”, transition to the 
next stage was associated with strengthening of the initially strong business ties and ties to 
shareholding companies. Our data has shown that many of the weak ties occurred to be 
temporary, as they had been weakened or completely dissolved in the later stage of expansion. 
For firm “A” further expansion was associated with gradual weakening of its international ties 
and ties to financial institutions. Moreover, the weak ties to political and non-business actors 
that had existed in firm’s network even at the time of its IPO, in the later stage of expansion 
were completely dissolved. Yet, the firm kept strengthening ties to shareholding companies and 
other firms in the environment. Firm “B” followed a similar pattern of strengthening these two 
types of ties, yet in this case the ties to shareholding companies were becoming stronger over 
time, while the strength of the business ties in the last two years of the analyzed period (2011 
and2012) had shown a slight weakening. The weak ties to political actors and to financial 
institutions that had been present during the initial stage of expansion were dissolved shortly 
after entering the later stage. The firm, however, sustained weak ties to non-business actors, but 
these ties were decaying over time. Nevertheless, our evidences have demonstrated that weak 
ties may decay and be dissolved over time, when firms are transitioning between stages of 
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expansion. This phenomenon of weak tie decay could be explained by the previous research 
arguing that social capital deriving from bridging ties may quickly depreciate and the ties may 
disappear (Burt, 2002). Although the literature has paid less attention to dissolution of network 
ties and social capital depreciation (Adler and Kwon, 2002); it is acknowledged that tie strength 
and its importance may depreciate over time (Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2010; Soda, Usai, 
Zaheer, 2004). The obtained results are in line with the literature, yet to advance the existing 
studies we propose the following, based on our evidences:    
 
Proposition 2: An initial strengthening of weak ties and weakening of strong ties in firm’s 
external network will be followed by a subsequent strengthening of strong ties 
and weak tie decay, as the firm moves from an initial to a later stage of 
expansion. 
  
The case “C” deviates from the logics replicated across the other cases. In contrast to other 
firms, from the very beginning of the initial stage of expansion firm “C” had been keeping very 
strong ties only to shareholding companies, until 2005 when other actors appeared in the 
network. Since then the established weak international ties started strengthening and remained 
relatively strong also in the later stage of expansion. Since 2005 the firm also had been keeping 
weak ties to non-business actors and financial institutions throughout both expansion stages. 
Also, weak political ties temporarily appeared in the network. Hence, throughout the initial and 
the later stage of expansion firm “C” was keeping strong ties to shareholding companies, 
intensively networking with other firms in the environment, strengthening international ties over 
ties, and maintaining weak ties to non-business actors and financial institutions. The deviation of 
this case from the pattern identified for cases “A” and “B” could have been caused by the 
following factors. First, in comparison to the other cases, firm “C” had experienced relatively 
more frequent changes in board composition, including replacements of CEO, board chair, and 
assistant general manager. These replacements inevitably disrupted evolution paths of networks 
formed by board members, and presumably also affected consistency of firm’s expansion 
strategy. Second, a relatively later engagement in expansion of operations could have caused 
divergence from the pattern. In fact until 2009 the firm owned subsidiaries only on the domestic 
market. Since then the firm had been successively establishing foreign subsidiaries and 
expanding further on the domestic market. The international expansion was closely matching 
with strengthening of firm’s international network ties. Still, domestic and international 
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expansion started relatively later, compared to the other firms, thus it might have been another 
reason for divergence of the network evolution pattern.        
The empirical investigation of internal networks formed amongst board members of the 
analyzed firms has revealed replication of logics across cases. The identified pattern has two 
distinctive features: emergence of subgroups (cliques) within boards and increasing network 
cohesion. Along with consistently increasing network cohesion, board members had formed 
densely connected subgroups within boards. The subgroups, however, displayed structural 
differences. For example, in firm “B” the subgroup included only inside board members, none 
of whom held a central position in the network. In contrast to that, in firm “A” CEO was the 
most central actor. The CEO was connected to several board members, but the members were 
not necessarily connected to each other. The internal network of firm “C” followed an evolution 
path, which resulted in emergence of two subgroups within the board. One subgroup had formed 
around CEO and assistant general manager, while the other subgroup around board chairman. 
Despite these structural differences, across the analyzed cases the emergence of subgroups was 
linked to common external affiliations of board members. The already appointed and the new 
board members typically had been already affiliated with shareholding business groups. This 
finding suggest that homophily (Lincoln & McBride, 1985; Wholey & Huonker, 1993) is a 
powerful factor affecting evolution of  internal networks, namely that similar actors are more 
likely to establish social relationships. The emergence of subgroups within boards can be also 
explained by the faultline theory, which proposes that a team is likely to split into subgroups 
when demographic attributes of team members are aligned (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). The 
theory describes faultlines as “hypothetical dividing lines that may split a group into subgroups 
based on one or more attributes” (Lau & Murnighan,1998, p. 328). In the analyzed cases 
affiliation with shareholding business groups was a common attribute amongst inside directors, 
CEOs, board chairmen, and assistant general managers. Hence, the boards split along these 
attribute and formed distinctive subgroups of members with common external affiliations. 
Previous studies on subgroups report that agreement within a subgroup with strong faultlines, 
namely with more aligned characteristics of members, is greater than the overall agreement 
within a group (Lau & Murnighan, 2005; Tuggle, Schnatterly, Johnson, 2010). Therefore, we 
may presume that the presence of subgroups in boards of the analyzed firms had facilitated 
communication and efficient decision making. This argument is also supported by previous 
research on internal social capital that has shown a positive effect of strong network ties 
amongst board members on building trust, knowledge sharing, and teamwork (Forbes and 
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Milliken, 1999; Granovetter, 1985). In addition, strong ties to business group facilitate 
acquisition of organizational capabilities outside the firm boundaries, but within a business 
group (Mahmood, Zhu, Zajac, 2011).       
The analyzed internal relationships within boards had evolved from fragmented networks 
of isolated members to high density networks with an increasing number of ties per each board 
member. Considering the context of firm expansion, such development pattern highlights 
importance of cohesive networks for internal control and decision making process. Following 
Coleman’s (1988) argumentation, actors in densely connected networks develop common 
routines, mutual understanding, and trust. It improves information sharing within the network 
and in turn may positively influence teamwork and group performance (Forbes & Milliken, 
1999). While the benefits of high cohesion may explain motivation for emergence of such 
network structure, our findings show new insights regarding evolution patterns and 
sustainability of the structure. Previous findings suggest that a highly interconnected network 
structure is expected to follow an inverted U-shape evolution pattern, because of diminishing 
bridging ties, homogenization of exchanged information, and potential fragmentation of the 
structure over time (Gulati, Sytch, Tatarynowicz, 2012). This indeed had occurred in the internal 
network of firm “C”. The very densely connected internal network disrupted in 2005, after being 
sustained for three years. While increasing its level of fragmentation in the following years, the 
firm’s internal network still kept a relatively high connectedness, in comparison to the other 
analyzed cases. However, our results have also demonstrated that cohesive internal networks 
may be sustainable over time. Network sustainability in our cases was associated with the 
observed pattern of board appointments and board interlocks. Most of the new members had 
been affiliated with the same business groups as the already appointed board members. The 
literature highlights that social capital influences director selection in a way that results in 
appointments of candidates, who have prior relationships with other members (Kim & Cannella, 
2008). Nonetheless, research also reports that well-connected board members who have 
extensive internal and external ties may influence board decisions (Stevenson & Radin, 2009; 
Westphal, 1999). The literature suggests that in conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity boards 
face challenging decisions and consensus is more likely to be achieved in a group characterized 
by stronger ties among members (Kim & Cannella, 2008; Rice & Aydin, 1991, Stevenson & 
Radin, 2009). We argue that design and implementation of expansion strategy requires new 
expertise and, at the same time, effective decision making. Empirical findings from the cases 
have shown that in response to this challenge the external networks of the previously appointed 
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board members were extending to access unique resources. The internal networks, however, 
were becoming more cohesive and strongly bonding, since board members had been forming 
board interlocks with the firms. Moreover, the cohesive network structure was further 
strengthened by the patter of appointing new board members, who had been already affiliated 
with the same business groups as the analyzed firms. Therefore, considering our empirical 
evidences, we propose:        
 
Proposition 3: Firm’s internal network will be consistently increasing its cohesion, as the firm 
moves from an initial to a later stage of expansion. 
 
Though the previous studies rightly acknowledge that social capital ought to be perceived 
as dynamic (Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2010), its evolution still remains underexplored, 
particularly in the context of boards of directors. This study contributes in several ways to 
understanding how board social capital can evolve over time. First, we disentangle dynamics of 
board social capital by investigating evolution patterns of networks it derives from. Following 
the literature, we assert that board social capital is an asset that derives from network ties of 
board members (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998), however, in order to 
thoroughly depict its dynamics, a distinction between its internal and external dimension has to 
be made. As networks of board members can evolve and be adjustable over time, then evolution 
patterns of internal and external networks ought to be investigated. Our findings demonstrate 
that internal and external networks follow different patterns, as they approximate different 
instrumental functions of board social capital. While external social capital, investigated through 
the changes in diversity and strength of external network ties, follows an inverted U-shape 
pattern, evolution of internal social capital is associated with consistent increase in cohesion of 
internal network. Therefore, we highlight that board social capital is a complex construct and 
better understanding of its development patterns requires a careful consideration of 
multidimensional changes at the network level. Second, a separate analysis of internal and 
external networks gives insights into different motivation for network development in the 
context of firm expansion. While the literature acknowledges the facilitating role of external 
social capital in firm expansion (Coviello & Munro, 1997; Coviello, 2006), our results 
demonstrate a pivotal point in social capital accumulation, which possibly results from “network 
memory” (Soda, Usai, Zaheer, 2004) and high maintenance costs of redundant network ties. 
Moreover, we stress depreciating value of social capital, which has been underestimated in 
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previous studies (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Nonetheless, we touch upon evolution of internal social 
capital, which so far has been overlooked in the context of firm expansion and not exhaustively 
discussed in the literature (Harris & Helfat, 2007). We specifically show that homophily 
(Lincoln & McBride, 1985; Wholey & Huonker, 1993) has a strong influence on the evolution 
pattern of internal network. Moreover, the observed pattern suggest emergence of subgroups 
with strong faultlines that consist of board members with similar attributes, such as affiliations 
with the same business groups (Lau & Murnighan, 2005; Tuggle, Schnatterly, Johnson, 2010). 
Moreover, internal network develops a more cohesive structure along with firm’s transition from 
an initial to a later stage of expansion, which could be explained by motivation to keep control 
and effective decision making (Coleman, 1988; Stevenson & Radin, 2009). Third, we 
demonstrate how combination of different methods, namely multiple case study analysis and 
social network analysis, may help to disentangle complexities of unexplored theoretical 
concepts. Owing to such approach we were able to carefully observe mechanisms and develop 
theoretical propositions suitable for empirical testing.   
Although this study provides new insights into how board social capital may evolve, 
inevitably it has some limitations. First, this study relied on accuracy of the reported data in 
annual reports of the selected firms. This secondary data were obtained from CSMAR database. 
Although we are aware that some network ties might have been underreported in our data, still 
we are convinced that this data provide the best longitudinal approximation of firms’ networks. 
Primary data collection for network research poses certain constrains and risk of biases, as the 
information regarding professional connections often seems confidential. Moreover, potential 
respondents may not be able to accurately describe their present and past networks. Therefore, 
we have decided that using secondary data from annual reports is the most suitable for our 
longitudinal study. Future research could complement our findings by analyzing primary data 
from expanding companies. Advancement for this and other network studies could be provided 
by discussing the relationship between networks and expansion during interviews with senior 
executives and board members. It would confirm our assumptions regarding the way networks 
may be changing over time because and along with expansion process.               
Second, reliance on secondary data had limited our conclusions to assumptions based on 
the matched patterns in the data. We acknowledge that inability to strongly indicate the causal 
relationship is a major limitation of this study. However, this is also a broader problem in social 
network research. As the analyzed firm-level outcome, such as firm expansion in our study, may 
be a predictor as well as a consequence of the network, studies investigating causal relationships 
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between networks and firm’s outcomes struggle with endogeneity problem and recognize it as a 
main challenge (Burt, 1992; Carpenter, Li, Jiang, 2012). In our study we assume that changes in 
external and internal network are antecedents of firm expansion, based on the presented 
theoretical premises. However, we are aware that our data do not sufficiently support this 
claims. Also for this reason, we were unable to develop strong causal claims about the 
relationship between changes of networks over time and firm expansion, like also to control for 
other alternative explanations. However, we were able to show network changes with 
exceptional detail and capture the possible associations with patterns of firm expansion. 
Therefore, we argue for the link between sociological network effects and economic outcomes. 
While this study captures multiple snapshots of network development, we do not claim that the 
results are exhaustive. Perhaps observation of networks over a longer period of time, although 
knowing difficulties in data collection, would reveal subsequent cycles in network development 
and accumulation of board social capital. We do not claim that our findings demonstrate 
complete process of network development. Depending on expansion plans and external 
environment, internal and external networks may develop in another direction, as current stock 
of social capital has a temporal value and may be adjusted accordingly.  
Third, given that the study focuses on a specific empirical context, external validity of this 
study is limited. The insights from the selected Chinese firms show evolution patterns typical for 
business environment in emerging economies. Therefore, our findings may be generalizable also 
to other countries going through institutional transition, where reliance on network relationships 
is a common practice in business. Our findings, however, have a limited generalizability to 
developed economies. In these economies business activity is regulated by laws and contracts, 
which are effectively executed. Therefore, organizations in developed economies relay on the 
rule of law, while reliance on social relationships is typical for emerging economies (Akamatsu, 
1962; Redding, 1990). Future research could complement our findings with evidences from 
developed economies, to juxtapose the patterns and enhance understanding of board social 
capital dynamics in different empirical contexts. Although organizations in developed 
economies do not rely on social relationships to the same extent as organizations in emerging 
economies, still social capital is important when it comes to industry knowledge sharing 
(Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997), advice seeking by executives (McDonald, Khanna, Westphal, 
2008), or dissemination of practices between organizations (Shipilov, Greve, Rowley, 2010). 
Therefore, social capital also in this empirical context should not be ignored, especially when 
research on dynamics of board social capital is still scarce. Therefore, regardless of the 
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aforementioned limitations, we hope that our study brings attention to the shortcomings of the 
literature, particularly in the area of board social capital dynamics, and will motivate further 
research in this area.   
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
The dissertation explores social capital in boards of directors from the perspective of its 
complexities. It puts emphasis on the often overlooked fact that social capital is a more complex 
construct than has been assumed in previous studies. A common oversimplification of social 
capital in empirical research diminishes its value and leads to misleading conclusions. In the 
dissertation it is consequently asserted that refocusing on perhaps difficult and inconvenient 
features of social capital is a way forward for advancing the knowledge on the construct. 
Therefore, the dissertation aims to address the overarching research question: in the context of 
boards of directors, how can social capital be better understood through exploration of its 
complexities? Owing to careful consideration of numerous complexities that are inherent to 
social capital, the dissertation provides detailed insights on the construct, proposes how to 
integrate the complexities into empirical research, and executes these insights in three empirical 
studies presented in the respective chapters. The studies with their distinct findings contribute to 
answering the overarching research question and construct a comprehensive perspective on 
social capital.  
The study presented in Chapter 2 (“Board social capital and firm performance: nuances 
of the relationship”) shows that board social capital derives from an integrated system of social 
ties created by board members in which there is a possible interplay between the resources 
transmitted through the ties to actors both inside and outside the organization. This perspective 
helps to understand that the impact on firm performance actually stems from complementarity 
and substitution between the resources available through internal and external ties of board 
members. Unlike Chapter 2, which looks at social capital in a group context, the next empirical 
study in Chapter 3 (“Social capital of board chair and its performance implications”) migrates 
to a different level of analysis: assessment of social capital at the individual level. The study 
challenges the traditional perspective on board chair and asserts that in the relationship with firm 
performance social capitals of board chair, CEO and the board play equal roles and, most 
importantly, may act as complements and substitutes. Therefore, the resources available through 
external and internal social ties of these actors may complement each other or compensate for 
the lack of resources in the boardroom. The previous two studies offer a static perspective on 
social capital: first at the group level and then at the individual level. The following study 
presented in Chapter 4 (“Dynamics of board social capital – multiple case studies from China”) 
progresses into a dynamic angle. The study explores how board social capital may evolve when 
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firms are transitioning from an initial to a later stage of expansion. Based on empirical 
evidences, it proposes a multidimensional evolution process, which unfolds within external and 
internal social networks of board members.    
Altogether, the studies included in this dissertation argue that in academic research social 
capital in boards of directors ought to be studied with reflection on its complex nature. The 
construct should not be narrowed down to a single type of social tie or an individual social 
network, but rather should be seen as a constellation of social relationships formed by board 
members, who also may establish new ties or dissolve the existing ones over time. Boards of 
directors are decision-making groups to which all members contribute with their diverse 
background, expertise, and social networks (Hillman, Cannella, Paetzold, 2000; Kor & 
Misangyi, 2008; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009). Therefore, board social capital derives from a 
system of social ties formed by all members in which the available resources may complement 
each other or compensate for the absence of other resources (Chapter 2). Social ties of any board 
member may be of great importance for organizational outcomes, as evidenced in Chapter 3. 
Therefore, when studying individual social capital of CEOs and directors, scholars ought to take 
into account also social capital of board chair and the potential interplay between the resources 
available through social ties of these individuals (Chapter 3). Research on social capital in 
boards may focus on snapshots of social networks from a given point in time, but also may try to 
investigate dynamic nature of the construct and the link to organizational changes, such as firm 
expansion analyzed in Chapter 4. While diving into dynamics of social capital, it is essential to 
have in mind that changes in social networks of board members may occur in several 
dimensions, such as strength and diversity of external ties, and cohesion of internal network 
within the board. The outlined findings from the empirical studies hold implications for theory 
development and open possibilities for future research, which will be elaborated in the next 
section.           
 
General findings, limitations, and implications for future research 
 
General findings 
The dissertation provides a number of general findings that have theoretical implications 
and motivate future research on social capital in boards of directors. First, it demonstrates that 
studying social ties of board members regardless whether at a group or individual level requires 
a comprehensive perspective that includes diversity of ties and their interplay that contributes to 
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organizational outcomes (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). Although research on social capital is 
flourishing (Drees & Heugens, 2013; Sauerwald, Lin, Peng, 2016; Zona, Gomez-Mejia, 
Withers, 2015), it rarely pays attention to the complex nature of the construct itself. This implies 
that social capital research may be still in its infancy, because of recurring oversimplification of 
the construct. This dissertation encourages scholars to be mindful of the comprehensive and 
complex nature of social capital, regardless the level of analysis. The evidences from the study 
presented in Chapter 2 motivate future research to reconsider social networking of board 
members with attention to diversity of their social ties. The study extends the existing research 
on board social capital (Haynes & Hillman, 2010; Hillman, Cannella, Paetzold, 2000; Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003; Johnson, Schnatterly, Hill, 2013) by demonstrating how the resources deriving 
from both external and internal social ties of board members work together to contribute to firm 
performance. This is a significant change in approach to social capital in boards, since previous 
studies have been mostly focusing on either board interlocks, thus external social ties (Martin, 
Gözübüyük, Becerra, 2015; Mizruchi, 1996; Shipilov, Greve, Rowley, 2010) or on internal 
social ties, though to a lesser extent (Harris & Helfat, 2007; Kim & Cannella, 2008). In contrast 
to previous research, this study brings together external and internal dimensions of social capital 
in an inclusive perspective and demonstrates the richness of social capital in boards. Moreover, 
the empirical evidences demonstrate that in studying the relationships between board social 
capital and organizational outcomes it is reasonable to consider the whole system of social 
relationships created by board members. This is highly relevant for development of social 
capital research, since the filed suffers from lack of nuanced studies challenging the existing 
perspectives on social capital. Future research may fill this gap by exploring further how the 
resources transmitted through external and internal social ties may be associated with other 
organizational outcomes, such as firm competitiveness and product diversification. Moreover, 
industry expertise combined with trust and shared values amongst board members may also 
have an impact on firm innovativeness. Furthermore, future research by looking at the 
accumulated external knowledge and internal dynamics within the board may assess their 
impact on the adopted corporate governance practices and firm’s commitment to corporate 
social responsibility.     
Second, the dissertation challenges the academic community to redefine the role of board 
chair in boards of directors. The empirical study in Chapter 3 emphasizes the importance of both 
internal and external social ties of board chair for firm performance. In this way the study, 
contrary to the existing research, moves the focus from control and liaising functions of board 
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chair to her/his social relationships. Chapter 3, as well as the whole dissertation, is a 
continuation of the scholarly effort to reflect the richness of board composition with regard to 
professional background (Hillman, Cannella, Paetzold, 2000; Kor & Misangyi, 2008; Kor & 
Sundaramurthy, 2009) and the consequent social networks. Particularly the evidences from 
Chapter 3 build ground for redefinition of the role of board chair and advancements of research 
on individual social capital in boards of directors. While the field has been focusing on 
individual social capital of CEOs and directors (Geletkanycz & Boyd, 2011; McDonald, 
Khanna, Westphal, 2008; Tian, Haleblian, Rajagopalan, 2011), it marginalized social capital of 
board chair. The outcomes of Chapter 3 contribute to the field by bringing the scholarly 
attention back to the board chair and opening a discussion on how board chair may contribute to 
the board and firm performance through capitalizing on her/his social relationships inside and 
outside the organization. It is a very relevant extension of the existing way of thinking about 
board chair, since, as evidenced in Chapter 3, board chair together with CEO and directors join 
effort to contribute to firm performance. Although board chair, CEO, and directors are distinct 
individual with particular roles assigned within the board, still they build a decision making 
group in which their knowledge, expertise, and other resources are accumulated to set the 
strategic direction of the firm and monitor its execution. However, because of fragmentation of 
the literature, research has overlooked this natural interplay between the key figures in the 
board. On top of this, only recently scholars have launched a discussion on board chair beyond 
the context of CEO duality (Krause, Semadeni, Withers, 2016; Krause, 2017). Future research 
may use the presented findings to further explore how social capital of board chair, CEO, and 
directors is linked to board effectiveness, how it affects collaboration amongst board members 
and the overall board orientation. Moreover, as it has been shown in previous studies, individual 
social capital may be a source of power in a group (Oh, Chung, Labianca, 2004; Westphal, 
1999). Hence, investigation of power balance with consideration of the power deriving from 
social capital of board chair would provide new insights into this phenomenon and move the 
research on individual social capital in boards beyond its present boundaries.  
Third, this dissertation acknowledges the complexity of board social capital to a new level 
by offering insights also into its dynamics. As evidenced in Chapter 4, evolution of board social 
capital is a multidimensional process, which unfolds within external and internal social networks 
of board members. Triggered by organizational changes, such as firm expansion, social ties are 
reconfiguring to adapt to the new circumstances and, depending on the type of ties, may follow 
divergent evolution patterns. The empirical evidences from this chapter suggest that when firms 
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are transitioning from an initial to a later stage of expansion diversity of external network ties 
follows an inverted U-shape pattern. Likewise, the pattern typical for strength of external 
network ties demonstrates initial strengthening of weak ties and weakening of strong ties, and 
subsequent strengthening of strong ties and dissolution of weak ties. In addition, in the transition 
between stages of expansion cohesion of internal network amongst board members increases 
consistently. This implies that whenever social capital dynamics are studied, it is reasonable to 
dive into evolution processes of external and internal networks, in order to get a full picture of 
how social capital is evolving. This chapter with its distinct insights addresses the recognized 
problem in the literature, namely the lack of evidences regarding dynamics of social networks 
and social capital (Ahuja, Soda, Zaheer, 2012; Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2010). While scarce 
previous research has studied evolution of entrepreneurial social networks (Coviello & Munro, 
1997; Coviello, 2006; Maurer & Ebers, 2006), this is a first study of its kind investigating board 
social capital dynamics. The study raises awareness of the possible reconfiguration of social ties 
to actors inside and outside the firm in response to firm expansion. Social ties of board members 
serve as conduits for resource flow (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), transmit knowledge and 
information from external actors and facilitate cooperation within the board (Kim & Cannella, 
2008). Therefore, it is natural to presume that, in order to respond to organizational challenges, 
social ties of board members may reconfigure. However, the existing research has not explored 
this angle hitherto. The findings from Chapter 4 reveal evolution patterns of externa and internal 
social ties when firms are moving from an initial to a later stage of expansion, and thereby offer 
unique insights into the dynamics of social capital in the context of firm expansion. 
Nevertheless, reconfiguration of social ties of board members, and thus evolution of board social 
capital, may be motivated by numerous factors. For instance, previous research has shown that 
changes to business environment in which the firm is operating have an impact on its board 
composition (Hillman, Cannella, Paetzold, 2000; Mizruchi, 1996). By altering board 
composition firms may secure their positions in the new circumstances by establishing social 
connections to powerful actors in the business environment, and in this way enrich board social 
capital. Therefore, future research may build on the findings of this chapter and utilize insights 
from previous research to investigate how board social capital is evolving in response to 
environmental changes, such as introduction of new regulations or industry deregulation, 
industry consolidation, or when a new competitor enters the market. Scholars may also take a 
more firm-centric approach and provide insights on how board social capital evolves in the 
context of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The integration process proceeding M&As 
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requires coordination and extraction of synergy between the entities (Datta, 1991; Shrivastava, 
1986; Vaara, 2002). This process may also trigger changes at the board level and affect board 
composition of the acquired firm and the acquirer or of the new firm composed of the merged 
entities. Therefore, scholars in future research may investigate if effectively adapted board 
social capital may be the key to successful post M&A integration.       
Fourth, the evidences in Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4 highlight the social 
dimension of boards of directors. Boards are groups of individuals, who build social 
relationships with colleagues, industry professional, politicians, alumni groups, etc. These 
relationships are not without organizational implications, as evidenced in the dissertation. These 
individuals are responsible for decision making, firm strategy, and consequently firm 
performance. Therefore, it is highly important for the field of corporate governance and strategic 
management to unpack the black box of boards of directors and reveal their human side. The 
dissertation provides guidelines how to investigate social capital in boards in the context of 
groups and individuals, and how to approach its dynamic facet. In a broad perspective, it is an 
extension of the existing research on the behavioral aspects of boards of directors (Huse, 2007; 
Osterloh, Frey, Frost, 2001). The outcomes of the dissertation and previous evidences draw a 
roadmap to guide future research amongst sociological features of boards. Building on the 
presented empirical findings, the dissertation argues for recognition of social relationships, both 
internal and external, as an inherent feature of boards. This perspective may be relevant for 
uncovering nuances of the phenomena underpinned by interactions of individuals, such as 
conflict resolution in boards, leadership style, board teamwork, and cooperation amongst CEO, 
board chair and other board members.   
 
General limitations 
Although the discussed studies contribute to unraveling the complexities of social capital 
in boards of directors, the dissertation ought to be viewed in light of its limitations. First, all of 
the empirical studies included in the respective chapters utilize secondary data. Obtaining 
reliable and unbiased primary data on social ties of board members, and in the context of China 
in particular, constitutes a challenge for researchers studying social capital and social networks 
(Borgatti, Everett, Johnson, 2013). Therefore, for conducting the presented empirical studies an 
optimal solution has been found in reliance on an acknowledged secondary data source, such as 
CSMAR database utilized by, for example, Markóczy and colleagues (2013) and supplementing 
this data with information obtained from other external sources. However, the studies would 
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undoubtedly benefit from additional primary information collected through surveys or 
interviews. Future research therefore may enrich in this way the presented findings, to enhance 
the knowledge on social capital and its organizational implications.      
The studies presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 have adopted a novel methodology, 
namely fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin, 2006; 2008), which 
generated nuanced insights into the relationship between social capital and firm performance. 
However, as any other method, it has some limitations. Modeling a causal relationship using 
fsQCA has to deal with a limited number of causal conditions, which can be included in the 
model. Therefore, the causal conditions included in the studies were mainly representing social 
ties or social capital, while other sources of variance in firm performance were controlled for in 
the sampling process to ensure comparability of the analyzed cases. Moreover, as recommended 
in the literature (Ragin, 2008; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012), post QCA analyses of the results 
provided complementary insights and added more details about the investigated relationships. 
Although fsQCA has the analytical power to explore complex causal relationships, it has a static 
nature and is mostly applied to cross-sectional data. This is a recognized problem in the QCA 
literature that makes investigation of time effects problematic. To overcome this problem, in the 
empirical studies presented in this dissertation separate fsQCA analyses were performed with 
two different outcomes sets, namely short-term and long-term firm performance. The QCA 
literature accepts this partial solution to the problem (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012), however, 
the method is being constantly developed and new advancements hopefully will make 
longitudinal fsQCA applicable in empirical research. For example, Garcia-Castro and Ariño 
(2016) presented a promising development of the method by combining QCA with panel data 
econometrics. Moreover, Misangyi and colleagues (2017) has recently outlined several 
interesting trends in the development of QCA methodology. The high level of academic interest 
in the method encourages scholars to adopt it to investigation of complex causal relationships 
underlying various organizational phenomena.     
The last general limitation stems from the choice of empirical context. Conducting a study 
in the context of China is definitely an opportunity for delivering unique insight from a non-
Western context, yet it limits generalizability of results. Therefore, the findings presented in this 
dissertation cannot be generalized to a larger population of countries. The particular institutional 
setting of China makes the results relevant for other countries going through institutional 
transition. Typically for these countries, social relationships serve as substitutes for market 
institutions and become an important element of economic activities. This is in stark contrast to 
217 
 
the institutional setting typical for developed countries, which rely on the rule of law and 
regulations. For this reason the results cannot be generalized to the context of developed 
countries, yet may serve as an inspiration for future research juxtaposing the role of social 
capital in boards of directors in different countries. Moreover, generalizability of the findings is 
also limited by the choice of industries analyzed in the respective studies. Therefore, one should 
have in mind that the findings are applicable only to industries with similar characteristics to 
those analyzed in the dissertation. Future research may, however, extend applicability of the 
results to other industries.     
      
Concluding remarks 
The dissertation presents a novel approach to studying social capital in boards of directors 
with particular attention given to complexities of the construct and elaboration on their impact 
on organizational outcomes, such as the investigated firm performance and firm expansion. The 
chosen perspective responds to the prevalent oversimplification of social capital in academic 
research that hitherto has been focusing on particular types of social ties formed by board 
members or individual social networks of CEOs and directors. Contrary to the common 
assumptions, social capital is a rich, multidimensional construct, which requires scholarly effort 
to be explored and applied in empirical research. In the context of boards of directors social 
capital derives from an entire system of social relationships in which the available resources 
may be complements or substitutes, and thereby contribute to organizational outcomes. 
Likewise, individual-level social capital of CEOs, board chair, or directors ought to be discussed 
with consideration of social capital of the other actors in the board, since all of them participate 
in oversight and may have an impact on strategic decisions. Furthermore, social capital has also 
a dynamic nature, since board members may establish and dissolve their social relationships. In 
studying social capital dynamics it is important to recognize simultaneous changes occurring in 
multiple dimensions of social networks. The findings of this dissertation are by no means 
exhaustive, but indicate important features of social capital that have been overlooked and leave 
room for academic debate.  
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